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Most existing interpretations of the thought of Antonio Gramsci in International Relations 
and International Political Economy are strongly influenced by the seminal account provided 
by Cox in the early 1980s. Recovering the hitherto neglected concept of philosophy of praxis, 
this thesis departs from the ‘Coxian orthodoxy’ and develops an alternative understanding 
of Gramsci that sees hegemony as a combination of coercion and consent emerging from the 
articulation on three overlapping dimensions, respectively involving the interaction of the 
economic and the political, the international and the national, the material and the ideational. 
 
The potential of this approach is illustrated by examining the unfolding of neoliberal 
economic reforms in Egypt in the past two decades. It is argued that, firstly, the interaction of 
economic and political factors produced the emergence of a neoliberal authoritarian regime 
with a predatory capitalist oligarchy playing an ever greater role. Secondly, articulation 
across different spatial scales brought about a passive revolution managed by the state with 
the aim of adapting to the globalising imperatives of capital accumulation without 
broadening political participation. Lastly, the performative power of neoliberalism as an 
ideology fundamentally reshaped economic policymaking in favour of the rising capitalist 
elite. 
 
This focus on the shift in class relations produced by – and itself reinforcing – neoliberal 
reforms allows us to understand how the already waning hegemony of the Egyptian regime 
under Mubarak gradually unravelled. The rise of the capitalist oligarchy upset relations of 
force both within the ruling bloc and in society at large, effectively breaking the post-
Nasserite social pact. Passive revolution witnessed the abdication to the pursuit of hegemony 
on the national scale, with the attempt of replacing it with reliance on the neoliberal 
hegemony prevalent on the international scale. The success of neoliberalism as an ideology 
did not obscure the increasingly inability of the regime to provide material benefits, however 
marginal, to subaltern classes. Thus, the affirmation of neoliberalism in Egypt corresponded 
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RATIONALE FOR A GRAMSCIAN APPROACH  
TO THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EGYPT 
 
 
‘This time is different’. On a torrid Sunday in early July 2010, sitting on a large 
armchair in his opulent and indulgently air-conditioned office in Heliopolis, then 
minister of investment Mahmoud Mohieldin gave what felt like a routine answer to 
what probably was a routine question. Echoing the concerns of the respected 
economist Hanaa Kheir-el-Din, I asked the minister whether also on this occasion 
the push for reform was receding with the waning of external pressures, as some 
measures taken in 2009 and 2010 already seemed to suggest. ‘This time is different’ 
was his answer, before he eloquently went on to claim that the halt to reforms was 
due to adverse global economic conditions, and that the impetus for reforms would 
have gathered new momentum as soon as the global economy would allow for it. 
After all, he suggested while holding a cigar in his right hand, the cabinet was still 
the same, and so were the beliefs of its most prominent members. 
A couple of months after our interview, the president of the World Bank 
Robert Zoellick appointed Mohieldin as managing director of the World Bank 
group, praising him as ‘a tireless reformer’ and ‘[a]n outstanding young leader’ 
(World Bank 2010). Mohieldin took his post in early October, thus resigning from 
the Ministry of Investment whose policy remit had been tailored around his 
competences and projects. About six months and a half later, while Mohieldin was 
in his new office in Washington, DC, hundreds of thousands of people 
demonstrated around the streets of Cairo, Alexandria and the other major cities in 
Egypt asking for an end to thirty years of emergency law. As days went on, the 
protests increased both in size and demands, leading on the 11th February 2011 to 
the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, after almost three decades of rule. 
Mohieldin had been proven right in two ways. The obvious meaning of his 
statement, as witnessed by his following remarks, was that a ‘reformist’1 cabinet had 
finally emerged in Egypt and proved able to discard a state-dominated economy. 
                                                 
1 Following the success of this self-definition, the term ‘reformist’ is used in this work to 
identify the faction of the Egyptian ruling bloc in favour of free market reforms. 
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The support given by the army to demonstrators in the first phase of the revolution 
could then be seen as the reaction on the part of the ancien régime against the 
‘winner-take-all’ tendencies of the new bourgeoisie empowered by reforms. 
Mohieldin was also right in a way he had not intended. This time was different 
because the impact of both the wide-ranging reforms implemented over the past 
two decades and the global economic crisis, though not captured adequately by the 
aggregate indicators provided in official reports, had led a substantial portion of the 
Egyptian middle and lower classes to desperation and eventually to take it to the 
streets. Reforms driven by neoliberal ideas, and the effects of the crisis of the 
neoliberal economic model worldwide, had succeeded in mobilising Egyptian 
masses against their rulers. 
Following Mohieldin’s suggestion, this thesis looks at the economic reforms 
carried out in Egypt between 1991 and 2010 in order to understand what was 
different this time, and why. 
 
Why Gramsci? Which Gramsci? Rationale and theoretical contributions 
Whereas there is on the one hand a sizeable literature on the rise of neoliberalism 
both in the developed and developing world,2 and on the other hand considerable 
efforts have been devoted to studying the politics of economic reforms in the 
Middle East,3 the main issue arising from the overlap of these two literatures –
neoliberalisation in the Middle East – has been somewhat neglected to date.4 By 
focusing on the case of Egypt, this work aims to contribute towards filling this gap.  
In order to do so, it develops a perspective rooted in critical International 
Political Economy (IPE), and more specifically one inspired by the thought of 
Antonio Gramsci. This choice is dictated by two considerations. Firstly, relying on 
Gramsci’s unorthodox Marxist stance allows us to study the consequences of 
neoliberal economic reforms by still focusing on the conditioning power held by the 
structure and by the relations of class forces underlying it, while at the same time 
avoiding the shallows of deterministic Marxist approaches (Germain and Kenny 
1998: 5). Secondly, the suitability of Gramsci to the study of the Middle East, and 
                                                 
2 On the emergence and diffusion of neoliberalism in the US, see Duménil and Lévy (2004); 
in the EU, see Bieler and Morton (2001); in Eastern Europe, see Worth (2005) and Shields 
(forthcoming); in Latin America, see Otero (1996) and Chase (2002). 
3 See for example, Barkey (1992), Harik (1997), Hakimian and Moshaver (2001). 
4 The volume edited by Guazzone and Pioppi (2009) is a valuable attempt towards bridging 
this gap. 
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especially of its political economy, has been seriously underexploited. In the last 
decade, Gramsci has increasingly been used, either alone or combined with insights 
from other thinkers, to discuss specific elements of the international relations of the 
Middle East, ranging from the US foreign policy in Iraq and its relation to state 
autonomy (Dodge 2006), to the reproduction of culture and identities in Egypt as an 
obstacle to meaningful democratisation (Pratt 2005). Despite these valuable 
contributions, to my knowledge the only systematic attempt to develop a Gramscian 
framework for the analysis of the transformation of the political economies in the 
Middle East came from Nazih Ayubi (1995). However, the explicit focus on the 
regional dimension characterising this study means that little attention is paid to the 
international dimension, both with respect to the globalising tendencies of capital 
accumulation and to the specific policies adopted by social groups and institutions 
active on the international scale. Yet, Gramsci’s peculiar biography, with a 
childhood in underdeveloped Sardinia followed by university studies in Turin, one 
of the outposts of European industrial capitalism in the early twentieth century, 
suggests that he might have something to tell us about how developed and 
developing countries interact with each other, and what are the social relations 
involved and mobilised by this interaction. 
Most existing interpretations of the work of Gramsci in IR and IPE rely on the 
seminal account provided in the early 1980s by Robert Cox (1981 and 1983), which 
eventually spurred the emergence of two strands of neo-Gramscian literature. On 
the one hand, the so-called Italian School (Gill 1993), directly inspired by Cox, and 
hence relabelled here Coxian. Within this strand, the explicit focus on social 
relations of production does not prevent a slide into Eurocentric state-centrism 
when the expansion of hegemony in the international is discussed: for Coxian 
analysts, hegemony in the contemporary global political economy is rather 
unambiguously American. On the other hand, the Amsterdam School,5 departing 
from the Coxian analysis and relying more on the work of Kees Van der Pijl (1984 
and 1998), develops a class-centric perspective, focusing on the emergence of a 
transnational capitalist class, which is the main subject elaborating and diffusing an 
hegemony that is largely independent from states. 
Being dissatisfied with the unilateral tendencies of these two strands on this 
issue of the extension of hegemony to the international scale and yet being 
                                                 
5 This approach has been labelled by Overbeek ‘transnational historical materialism’ (2000). 
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convinced of the potential that Gramsci holds for IR and IPE,  I took the route of 
going back to the original source. Hoping to make good use of my familiarity with 
both the cultural context and the nuances of the original version of the Prison 
Notebooks, I hereby attempt to provide a novel interpretation of Gramsci’s thought 
and its potential application to IR and IPE, particularly with reference to the 
developing world. Along this way, I have been preceded by Adam Morton’s 
excellent work on hegemony and passive revolution in Mexico (2007a). 
In particular, I became persuaded that a key to the study of Gramsci could be 
found in the implications of the concept of ‘philosophy of praxis’ often used in the 
notebooks. As discussed extensively in Chapter 1, this compound concept is 
underpinned by an understanding of history as an essentially dialectical process. 
This brings to the fore what is arguably the most distinctive – and most neglected in 
IR and IPE – theoretical and methodological insight inspired by philosophy of 
praxis: the importance of different forms of articulation for the constitution of 
hegemony,6 both on the national and international scale. Articulation makes it 
possible to relate in an interactive form elements that are either analysed separately 
in studies relying on Weberian idealtypes or related only mechanically as in 
deterministic Marxism. In this respect, the attempt to develop a Gramscian 
approach based on articulation serves not the scope of developing an alternative 
Gramscian theory, but rather to suggest how Gramsci can provide the foundations 
for an alternative method for studying continuities and transformations in the global 
political economy. 
The interpretation of Gramsci provided here is firmly grounded within the 
Marxist fold, resisting the risk of ‘pluralist empiricism’ characterising Cox’s account 
(Burnham 1991), while at the same time allowing for greater flexibility than most 
Marxist approaches when relating class relations to political and ideational 
developments. This is done through two interrelated moves. In the first place, 
articulation is conceived as an asymmetrical relation, characterised by 
determination in the first instance and relative autonomy. Determination in the first 
instance refers to the shaping influence enjoyed by the various instances of 
structure, discussed below, over the superstructure. In other words, the structure 
defines the boundaries within which various forms of agency develop and realise 
                                                 
6 In contrast with neo-Gramscians, and much closer to the approach developed here, Ayubi 
had put articulation at the very core of his analytical apparatus (1995: 26-30). 
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their own strategies and projects. Relative autonomy on the other hand is 
understood in two forms: in a weaker sense, as the freedom for agency to take any 
course of action within the boundaries defined by determination in the first 
instance; in a stronger sense, as the ability of these actions to feed back on the 
structure itself and thus to some extent reshape those boundaries which initially 
constrained possibilities for action. Secondly, the extent of the relative autonomy 
enjoyed by agency is still related to transformations in class relations. Every 
determination in the first instance empowers some social groups vis-à-vis others, 
thus creating an uneven playing field where some actors enjoy more room to 
manoeuvre than others. The argument here, following what Morton calls ‘minimal 
foundationalism’ (2007a: 129), is that the groups empowered and disempowered by 
structural changes can be best identified by referring to class relations. 
More specifically, this study focuses on three forms of articulation, which refer 
to three different instances of the relation between structure and superstructure at 
the heart of Gramsci’s thought. Incidentally, these three forms of articulation also 
constitute the means to develop the three theoretical contributions of this work to 
critical IPE. Firstly, the articulation between the economic and the political allows us 
to understand the form of changes generated by neoliberal reforms. In this respect, 
while by no means denying the fundamental role of the economic structure, this 
study suggests that political dynamics and institutions, and particular the type of 
political regime, do matter. This is an aspect largely neglected by neo-Gramscian 
IPE, but one that has crucial relevance for the analysis of neoliberalism, as political 
factors always mediate the shift towards a neoliberal accumulation regime, thus 
producing forms of hybridisation that undermine the neo-Gramscian assumption of 
neoliberalism as a monolith.7 
Secondly, the articulation between international and national scale is helpful to 
grasp the spatial sources of these politico-economic transformations. In this respect, 
both the Coxian and the Amsterdam schools tend to assume the spread of 
hegemony as a form of unilateral Eurocentric diffusion, thus conceiving the national 
scale as a passive recipient of outside-in pressures. The articulation approach brings 
the state back into the picture, providing a more fine-grained characterisation, 
                                                 
7 This assumption is increasingly being contested from a neo-Gramscian perspective with 
respect to the different varieties of neoliberalism that have emerged in Western Europe. See 
for example, Bruff (2009) and Macartney (2010). 
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which sees the national scale as a nodal scale (Jessop 2008: 106), enjoying relative 
autonomy from the international. Within this context, the state articulates the 
pressures deriving from the globalising tendencies of capital with the political 
objectives of the ruling bloc on the national scale. 
Lastly, the articulation between material and ideational factors provides a key 
to understanding the reasons for the changes produced by neoliberalism. In this 
respect, the two neo-Gramscian strands differ starkly. On the one hand, the 
Amsterdam school has an approach that Gramsci would define as ‘vulgar 
materialist’, with hegemony mostly seen in functional terms as the legitimation of 
the rule of a specific class or fraction thereof. On the other hand, the Coxian school 
slides towards an idealist account that puts too heavy an emphasis on the 
consensual dimension of hegemony. On this issue, the contribution of the 
articulation approach lies in acknowledging the performative power of economic 
ideas in defining and framing economics as an academic discipline and ‘the 
economy’ as a social field, while at the same time linking this role both to the 
material conditions from which ideas originated and to the changes, intended and 
unintended, that ideas themselves produce upon such material conditions. 
In providing these contributions, the method of articulation is particularly 
helpful also in that it allows us to enrich the Gramscian approach developed with 
suggestions and insights deriving from other accounts. This articulation is not an 
eclectic one, but rather again an asymmetrical one. In other words, contributions 
from other approaches are ‘brought in’ in the measure in which they are compatible 
with the Gramscian approach developed and can be reworked in its own terms. 
This happens for each of the forms of articulation discussed, with modernisation 
theory and elite-centred approaches being discussed with respect to the economic-
political dimension, area studies with respect to the national-international 
dimension, and social constructivism with respect to the material-ideational 
dimension. In this way, I hope to provide an account that is flexible but at the same 
time theoretically coherent. 
 
Why Egypt? Rationale for case selection 
The theoretical approach developed in this work is illustrated with reference to the 
case of Egypt and the economic reforms it experienced in the past two decades. The 
geographical focus is motivated by three reasons, one for each of the forms of 
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articulation considered, which supposedly made Egypt more resilient to neoliberal 
pressures. Firstly, by the end of the 1980s the regime of capital accumulation in 
Egypt was far away from the neoliberal regime that had become prevalent in several 
developed and developing countries. Indeed, until the early 1960s Egypt was 
arguably the country that got closest to the communist bloc with respect to state 
intervention and direct participation in the economy. In this respect, whereas the 
infitah was meant to reverse this condition, it only marginally succeeded in doing so, 
particularly as the economy became increasingly reliant on rent. Thus, by the 
beginning of the 1990s, the state was still by far the largest actor in the Egyptian 
economy, seemingly discouraging the adoption of an accumulation regime based on 
the considerable downsizing of state presence in the economy. 
Secondly, with respect to interscalar relations, despite showing most of the 
structural characteristics of peripheral economies, ever since Nasser the economy 
had been dominated by Egyptian capital, public more often than private. Whereas 
external financing from other countries, particularly in the form of aid, was always 
relevant and increasingly so in the wake of infitah and the Camp David agreement, 
what is most striking is that the presence of private foreign capital had always been 
marginal at best. Considering that foreign direct investment has historically been 
considered one of the main driving factors of neoliberalisation (Kotz 2002), this 
element also seems to conjure up against the prospects of neoliberalism in Egypt. 
Thirdly, also on the articulation between material conditions and ideas the 
conditions did not seem particularly propitious. On the one hand, the predominant 
role of the state in the economy reverberated on the social structure, with the state 
being effectively able to create its own classes, as it happened with the state 
bourgeoisie in the 1960s, mostly composed of bureaucrats, technocrats and army 
members (Hinnebusch 1985), and with the infitah bourgeoisie in the 1970s, which 
despite being formally private and independent still heavily relied on the state for 
its prosperity. On the other hand, economic nationalism had been the main 
economic ideology among Egyptian elites even before 1952, as witnessed by the 
historical work of Vitalis (1995) and EzzelArab (2002). In this respect, the infitah had 
fallen short of producing a change in the political discourse regarding the Egyptian 
economy. 
Other than providing conditions generally hostile to neoliberalism, the 
Egyptian case also presents a difficult puzzle for mainstream macro-level 
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explanations. Modernisation and democratisation theory, for example, suggest that 
reforms aiming at opening up the economy provide the conditions for the 
development of a strong and autonomous middle class that would in turn push for 
political opening. In Egypt, it appears that exactly this type of reform weakened, if 
anything, the local middle class, and on the other hand allowed for the rise of a 
capitalist oligarchy with little or no interest in moving beyond authoritarian rule. 
Elite-centred approaches also encounter difficulties. Their key prediction is that 
rent-based behaviours typical of elites in authoritarian contexts neutralise any 
substantial restructuring of politico-economic relations, with the political logic of 
power maintenance taking precedence over the logic of economic efficiency.8 Yet, 
the Egyptian case suggests that reforms went beyond this point, in the direction of a 
more thorough restructuring of economic relations. Thus, I believe that the Egyptian 
case forces us to go beyond these mainstream explanations that appear inadequate 
to grasp the magnitude and direction of the changes experienced by the Egyptian 
political economy. 
Existing approaches inspired by Gramsci also seem to struggle with coming to 
terms with the unfolding of reforms in Egypt. In particular, both Coxian and 
transnational historical materialist approaches tend to put too heavy an emphasis on 
the role of transnational factors in the diffusion of neoliberalism. In this respect, 
Chris Brown has a point when arguing that Cox’s work is theoretically more 
indebted towards dependency theory than towards Gramsci himself (1994: 221). 
Contrary to the expectations of most neo-Gramscian approaches, the Egyptian case 
shows that the pressures towards neoliberalisation, while in some cases effectively 
hard to resist, are still articulated on the national scale, leading to processes of 
hybridisation and domestication that prevent considering neoliberalism on the 
global scale as a coherent whole. 
The empirical analysis focuses on three macro-sectors of particular relevance 
for the Egyptian economy both in material and symbolic terms. On the one hand, 
transformation of relations in agriculture and manufacturing are particularly 
important because these were the two sectors constituting the heart of the populist 
social contract, and thus understanding whether this has been dismantled 
                                                 
8 On the conflict between political and economic logic, see Heydemann (1992) and 
Schlumberger (2008). On the issue of the restructuring and repositioning of the state in order 
to partially adapt to economic pressures, see Owen (2001) and Tripp (2001). 
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constitutes an excellent indicator of the success of neoliberalism. On the other hand, 
the focus on finance is motivated by the domination of the sector on the part of 
state-owned banks, and by the relevance of the financial sector itself as one of the 
main channels by which neoliberalism penetrated and was consolidated in several 
developing countries. 
The decision to focus on the last two decades, rather than for example on the 
whole three decades of Mubarak’s rule, is mostly motivated by institutional reasons. 
1991 represents a key year in the unfolding of the reform process because in this 
year the Egyptian government signed the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) with the IMF and the World Bank, which would 
become the first agreement concluded with international financial institutions (IFIs) 
that Egypt would carry out until its completion. As discussed extensively in 
Chapter 3, the implementation of most of the reforms suggested by the Bretton 
Woods twins was a necessary, if not in itself sufficient, condition for a shift in the 
accumulation regime in a neoliberal direction. On the other end of the timeframe, 
the empirical work of this thesis stops at the gates of Mubarak’s overthrow, to avoid 
the thesis being dragged too much into current affairs whose future developments 
appear to be uncertain. 
 
Caveats, or: what you should not expect from this thesis 
Rather than being a conclusive test, the study of neoliberal economic reforms in 
Egypt between 1991 and 2010 serves the purpose of illustrating the empirical value 
of the alternative Gramscian approach developed in this work. Thus, the aim here is 
to provide a plausible and hopefully compelling account of the class basis of the 
neoliberalisation of the Egyptian political economy, while at the same time showing 
the importance of political and ideational superstructures in determining the final 
outcome. Coming to a conclusive test of the articulation approach in the cradle of 
Pan-Arabism, whereas certainly desirable, would have required linguistic 
competences that I currently do not possess. Similarly, there are some other 
questions on which this study may cast some tangential light, but these are aspects 
that I am not primarily seeking to address. 
For example, the language issue also foreclosed two extremely interesting yet 
practically unfeasible avenues for research. On the one hand, the study of emerging 
forms of counter-hegemony in the face of unravelling state hegemony had to be 
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somehow neglected. The focus of this study is thus more on the erosion of the 
sources of state hegemony on the three dimensions upon which articulation occurs 
than on the rise of alternative political and economic projects put forward by 
subaltern classes. Such a choice runs the risk of developing what Morton calls a 
‘political economy of lordships’ (2007a: 49).9 In order to counter this tendency, the 
study of transformations in social relations within the ruling bloc is balanced with 
an appreciation of the impact of economic reforms also on the lower social classes, 
and particularly on peasants and industrial workers. On the other hand, this study 
was forced to neglect the analysis of what is arguably one of the most effective 
superstructures in Egypt, and one that was at the core of Gramsci’s concerns: 
religion. Whereas religion has certainly been a fundamental factor in the 
transformation of socio-political relations in Egypt, and one whose exploitation has 
been perfected under Mubarak, both along sectarian lines and more often in a 
divide-and-rule game with the secular and religious opposition, the choice of 
leaving religion aside is motivated by the limited impact it had on the 
neoliberalisation of the Egyptian economy, which constitutes the main focus of this 
analysis. 
Another caveat ought to be made regarding a rather sizeable intervening 
variable, whose analysis is precluded to most analysts:10 the presence of a parallel 
military economy largely off the book. These ‘military industries engaged in non-
military production’, as Hanaa Kheir-el-Din put it, are thought to still constitute a 
substantial share of the Egyptian economy, which was left virtually untouched by 
reforms. This has key implications in that it provides the army with an autonomous 
economic base underpinning its political clout within the regime, while at the same 
time suggests to tone down the claims about a full-fledged neoliberalisation of the 
Egyptian economy. Yet, understanding how neoliberalism penetrated the official 
economy and how it impacted on the whole social structure might be helpful to 
understand the reasons for the army to feel increasingly threatened by the rise of a 
capitalist oligarchy that was effectively made possible by neoliberal reforms. 
 
                                                 
9 More specifically, this criticism is levelled against Teschke’s account of the twin emergence 
of capitalist relations of production and the interstate system in the transition to modernity 
(2003). 
10 The only exception I know of is now more than twenty-years old (Springborg 1989). 
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Argument in a nutshell and thesis outline 
So, what was different this time and why? Until the late 1980s reform efforts in 
Egypt had been aimed at provisionally improving the financial position of the state 
before reverting to the same old policies and practices. Departing from this pattern, 
reforms undertaken since the early 1990s have fundamentally altered the Egyptian 
political economy. This transformation is best understood with reference to shifting 
relations of class forces within Egyptian society. Two shifts are particularly notable: 
on the one hand, within the ruling bloc, reforms have empowered the private sector 
component vis-à-vis other sections of the ruling bloc, effectively transforming most 
of the infitah bourgeoisie into a capitalist oligarchy; on the other hand, in society at 
large, such reforms have led to runaway inequality, considerably increasing the 
distance between the ruling bloc and subaltern classes. These shifts had three 
important implications, one for each of the dimensions on which hegemony is 
articulated. It is argued that, firstly, the interaction of economic and political factors 
produced the emergence of a neoliberal authoritarian regime with an ever greater 
role played by the rising capitalist oligarchy. Secondly, articulation across spatial 
scales brought about a passive revolution managed by the state with the aim of 
adapting to the globalising imperatives of capital accumulation carefully avoiding 
any meaningful broadening of political participation. Lastly, the performative 
power of neoliberalism as an ideology fundamentally reshaped the boundaries of 
economic policy-making in favour of Egyptian large private capitalists. All these 
developments suggest that the main domestic sources of state hegemony in Egypt 
dried up over the past two decades, and that the shift to a neoliberal accumulation 
regime appears to be the main reason for this. 
In the attempt to substantiate this argument, the thesis proceeds in the following 
way. Chapter 1 identifies the common thread underlying Gramsci’s writings in the 
‘philosophy of praxis’, best understood as a form of historical dialectical 
materialism. This provides the basis for a critique of Cox’s interpretation of Gramsci 
on epistemological, methodological and analytical grounds, and for the 
development of an alternative understanding of Gramsci on these same three levels. 
This approach also has substantial implications for the meaning and functioning of 
hegemony. In particular, after discussing how hegemony has been conceived both 
in mainstream and critical IR theory, the potential of the articulation approach 
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towards understanding the constitution, reproduction and transformation of 
hegemony is assessed. 
Building up on this approach to Gramsci, Chapter 2 locates it within the broader 
debates on the three dimensions around which hegemony is articulated. With 
respect to the interaction of economic and political factors, the discussion revolves 
around the accounts provided by modernisation theory and elite-centred 
approaches. On interscalar articulation, the thesis of the transnationalisation of the 
state suggested by neo-Gramscian scholars is contrasted with the continued 
relevance of the state maintained by most Middle East specialists. Lastly, the 
implications of both neo-Gramscian and social constructivist approaches on the 
relation between material conditions and ideas are discussed. 
Considering that the very starting point of this thesis, i.e.: the neoliberalisation 
of the Egyptian economy, is still contested in the literature, Chapter 3 attempts to 
convince the reader that what economic reforms have produced in Egypt over the 
past two decades does amount to a shift from an étatist towards a neoliberal 
accumulation regime. After providing a broad-brush picture of the transformations 
of the Egyptian political economy from 1952 to 1990, it discusses firstly 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment, before moving to the second 
wave of reforms implemented after the appointment of a ‘reformist’ cabinet in 2004. 
Most importantly, the chapter assesses the impact of these reforms on the 
agricultural, manufacturing and financial sector, suggesting that Egypt effectively 
underwent a process of neoliberalisation. 
Once the magnitude of these economic transformations has hopefully been 
established, the following three chapters illustrate how articulation on the 
dimensions outlined above influenced, and was influenced by, such changes. 
Chapter 4 focuses on what was the form of these changes, relating economic and 
political factors. Whereas modernisation theory tends to assume too direct a link 
between economic and political change, and elite-centred approaches maintain a 
neutralisation of economic factors effected by political power, the articulation 
approach suggests that the interaction of the economic and the political leads to the 
emergence of a peculiar politico-economic configuration that I term neoliberal 
authoritarianism. However, this new configuration is not merely a combinatory 
outcome, but rather the result of an articulation that in many respects alters both 
neoliberalism and authoritarian rule. This is seen in particular with reference to the 
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increasing political role of the business elite, the privatisation of state functions in 
the hands of select members of the ruling bloc, and the importance of old and new 
informal practices mediating the implementation of economic reforms. Interestingly, 
it appears that the relative autonomy of the political increases as the economic rise 
of the capitalist oligarchy is matched by their concomitant political rise. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the spatial sources of this neoliberal turn, thus moving 
along the international-national dimension discussed in Chapter 2. Considering the 
national scale as nodal makes it possible to see how the state plays a role that goes 
well beyond that of transmission belt of global trends. Rather, the state makes use of 
its relative autonomy to ‘domesticate’ the globalising tendencies of capital, effecting 
a passive revolution by which adaptation of neoliberal globalisation is accompanied 
by continued reliance on the same exclusionary political regime, albeit with a 
different balance of forces within the ruling bloc. More specifically, this is analysed 
with reference to the institutional relations between actors on the international scale, 
ranging from IFIs to major donors, and the Egyptian government. Evidence seems 
to suggest that the relative autonomy of the national scale increased as outward-
oriented private capitalists became more prominent in the ruling bloc. 
The reasons for the neoliberalisation of the Egyptian political economy are then 
analysed in Chapter 6, which discusses the articulation of material conditions and 
ideas in producing this transformation. The argument here is that the role of 
economic ideas is best understood if these are situated socially, and more 
specifically if they are related to the class and class factions empowered or 
weakened by them. At the same time, it is suggested that once settled within a 
society, ideas may take a life of their own, eventually contributing to reshaping 
those material conditions from which they originated. Empirically, the chapter 
focuses on the creation of the two most important economic think-tanks in Egypt, 
and on their academic production, in order to evaluate their role in recasting the 
economic policy discourse along lines advantageous to the rising capitalist class. 
Also in this case it appears that the relative autonomy of ideas increased with the 
empowerment of the new bourgeoisie. 
Lastly, the conclusion evaluates how changes in these three forms of articulation 
impacted on the constitution, reproduction and transformation of hegemony in 
Egypt, substantially undermining its domestic foundations and eventually 
providing the basis for the popular revolts leading to the end of Mubarak’s regime. 
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Indeed, whereas the final outcome at the time of writing looks as open-ended as 





RECOVERING THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS: 




Since his introduction to IR and IPE in the early 1980s, Antonio Gramsci has become 
an important reference point for scholars interested in bridging the analysis of 
economic structure and political and ideational superstructures. This common 
interest has led to a proliferation of interpretations, with scholars calling Gramsci to 
support arguments related to the emergence of a global civil society (Lipschutz 
1992), to the prospects of a post-liberal democracy (Golding 1992), to a cultural turn 
in post-colonial theory and subaltern studies (Harris 1993). Whereas it is 
understandable that more than two-thousand pages scattered with notes might lead 
to interpretive divergences, and whereas such diversity is to be welcome, the main 
risk is that anyone builds up his/her own prêt-à-porter version of Gramsci. And if 
Gramsci’s work deserves any attention, ‘it is because his philosophical assumptions 
do preclude some interpretations of his thought in general, and support others’ 
(Morera 1990: 1, emphasis added). It is only wise to assume that in twenty-nine 
notebooks written in more than seven years in prison one necessarily develops his 
thought, sometimes contradicting himself, sometimes venturing tentatively into 
uncharted paths that may be followed through, re-elaborated or abandoned 
altogether in subsequent notes. This is why it is imperative to have as clear as 
possible an idea of what is Gramsci’s thought ‘in general’. But how should we 
proceed in fulfilling this task? The Prison Notebooks themselves lend a helpful hand 
in this respect. As Stuart Hall put it: ‘It is, after all, Gramsci himself who first taught 
us how to “read Gramsci”’ (1991: 7): 
 
If one wants to study a conception of the world that has never been 
systematically expounded by its author-thinker, detailed work is required, and 
it has to be conducted with the most scrupulous accuracy and scientific honesty. 
It is necessary, first of all, to trace the process of the thinker’s intellectual 
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development in order to reconstruct it in accordance with those elements that 
become stable and permanent – that is, those elements really adopted by the 
author as his own thought, distinct and superior to the ‘material’ that he had 
studied earlier and that, at a certain time, he may have found attractive, even to 
the point of having accepted it provisionally and used it in his critical work or in 
his work of historical or scientific reconstruction. This precaution is essential, 
particularly when dealing with a nonsystematic thinker, with a personality in 
whom theoretical and practical activity are indissolubly intertwined, and with 
an intellect that is therefore in continuous creation and perpetual movement. 
Hence: (1) biography in great detail, and (2) exposition of all the works, in 
chronological order, sorted according to the different phases: intellectual 
formation, maturity, the grasp of a new way of thinking, and its confident 
application. The search for the leitmotiv, the rhythm of thought, more important 
than single, isolated quotations (1996: 137, Q4§1). 11 
 
As the elaboration of a Gramscian approach is only the starting point of this 
research, and thus we have much more to go through, I spare the reader the long 
process of biographical and bibliographical research, and maintain that the 
underlying thread – the leitmotiv – is the conception of ‘philosophy of praxis’, which 
best encapsulates Gramsci’s own brand of Marxism, defined here as historical 
dialectical materialism. Within IR and IPE, there have been sporadic works tackling 
Gramsci’s dialectical theory of history, centred around the concept of ‘absolute 
historicism’ (Morton 2007a: 24-36). Other studies have discussed the dialectical 
nature of Gramsci’s Marxism, referring to Olman’s definition of ‘philosophy of 
internal relations’ (Bieler and Morton 2008: 115-6). Many others, from Robert Cox 
onwards, have discussed Gramsci’s peculiar definition of materialism which sees 
ideology playing a fundamental role in the material constitution of reality. Yet, to 
my knowledge, within the discipline there are no works which explicitly pull these 
threads together: the historical, the dialectical and the materialist. 
Thus, this chapter starts from discussing what Gramsci means by philosophy 
of praxis, and how it develops in the Prison Notebooks as historical dialectical 
                                                 
11 Following an increasingly common convention among ‘Gramsciologists’, the quotations 
from the Prison Notebooks are referenced in this way: (i) year and page of the edition from 
which the quotations is taken; (ii) notebook number (Q); (iii) note number (§). With respect 
to (i), not all the notebooks have been translated into English. Thus, I translated those 
quotations which have never appeared in English referring to the 1975 Italian complete 
edition. Same applies for the volume of the Letters from Prison, published in Italy in 1965. 
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materialism. Once this new route into Gramsci’s thinking is established, the 
following section takes on the most influential interpretation inspired by Gramsci 
within IR and IPE, thus discussing the work of Robert Cox, which is criticised on 
epistemological, methodological and substantive grounds, leading to a clarification 
of how Gramsci is interpreted here on those very three levels. The last section 
explores the implications of the Gramscian approach developed here for hegemony, 
a crucial concept for both mainstream and critical scholars in IR and IPE. In 
particular, this study focuses mostly on the exercise of hegemony on the part of the 
state and its ruling bloc, and thus for this purpose hegemony is considered here as a 
combination of coercion and consent. Importantly, rather than assuming it away, 
the specific form taken by hegemony is considered as shaped by articulation on 
three dimensions, respectively between the economic and the political, the 
international and the national, the material and the ideational. 
 
1.2. Philosophy of praxis as historical dialectical materialism 
Being well aware that his notebooks were to be closely inspected by suspicious yet 
not particularly well-read censors, Gramsci had to elaborate some strategy of 
concealment for his notes to survive, and make possible the realisation of the long-
lasting project he had in mind.12 So, for example, instead of writing ‘Marx’s Capital’ 
he always used ‘critique of the political economy’, instead of ‘historical materialism’ 
or ‘Marxism’ he used ‘philosophy of praxis’. In much the same way, Marx and 
Engels in the notebooks systematically become ‘the founders of the philosophy of 
praxis’. Whereas it is arguably true that ‘philosophy of praxis’ was used as 
surrogate for historical materialism and Marxism in the first notebooks, as time goes 
by and notes become more elaborate one can see how the concept starts to be 
charged with peculiar elements, beyond – and sometimes away from – historical 
materialism as developed by Marx and Engels.13 Thus, the phrase ‘philosophy of 
praxis’ is ‘an accurate characterisation of his theoretical perspective as part of a 
                                                 
12
 In a letter to his sister-in-law Tania written in 1927, two years before the actual drafting of 
the notebooks started, Gramsci said: ‘I am obsessed (and this fact is typical of prisoners, I 
suppose) by this idea: that there would be need to do something für ewig, following a 
complex conception by Goethe. […] In sum, following a predetermined plan, I would like to 
occupy myself intensely and systematically of some subject that would absorb and centralise 
my inner life’ (1965: 58). 
13 For the sake of linguistic accuracy, it is worthwhile reminding the reader that Marx never 
used the phrase ‘historical materialism’ to refer to his own perspective. Rather, he preferred 
to speak of ‘the materialist conception of history’.  
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long-standing tradition opposed to positivist, naturalist and scientific deformations 
of Marxism’ (Piccone 1976: 37). And indeed, this expression is already in its own 
semantics an attack against mechanistic versions of Marxism, in that – by referring 
to praxis – Gramsci emphasises the importance of agency and of the strategies that 
political actors devise in order to achieve what they wish for. In much the same 
way, by linking philosophy to praxis, it is also an attack on speculative forms of 
idealism, that divorce theory from practice, leading to ‘a mutilation of Hegelism and 
the dialectic’ (1975: 1220, Q10I§6).  
I argue that in the mature Gramscian formulation, the philosophy of praxis is 
better understood as historical dialectical materialism.14 The first term refers to 
Gramsci’s conception of history as both contingency and necessity. The second 
refers to Gramsci’s use of the dialectic as both interaction of opposites within unity 
and process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Lastly, materialism is conceived as 
the transcendence of metaphysical and sectarian conceptions of both materialism 
and idealism, towards an integral philosophy that is at once ‘absolute humanism’ 
and ‘earthliness of thought’ (1971: 465, Q11§27). 
 
1.2.1. Gramsci’s theory of history 
‘It has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression [historical 
materialism] one should put the accent on the first term – “historical” – and not on 
the second, which is of metaphysical origin. The philosophy of praxis is absolute 
“historicism”, the absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute 
humanism of history. It is along this line that one must trace the thread of the new 
conception of the world’ (465, Q11§27). In a time where Marxism was being led 
through the Second International in the shallows of determinist and mechanistic 
interpretations, this remark to pay more attention to history than to materialism 
itself, implying that without the former the latter slips back into its primitive 
metaphysical meaning, is arguably the strongest signal of the importance that 
Gramsci gives to history. History is first of all defined as a progressive process, 
thereby implying some line of immanent development of events. Such conception 
carries itself an inherent tendency towards determinism, which is eschewed by 
                                                 
14 To my knowledge, the first explicit formulation of this phrase to characterise Gramsci’s 
thought is to be found in Luporini, that makes this point almost as if it were a triviality: 
‘Central in his thought is historical materialism itself (to be conceived, needless to say, as 
historico-dialectical materialism)’ (1958: 42, original emphasis). 
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treating history also as contingency, as a conjuncture with its own specific 
parameters, in economic, political and ideological terms, and therefore necessarily 
open-ended. It is in this dialectical treatment of history that Gramsci’s philosophy of 
praxis starts to take shape. 
History-as-necessity comes from a fundamental aspect of Hegel’s philosophy of 
history, critically accepted by Marx and hence an integral part of historical 
materialism. However, the Hegelian philosophy of history as the dialectical 
progression towards the realisation of freedom has two main flaws in the eyes of 
Gramsci. Firstly, despite being able to overcome the separation between thought 
and matter, Hegel, by giving priority to the former, can see freedom only as 
‘freedom of the Spirit’ (1975: 1229, Q10I§10), and therefore he is unable to ‘unify 
practical moment and speculative thought’ (1826, Q15§61). Secondly, by 
emphasising the role of necessity, the Hegelian philosophy of history is inherently 
teleological. In this respect, Gramsci recalls an epigram by Goethe – ‘cork [raw 
material] was not born to make cork [to seal bottles]’15 – to dismiss in a rather 
sarcastic fashion this teleological tendency, that is even more evident in the work of 
Croce, whose history is ‘history by design’ (1975: 1327, Q10§41).  
Only a fuller conception of history, combining necessity and contingency, is 
able to overcome the teleological risks of both idealism and materialism when they 
sever the dialectical relation between theory and praxis. In this respect, the concept 
of historicism is equally important in understanding Gramsci’s own philosophy of 
history. According to Adam Morton, who has worked extensively on the concept of 
‘absolute historicism’ frequently used in the Prison Notebooks (2007a: 15-38), this is to 
be intended not as ‘absolutely historicist’, but rather as ‘absolute + historicist’. In 
other words, by this concept Gramsci aims to internalise the dialectical character 
typical of idealist historicism, but also to make it absolute by transforming it into an 
immanent element of his own philosophy (1434-7, Q11§27). The methodological 
implications of this point are by no means marginal. Every conception of the world 
as much as every historical structure is composed of organic and conjunctural 
elements. The first ones have the character of historical necessity ascribed to them 
by Hegel, in that they become real, and because of their realisation they are also 
                                                 
15 It is rather ironic that English language actually internalises this teleology with respect to 
the term ‘cork’, used for both the raw material and its most used final product. This does not 
happen in Italian, with the raw material called sughero and the final product tappo. 
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rational, necessary. Conjunctural elements are transient, which means that once the 
conditions for their existence have disappeared, they are not active anymore, and 
therefore become irrational.16 Accordingly, if it is to be of any help for 
understanding the present, the application of a philosophical system of the past has 
to define the organic elements by a reality-check that sees whether they are still 
active in the ‘effective reality’ or whether they have exhausted their historical 
function. 
Gramsci himself summarised best his conception of historicism, albeit 
indirectly: ‘How the present is a criticism of the past, besides [and because of] 
“surpassing” it. But should the past be discarded for this reason? What should be 
discarded is that which the present “intrinsically” criticises and that part of 
ourselves that corresponds to it. What does this mean? That we must have an exact 
consciousness of this real criticism and express it not only theoretically but 
politically. In other words, we must stick closer to the present, which we ourselves 
have helped create, while conscious of the past and its continuation (and revival)’ 
(1992: 234, Q1§156, original emphasis). 
 
1.2.2. Two-dimensional dialectic 
Quite simply, the dialectic is for Gramsci ‘a doctrine of knowledge and the very 
marrow of historiography and the science of politics’ (1971: 435, Q11§22). Yet, back 
in 1958, Norberto Bobbio lamented the lack of attention to this critical concept: ‘It 
does not seem to me that the issue of the dialectic in Gramsci has been faced with 
the attention that the importance of the concept requires. Yet for understanding the 
philosophy of a Marxist writer it is useful to start from the concept he has of the 
dialectic and from the function assigned to it’ (1958: 73). More than half-century has 
passed, and significantly Bobbio’s article is arguably the best treatment of the 
dialectic in Gramsci to date.17 But then, what is the Gramscian definition of the 
dialectic? 
                                                 
16 This applies also with respect to the present: ‘Ways of life appear to those that live them as 
absolute, “as natural”, as we say, and […] it is already a great thing to show their 
“historicity”, to show that they are justified in that some conditions exist, but when these 
change they are not justified any longer, they become “irrational”’ (1975: 1727, Q14§67). 
17 The only book-length effort on this issue, written by Finocchiaro (1988), analyses the 
Gramscian conception of the dialectic from a perspective largely incompatible with the 
Gramscian one, in that – by using the tools of analytic philosophy – it severs the link 
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I argue that in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci elaborates a two-dimensional 
conception of the dialectic, intended at the same time as: (i) interaction of opposites 
within unity; (ii) process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.18 The first meaning is 
what Engels had called the compenetration of the opposites, whereas the second is 
the typical Hegelian meaning, which Engels would later call ‘negation of the 
negation’, and that is held by some to be the typical Gramscian use of the concept, 
therefore drawing Gramsci closer to Croce and speculative idealism (Bobbio 1958; 
Piccone 1974; Finocchiaro 1979 and 1988). However, I deem the first use to be just as 
important, in that it allows ‘philosophy of praxis’ to be both philosophy and praxis, 
establishing a dialectical relation between theory and practice, one of the couple of 
opposites on which Gramsci insists the most in his notes. The Gramscian conception 
of the dialectic emerges out of the double critique that he carries out, respectively 
against the speculative idealism of Croce and the mechanistic materialism of 
Bukharin.  
Croce uses the dialectic as a process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but – by 
elaborating the concept of the ‘dialectic of the distincts’ – he does not use it as 
interaction of opposites within unity, and this is particularly true in the case of the 
relations between such pairs of opposites such as theory and practice, but also 
structure and superstructure. For Gramsci, engaging with Croce and his writings 
was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, Croce was by far the most influential figure 
within the Italian intellectual and cultural scene, so much that Gramsci once referred 
to him as the ‘lay pope’ (1965: 481), and also the most prominent representative of 
neo-Hegelianism. Thus, Croce was meant to be for Gramsci what Dühring had been 
for Engels (1971: 371, Q11§51). Secondly, Croce had dealt extensively with historical 
materialism, even if in an overly dismissive way.19 However, Croce’s application of 
the dialectic is much less than satisfactory in the eyes of Gramsci, as it divorces 
                                                                                                                                          
between theory and practice, limiting itself to make ‘arguments about arguments’, as 
Finocchiaro himself admits in a later book (2005). 
18 In his scrupulous philological work, Bobbio argues that the first meaning is more common 
in conjunction with ‘relation’, ‘nexus’ and also ‘unity’, whereas the second meaning is 
usually accompanied by words such as ‘movement’, ‘process’, ‘development’, ‘becoming’ 
(1958: 76-7). 
19 The two main critiques made by Croce to historical materialism are the following: (i) the 
structure-superstructure distinction is a replication of theological dualism, with the former 
being detached from and determining the fate of the latter; (ii) the claim of scientificity held 
by Marx and Engels is unwarranted at best, and criminal at worst. See Croce (1968). 
However, Gramsci praises Croce for translating into ‘speculative language the progressive 
acquisitions of the philosophy of praxis [historical materialism]’ (1975: 1271, Q10II§31).  
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theory from practice – the two opposites that Gramsci aims to unify through the 
philosophy of praxis. To make but one example, in the process of becoming Croce 
does not see becoming in practice, but only the ‘concept’ of becoming (1975: 1240, 
Q10II§1). In this way Croce operates an amputation and domestication of Hegelian 
dialectic, which Gramsci ascribes to the immediate political interests that drive 
Croce’s work (1221, Q10I§6). Thus, because of this partial use of the dialectic, 
Gramsci considers Croce to be non-dialectical. 
On the other hand, Bukharin is charged as well for having amputated the 
dialectic, because in his Historical Materialism he posits too rigid a distinction 
between the general and the particular, between what he calls Marxist philosophy 
and Marxist sociology (Zanardo 1958). The dialectic in Bukharin is exclusively 
intended as the Engelsian ‘compenetration of the opposites’, but even in this respect, 
the separation of philosophy from sociology and the focus on the second have 
significant implications. In particular, Gramsci points out how this approach 
resolves itself in a popularisation of historical materialism not in the direction of 
raising the cultural level of the subaltern groups. Rather, by rejecting the conception 
of the dialectic as a process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and by simplifying 
historical materialism, Bukharin goes back to vulgar and mechanistic materialism, a 
closed system where the role of agency is forsaken in favour of an all-powerful 
structure (1975: 1422-6, Q11§26). This is why Bukharin neither can be considered a 
dialectical thinker from the two-dimensional perspective adopted by Gramsci. 
In sum, while Croce uses the dialectic à la Hegel but not à la Engels, Bukharin 
does the opposite, focusing only on the interaction of opposites within unity at the 
expense of the dialectic as process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Gramsci maintains 
that both these dimensions of the dialectic are integral to philosophy of praxis, and 
therefore criticises Croce and Bukharin for being non-dialectical thinkers. Or, to put 
it better, and less influenced by polemical intents, for not being dialectical enough. 
 
1.2.3. Materialism beyond materialism 
In the double movement of critique that allows Gramsci to get to his philosophy of 
praxis, Gramsci is not attacking idealism or materialism per se. In his critique of 
Croce, the target is the speculative element of his idealism. In much the same way, it 
is the mechanistic element of Bukharin to be under attack, and not his materialism. 
The English editors of the Selection from the Prison Notebooks are correct when they 
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argue that Gramsci ‘locates the main enemy of the philosophy of praxis not in 
idealism as such but in transcendence and metaphysics’ (Hoare and Nowell Smith 
1971: 378). Thus, in as much as they find their driving force and explanatory 
principle only within themselves, being respectively isolated from matter and 
thought, both speculative idealism and mechanistic materialism are metaphysical 
conceptions in the eyes of Gramsci, and as such should be rejected. 
In a long note titled ‘Questions of Nomenclature and Content’, Gramsci 
embarks on a rigorous philological study of the semantic evolution of the term 
‘materialism’, by arguing that the conceptual content of the term had been enlarged 
already by Marx and Engels, but ‘philosophical dilettantism’ and ‘a lack of an 
historical sense in grasping the different moments of a process of cultural 
development’ had made possible the conceptual confusion that led many 
commentators to lend a metaphysical materialist character to historical materialism. 
He then goes on to praise Lange and his History of Materialism, arguing that he ‘is a 
conscientious and acute historian who has a quite precise, definite and limited 
conception of materialism and therefore, to the great surprise and even indignation 
of certain people (such as Plekhanov) does not regard as materialist either historical 
materialism or even the philosophy of Feuerbach. Here again one can see how the 
terminology is conventional but not without importance in making for errors and 
deviations as soon as one forgets that it always necessary to return to the cultural 
sources in order to identify the exact value of concepts, since there may be different 
heads under the same hat’ (1971: 456, Q11§16).20 
In one of the few passages where the distinction between material and 
ideational elements is made explicit, Gramsci argues that ‘the distinction between 
form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be 
unconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual 
fancies without the material forces’ (1971: 377, Q7§21). But then, how is the 
philosophy of praxis supposed to deal with materialism and idealism? In a note on 
the dialectic of unification and separation between the two moments of thought, 
Gramsci implicitly sets up the task (1971: 396, Q16§9): 
 
                                                 
20 Yet again, another call to historicise and contextualise concepts, without discarding them 
completely. 
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Hegel, half-way between the French Revolution and the Restoration, gave 
dialectical form to the two moments of the life of thought, materialism and 
spiritualism, but his synthesis was “a man walking on his head”. […] The 
philosophy of praxis, through its founder, relived all this experience of 
Hegelianism, Feuerbachianism and French materialism, in order to reconstruct 
the synthesis of dialectical unity, “the man walking on his feet”. The laceration 
which happened to Hegelianism has been repeated with the philosophy of 
praxis [historical materialism]. That is to say, from dialectical unity there has 
been a regress to philosophical materialism on the one hand, while on the other 
hand modern idealist high culture has tried to incorporate part of the 
philosophy of praxis which was needed in order for it to find a new elixir. 
 
Accordingly, it is the goal of the philosophy of praxis to be able to provide a new 
synthesis of materialism and idealism, under the aegis of a two-dimensional 
conception of the dialectic, which also allows us to consider history and practice as 
open-ended combinations of necessity and contingency, and where even 
philosophical systems from the past can be re-actualised, and adopted beyond their 
original context. 
 
1.3. Towards a non-Coxian interpretation of Gramsci 
After delineating the underpinnings of the Gramscian philosophy of praxis, 
surprisingly underestimated in IR and IPE, I deem necessary to shed light on the 
inconsistencies between the Coxian interpretation of Gramsci and the reading 
suggested by the meta-theoretical considerations above.  It is important to highlight 
at the very outset that Cox has always rejected the definition of neo-Gramscian, and 
that he would rather call himself ‘historical materialist’ (Cox 1981: 133, 2002: 26-29). 
This is by no means secondary for the argument developed here, as it shifts the 
focus of my critique from Cox himself to those neo-Gramscian scholars who have 
based their understanding of Gramsci on the admittedly eclectic Coxian 
interpretation.21 
                                                 
21 One could argue that Gramsci was eclectic just as much as Cox, and that this could be a 
point for Cox, rather than against him. However, Gramsci’s use of concepts coming from 
Machiavelli, Vico, Croce, Cuoco, Bergson and Sorel is firmly rooted within its conception of 
philosophy of praxis fleshed out before (also see Haug 2000). On the contrary, Cox is eclectic 
even in his foundations, as is shown in this section. 
 30 
It ought to be said at this point that this Gramscian critique of neo-Gramscian 
scholarship is not a tedious exercise in some supposed Gramscian ‘purity’ towards 
the affirmation of truth, as such a test would never be conclusive, considering the 
elliptic and sometimes contradictory character of the writings of the Italian Marxist. 
Rather, critically engaging with Cox is necessary because of his influence on the 
reception of Gramsci’s thought in IR and IPE.22 Thus, the aim of this section is to 
move beyond Cox and retrieve the lost dimension of Gramsci within IR and IPE, 
which resides in the implications of his philosophy of praxis outlined above for his 
more used concepts, such as hegemony and passive revolution. 
 
1.3.1. From Robert Cox to the neo-Gramscian school 
Robert Cox’s work is just as un-orthodox as the road that led him into academia.23 In 
the words of Susan Strange, he is ‘an eccentric in the best English sense of the word’ 
(1988: 269). Despite his gradual shift in focus from hegemony and relations of 
production in IR towards a concern with ethical and civilisational issues, there is 
little doubt that three early pieces of his work constitute the gravitational centre 
around which the neo-Gramscian school has developed (1981, 1983 and 1987). It is 
exactly because of their relevance in the establishment of a new school of thought 
within IR/IPE that these pieces are the focus of my analysis and critique. 
In pursuing his ambitious aim of providing a critical theory of IR, Cox is 
admittedly eclectic, and he draws from such diverse sources as Leibniz and Vico, 
Sorel and Gramsci, Polanyi and Braudel. All these thinkers have at least one 
outstanding commonality: they had been mostly ignored by mainstream IR.24 Their 
retrieval certainly goes to Cox’s credit. Within the original synthesis that he 
provides, and that finds its most elaborate form in Production, Power and World 
Order, it is not hard not discern that Gramsci is at least a primus inter pares, 
constituting the main source of inspiration for Cox’s theory. In particular, three 
                                                 
22 On a rhetorical level, furthermore, this engagement allows to revive Gramsci’s style, that 
was mostly polemical in nature, as he admitted in a letter dated December 15, 1930: ‘all my 
intellectual development has been of a polemical sort […], ordinarily it is necessary to place 
myself from a dialogical or dialectical point of view, otherwise I do not feel any intellectual 
stimulus’ (1965: 390). 
23 After graduating at McGill in 1946, Cox worked for more than two decades at the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva. Only in the early 1970s he left the 
organisation, and started teaching at Columbia University before going back to his native 
Canada and settling down at York University (Cox 1996: 19-38). 
24 An exception in this respect is the explicit use of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ made by 
Ruggie in his famous article on ‘embedded liberalism’ (1982: 385-392). 
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Gramscian elements are at the core of Cox’s work: historicism, hegemony and what 
Cox calls the ‘state-society complex’. 
I just mentioned that Cox’s aim is to construct a critical theory of IR. Critical of 
what? To understand this, before going in any detail into the content of such theory, 
one needs to uncover the key epistemological principle upon Cox’s work is based: 
the distinction between problem-solving and critical theory (1981: 128-30). Problem-
solving theory serves the purpose to ‘help solve the problems posed within the terms 
of the particular perspective which was the point of departure’. Following from this, 
problem-solving theory takes ‘the prevailing social and power relationships and the 
institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’. 
Therefore, for problem-solving theory is not only feasible but also attractive to 
divide the social world into relatively separate spheres of action, where limits and 
parameters are fixed (the ceteris paribus assumption). Such a procedure allows to 
identify regularities between specific events, and by this to solve problems within 
the parameters given, hence the definition of ‘problem-solving theory’. On the other 
hand, critical theory is ‘more reflective upon the process of theorising itself’, starting 
from the Coxian oft-quoted punchline: ‘[t]heory is always for someone and for some 
purpose’ (1981: 128). Critical theory does not take for granted those parameters that 
allow problem-solving approaches to deal ‘effectively with particular sources of 
trouble’, but rather questions them in their deepest foundations, by asking how they 
came about. In opposition to the disciplinary separation typical of problem-solving 
theory, critical theory ‘leads towards the construction of a larger picture of the 
whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to 
understand the process of change in which both parts and whole are involved’. 
Understanding such process of change is not simply an analytical goal, but is a first 
step towards a normative goal: opening up the fractures within the existing order to 
change it towards ‘a more participant society’ (1987: 224). 
Whereas problem-solving theory is non-historical or ahistorical, critical theory 
is ‘theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a 
continuing process of historical change’.  This further distinction is the basis of 
Cox’s historicism, the first element of Gramscian derivation in his theory, even 
though the very concept came much before Gramsci himself, finding its roots in the 
work of the Neapolitan thinker Giambattista Vico. For Cox, historicism is the 
foundation of the ‘method of historical structures’, the key methodological device 
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for breaking the social world down into spheres of activity in order to make analysis 
manageable. By historical structure, Cox means ‘a particular combination of thought 
patterns, material conditions and human institutions which has a certain coherence 
among its elements’ (1981: 135). In other words, historical structures are made up of 
material capabilities, institutions and ideas. Material capabilities are defined as 
‘productive and destructive potentials’, ideas are considered both as intersubjective 
meanings and as alternative ideologies, and institutions are considered as emergent 
from the previous two, but not reducible to them, in that ‘[e]ventually, [they] take 
their own life’ (1981: 136). Another triad – world order, states, and social relations of 
production – identifies the three historical structures at the core of Cox’s theoretical 
framework. Each of them is thus composed of a particular combination of material 
capabilities, institutions and ideas.  
The second element of Gramscian derivation in Cox’s theory is his use of 
hegemony. In this respect, Cox takes issue with theorists of hegemonic stability, 
because of their narrow materialist understanding of the term. Against such trend, 
he argues for a broader concept, where an ideational dimension features 
prominently. Gramsci is instrumental in this respect, even though Cox does not 
make explicit reference to his conception of hegemony in the 1981 article. Finally, 
the third element that Cox borrows from Gramsci is the complex relation between state 
and civil society, categories which retain ‘a certain analytical usefulness but ceased to 
correspond to separable entities in reality’ (1983: 164). The meaning and function 
given by Cox to both hegemony and the ‘state-society complex’ is discussed in 
much greater detail in the next section. Suffice to say here that a hegemonic 
structure, exactly because of the balanced mix of material resources, appealing ideas 
and successful institutions it contains, is more stable than a non-hegemonic one. 
Within this picture, the driver of structural change is to be found in the construction 
of a counter-hegemony, which requires ‘a coherent view of an alternative world 
order, backed by a concentration of power sufficient to maintain a challenge to core 
countries’ (1981: 150). 
Regardless of his reluctance to accept the label of neo-Gramscian, it is 
undeniable that Cox’s writings have had a substantial role in the so-called 
‘Gramscian turn’ in international studies (Germain and Kenny 1998). Despite 
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significant internal differentiations,25 and some very notable exceptions,26 most neo-
Gramscian scholars have relied on Cox’s seminal work to develop their 
understanding of Gramsci. 
 
1.3.2. Threefold critique of the ‘Coxian Gramsci’ 
Earlier we have defined the philosophy of praxis as much more than a clever way of 
concealing Marxism from the eyes of the censor. Rather, I have argued that this  
phrase embodies Gramsci’s own conception of Marxism, defined as ‘historical 
dialectical materialism’. How does Cox’s interpretation of Gramsci relate to this 
understanding of the philosophy of praxis? I argue that it is possible to criticise the 
‘Coxian Gramsci’ on the three different grounds: (i) epistemological, (ii) 
methodological, (iii) analytical. 
At the epistemological level, Cox’s interpretation of Gramsci is biased by the 
distinction between problem-solving and critical theory underlying his whole 
work.27 Such a reading is well beyond any philological or ‘symptomatic’ reading of 
Gramsci.28 Let me go back to Cox’s punchline: ‘[t]heory is always for someone and 
for some purpose’. This brief sentence is extremely appealing in that it reveals an 
aspect obscured by mainstream IR: every theory is an interpretation of reality from a 
specific vantage point, and thus emphasises some aspects to the detriment of others. 
In other words, it refutes one of the two founding principles of philosophical 
realism: the ‘correspondence theory of truth’, which maintains that our knowledge 
of the world mirrors the world itself. By defining problem-solving theory as 
inevitably status-quo oriented and critical theory as inherently towards 
emancipation, it inserts a normative element in the epistemological distinction. By 
                                                 
25 For example, Worth (2008) distinguishes between the Amsterdam school, mostly 
concerned with the study of transnational classes (Van der Pijl 1984 and 1998; Overbeek 1990 
and 1993; Sklair 2001; Van Apeldoorn 2002 and 2004), and the Italian – or more 
appropriately Coxian – school, which focuses on the concept of world order and its 
economic, political and cultural implications (Gill 1990, 1993 and 1995; Rupert 1995). 
26 In particular, I am referring to the meticulous philological and interpretive work carried 
out by Adam Morton (2007a), and to a couple of edited volumes that import interpretations 
of Gramsci from political theory, linguistics and cultural studies in IR (Bieler and Morton 
2006; McNally and Schwarzmantel 2009). 
27 On the unwelcome consequences of this distinction for critical IPE as a whole, see 
Cammack (2007) 
28 The concept of ‘symptomatic reading’ was first advocated by Mouffe (1979) and then 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) in their seminal study of hegemony in political 
theory. 
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doing this, Cox denies the distinction between facts and values at the heart of 
positivist epistemology. 
On the other hand, Cox is not equally clear on where his theory stands with 
respect to the other fundamental principle of philosophical realism: the existence of 
a reality independent from the knowing subject. Such lack of clarity arguably 
derives from the polemical battle that Cox was waging: being his main target 
mainstream IR theory, his own critique was much more focused on positivism, 
indeed at the time dominant in IR, and thus somehow neglects Gramsci’s critique of 
speculative idealism. As a consequence, there are instances where Cox’s 
understanding of social reality is remarkably close to idealist positions, with 
objectivity being conflated with shared intersubjectivity. This is best elucidated by 
referring to the Gramscian and the Coxian definition of historical bloc.29 For 
Gramsci, the historical bloc represents the dialectical unity of structure and 
superstructure. On the other hand, Cox understands the historical bloc in purely 
intersubjective terms, as a relation between specific social groups in a given 
historical conjuncture (1987: 7). Similarly, ‘[a] hegemonic order is inscribed in the 
mind. It is an intersubjective sharing of behavioural expectations’ (Cox 1996: 245). In 
other words, whereas Cox never rejects explicitly the existence of a theory-
independent reality, 30 his position oscillates between the classical historical 
materialist stance that sees an objective reality to be explained and a theory that at 
times unfolds as if this was not the case. 
The philosophy of praxis provides a much clearer grounding on this. From a 
close reading of his notebooks, it appears that Gramsci endorses the rejection of the 
correspondence theory of truth, but still maintains that ‘there is a world out there’. 
On the first aspect, Gramsci’s viewpoint is best expressed by this note, 
unsurprisingly titled ‘Objection to empiricism’ (1971: 461, Q17§23): 
 
                                                 
29 The concept of historical bloc is discussed in greater detail in the next section on 
hegemony. 
30 In articulating his critique of reflexivism from within the Coxian school, Morton (2007b) 
recalls the first sentence of Production, Power and World Order – ‘Production creates the 
material basis for all forms of social existence’ (1987: 1) – and uses it to argue that Cox aims 
to build a critical theory that is still compatible with the acceptation of the existence of an 
external reality. My argument here is that Cox’s position oscillates between the two poles of 
acknowledging a theory-independent realm of facts and developing his theory as if this 
were not the case. 
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How can there take place a choice of facts to be adduced as proof of the truth of 
one’s own assumption if one does not have a pre-existing criterion of choice? 
But what is the criterion of choice to be, if not something superior to each single 
fact under enquiry? An intuition, a conception, which must be regarded as 
having a complex history, a process that is to be connected with the whole 
process of the development of culture (etc.). 
 
Therefore, history and culture shape our way of perceiving external reality, and 
therefore affect our theories. However, such a critique of positivism does not 
prevent Gramsci from accepting the second principle, the existence of a theory-
independent realm of facts. Gramsci’s philosophical position is based ‘on an 
awareness of the simple and fundamental fact that there exist objective, intractable 
laws to which man must adapt himself if he is to master them in his turn’ (1971: 34, 
Q12§2). It is only at this stage that external reality is encapsulated into our 
historically- and culturally-influenced world of meaning. To put it in Femia’s 
words, Gramsci ‘is denying not the existence of a nature prior to the human spirit, 
only to the relevance or intelligibility of such a natural order’ (1981: 106). Such a 
statement is exemplified in a note on ‘matter’, where Gramsci refers to electricity 
and its ‘mastering’ by man. It is worthwhile to reproduce the paragraph entirely 
(1971: 466, Q11§30): 
 
Electricity is historically active, not merely however as a natural force (e.g. an 
electrical discharge which causes a fire) but as a productive element dominated 
by man and incorporated into the ensemble of the material forces of production, 
an object of private property. As an abstract natural force electricity existed even 
before its reduction to a productive force, but it was not historically operative 
and was just subject to hypothetical discourse in natural history (earlier still it 
was historical “nothingness”, since no one was interested in it or indeed knew 
anything about it). 
 
How to explain this lack of understanding of the more nuanced position yet clearer 
against positivism taken by Gramsci? The answer is to be found on the two 
movements of the Gramscian dialectic between materialism and idealism. Whereas 
Cox appreciates and internalises Gramsci’s critique of mechanistic materialism and 
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uses it successfully against positivism, he seems not to take into proper 
consideration Gramsci’s symmetrical critique of the speculative idealism of Croce.  
This leads to another problematic point of Cox’s understanding of Gramsci. If 
the existence of a theory-independent external world is denied, how is one 
supposed to evaluate the merits of a given theory? Cox is not entirely clear in this 
respect, but – particularly in his assumption of the inherent conservative bias of 
problem-solving theory – he seems to imply that the value of a theory is to be 
assessed on its progressive and emancipatory intentions.31 Gramsci’s disagreement 
with this position could not be harsher. In his notes on Machiavelli, he is very clear 
in prioritising ‘effective reality’ over normative ideals, dismissed by him as ‘idle 
fancy, yearning, daydream’ whenever they are not rooted in ‘real possibilities’ for 
their actualisation (1971: 172, Q13§14). Gramsci’s brutally pragmatic definition of 
truth also goes in this direction: ‘[m]ass adhesion or non-adhesion to an ideology is 
the real critical test of the rationality and historicity of modes of thinking’ (1971: 341, 
Q11§12): to put it simply, the value of a theory is to be assessed on its ability to 
explain reality, and by this, provide a guide for action. 
In a nutshell, and in Coxian terms, the difference may be summarised in this 
way: whereas Cox is a critical theorist, Gramsci is a problem-solver and a critical 
thinker. If Gramsci is a problem-solver, is he subject to ‘an ideological bias’ towards 
‘tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order’ (Cox 
1981: 129-30)? In this irony one can identify the fallacy of Cox’s assumption that 
problem-solving theory is inherently status quo oriented. Cox argues that critical 
theory is the only way to think ‘outside the box’, to use a very fashionable 
expression, because problem-solvers take the existing reality as the parameters for 
their own research and analysis, whereas critical theorists are the only ones with the 
appropriate tools for providing a transformative view of international relations. This 
resolves into what has been called a ‘me-clever-you-stupid’ attitude (Cammack 
2007: 4). More importantly, this misses one fundamental link that was very clear to 
Gramsci. By borrowing a classical distinction of military theory and practice, Cox 
argues that ‘critical theory can be a guide to strategic action to bring about an 
alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions’ (Cox 
                                                 
31 Even the content of such emancipation has been subject to criticism. In particular, Spegele 
sarcastically argues: ‘who would want to spend most of his/her life rotting away in one of 
Mussolini’s prisons for marginal changes towards a “more participant society”?’ (1997: 224). 
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1981: 130). Again, the focus seems to be misplaced, as any transformative strategy 
needs to confront itself with the ‘effective reality’ that necessarily requires some 
tactical adjustments. In other words, tactics is not the opposite of strategy, but rather 
its necessary complement, if the goal is ‘to bring about an alternative order’.32 
Moving on to the methodological level, I argue that the use of the dialectic made 
by Cox is fundamentally incompatible with the two-dimensional concept developed 
by Gramsci. In particular, in the passage from Gramsci to Cox, the crucial dialectical 
link between theory and practice is severed, leading Cox and many neo-Gramscians 
after him to ‘base theory on theory’, exactly what it was meant to be avoided (Cox 
1981: 128). The method of historical structures developed by Cox is claimed to be 
dialectic. But what does he mean by this word? 
 
It is used here at two levels: the level of logic and the level of real history. At the 
level of logic, it means a dialogue seeking truth through the exploration of 
contradictions. […] At the level of real history, dialectic is the potential for 
alternative forms of development arising from the confrontation of opposed 
social forces in any concrete historical situation (1981: 133-4). 
 
The definition at the level of logic is supposed to take ‘dialectic back to its Greek 
origins and spares us the assertions of theological Marxism concerning “Diamat” 
[dialectical materialism]’ (1981, 152, ft.15). The concern to elaborate a definition of 
dialectic that redeems it from the Stalinist degenerations is both understandable and 
meritorious. However, Cox does not aim to overcome and transcend contradictions, 
but rather to explore them for the purpose of ‘seeking truth’. At the level of real 
history, again, the dialectic is not Aufhebung, actual overcoming, but transformative 
potential. In this double removal of the practical implications of theory and the 
theoretical implications of practice, we can see the mirror respectively of Gramsci’s 
critique of Bukharin and Croce. 
Even more important than definitions, but clearly related to them, is the way 
in which the dialectic is used in Cox’s work. Firstly, the di of di-alectics is denied by 
the very simple numerical observation that Cox’s work proceeds through triads. 
                                                 
32 Gramsci on this: ‘The class statesman grasps simultaneously the idea and its real process 
of realisation: draws up the project and at the same time the executive regulation. […] 
Corollary: every great politician cannot be anything but a great administrator; every great 
strategist a great tactician, every theorist a great organiser’ (1971: 1050, Q8§180). 
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Therefore, it would make more sense to speak of trialectics, as someone suggested 
(Jessop and Sum 2001: 94). However, if dialectic is to be conceived as the non-
totalising tension towards unity between opposites, it is hard to understand what 
institutions are the opposite of, in the triad with material capabilities and ideas.  
Secondly, in his empirical work, the use of dialectics seems more to pay lip service 
to the conventions of historical materialism, rather than being at the core of Cox’s 
critical theory. As noted elsewhere, Weberian ideal-types are at least as important 
for Cox’s methodology (Burnham 1991: 77-9; Smith 1996: 202). Think for example of 
the twelve modes of social relations of production identified and discussed in Part I 
of Production, Power and World Order (1987: 29-98). There is nothing inherently 
wrong in the use of Weberian ideal-types.33 Indeed, the argument he proposes that 
Weberian typologies are better suited to deal with the synchronic aspects of social 
reality, whether a Marxist methodology is better equipped for analysing conflicts 
and ruptures is a reasonable one (Cox 2002: 28). Therefore, ‘conceptually arresting 
movement’ (Cox 1987: 4) is not problematic in itself. The trouble arises earlier, and 
is simply hypostatised by Cox’s ideal-types of modes of social relations of 
production, which are not the product of the dialectical interplay between the 
constitutive triad of material capabilities, institutions and ideas, but a mere 
combination of them. Cox’s work ignores ‘the complex co-constitutive relationship 
among ideas, power and institutions in favour of a largely juxtapositional analysis 
of different factors’ (Jessop and Sum 2001: 95). In the simplest terms I could put it: it 
ignores the dialectic. 
At the analytical level, lastly, in the other triad between world order, states and 
social relations of production, Cox’s theory surprisingly underplays the role of the 
state. The metaphor of the state as a transmission belt within the mechanisms of 
transnational hegemony is particularly famous, as it has been attacked from various 
fronts,34 and eventually rejected by Cox himself (2002: 33). However, this original 
underestimation of the role of the state is a signal of a wider flaw weakening many 
neo-Gramscian studies: the tendency to see transnational hegemony as monolithic, 
particularly in its current neoliberal form (Drainville 1994; Cammack 2007; Worth 
2008). The subsidiary concept of the nébuleuse, intended as ‘an increasingly 
                                                 
33 As the reader will se in the next chapter, I am a strong advocate of methodological 
pluralism. 
34 For a review of the critiques of the role of the state in Cox’s theory, see Schechter (2002: 10-
2) and Cox (2002: 32-4). 
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centralised supranational management structure’ (Schechter 2002: 16), reinforces 
more than weakens this impression.35 It is not hard to see how problematic this 
analytical strategy is if seen in the light of the philosophy of praxis. Overshadowing 
the contradictions of neoliberal hegemony means significantly restricting the space 
for the transformative praxis at the core of Gramsci’s thought. In one of the best 
studies of the Marxist theories of the state, Gramsci is indicated as one of the main 
proponents of the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state from the economic structure 
(Jessop 1982: 143-53). It is quite ironic that in the ‘common sense’ interpretation of 
his thought in IR and IPE we end up with the image of the state as a transmission 
belt. 
In sum, the Coxian interpretation of Gramsci is epistemologically inconsistent 
with the philosophy of praxis as it superimposes the distinction between problem-
solving and critical theory which by severing the link between theory and practice 
effectively forecloses the potential for transformative action it claims to promote. It 
is methodologically problematic, since the use of the dialectic is largely replaced by 
Weberian ideal-types. Finally, it is analytically imprecise in that it overestimates the 
coherence and strength of the emerging transnational capitalist class and/or world 
order under investigation.36 
 
1.3.3. Gramsci in this study 
If these are the three points of incongruence between the ‘Coxian Gramsci’ and the 
Gramsci rooted in a more detailed analysis of his philosophy of praxis, what has the 
latter to offer us in exchange? This subsection aims to make explicit the pars 
construens that has so far been obscured by the critique of the Coxian understanding 
of Gramsci. Mirroring such critique, the argument develops at three different levels. 
In epistemological terms, I argue for the substitution of the problem-solving vs. 
critical theory dichotomy with a dialectical understanding of the relationship 
between theory and practice. In methodological terms, I argue that the very 
                                                 
35 Both strands of neo-Gramscian studies share this neglect of the tensions and contradictions 
characterising neoliberal globalisation. The ones focusing on the concept of world order tend 
to overemphasise the pervasiveness of disciplinary neoliberalism as embodied in formal and 
informal international organisations (Gill 1991 and 1995; Murphy 1994; Rupert 2000). In 
much the same vein, studies focusing on the formation of a transnational capitalist class 
overlook the fault lines within this emerging global subject (Van der Pijl 1984 and 1998; 
Overbeek 1993; Sklair 2001). 
36 The section on hegemony discusses further the neo-Gramscian tendency to consider 
neoliberal hegemony as a monolith. 
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definition of the philosophy of praxis as historical dialectical materialism provides 
three excellent guidelines for research. In analytical terms, I argue for ‘bringing the 
state back in’ within Gramscian studies in IR and IPE, thus paying more attention to 
the relation between state and civil society as developed by Gramsci. 
As I showed in the previous section, in criticising Benedetto Croce and his 
speculative idealism and in developing his two-dimensional conception of the 
dialectic, Gramsci puts a strong emphasis on the dialectical unity between theory 
and practice, considered as two sides of the same coin, and therefore presupposing 
and reinforcing each other within his philosophy of praxis. In this respect, the 
starting point for this intellectual development is to be found in the eleventh of 
Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point is to change it’ (1969). For Gramsci, this is not to be seen as a 
rejection of philosophy of all sorts, but rather as a critique of the speculative 
tendencies of philosophers. It is the task of the philosophy of praxis to realise the 
correspondence of thought and action implied by this interpretation of the Marxian 
text. Within this dialectical process, practice takes priority over theory: ‘the unity of 
theory and practice is not just a matter of mechanical fact, but a part of the historical 
process’, even if only a few sentences later he argues that this need not lead to see 
‘theory as a “complement” or an “accessory” of practice, or as the handmaid of 
practice’ (1971: 333-4, Q11§12). 
Accepting this principle of the dialectical unity of theory and practice has two 
main epistemological implications. Firstly, the Coxian distinction between problem-
solving and critical theory is rejected and replaced by the awareness that any 
transformative project has to be visionary and feasible at the very same time. This 
point is best expressed by Gramsci’s note on Savonarola and Machiavelli: ‘The 
opposition between Savonarola and Machiavelli is not an opposition between what 
is and what ought to be […], but one between two concepts of what ought to be: the 
abstract and phantasmagorical concept of Savonarola, and the realistic concept of 
Machiavelli’ (1971: 172-3, Q13§14). Secondly, taking ‘effective reality’ as the 
inescapable checkpoint where all theoretical ambitions are tested has major 
implications on theory evaluation. In the specific case of this work, the value of the 
conception of hegemony developed is to be assessed only on its explanatory merits, 
that is: on its ability to grasp the nature and the extent of the economic and political 
modifications produced by neoliberal reforms in Egypt. Thus, no normative 
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preference needs to be assumed, as the only evaluation criterion is the theory’s 
ability to fit ‘effective reality’. As for the ability of theory to provide a guide for 
action, studying the conditions of existence and the contradictions of the incumbent 
ruling bloc is already a stepping stone towards the development of an alternative 
project, both in its tactical and strategic implications. 
In methodological terms, the three basic components in which the philosophy of 
praxis has been divided all have substantial implications for the way this research is 
carried out. To start with, focusing on the historical and historicist aspect of Gramsci 
means putting history through a double reading, therefore looking at it as both 
process and contextualisation. This means sifting Gramsci’s thought in order to 
keep what is organic and let go what is conjunctural, to put it in Gramsci’s own 
terms, by both understanding how his thought related and relates to the process of 
historical development, and how it was influenced by the specific historical, social 
and cultural circumstances in which it was elaborated. Regarding the dialectic, it is 
used in both its dimensions to understand respectively how past economic 
structures and policies are only partly superseded, and how this happens through a 
process where the economic and the political sphere are dialectically related and 
therefore constitute and reconstitute each other through the unfolding of neoliberal 
reforms. Lastly, the non-materialist definition of materialism provided by Gramsci 
and embedded in the philosophy of praxis provides another element of open-
endedness to the research, as it adds a further level of interaction, this time between 
material and ideational factors. 
In analytical terms, the importance of the state, and more generally of the 
national scale of which the state is the most relevant centre of political authority, is 
reaffirmed. This comes as a direct consequence of the constitutive power that the 
political enjoys over the economic. The state is taken here in its inclusive sense, 
being treated as ‘integral State’, to use a typical Gramscian expression.37 Therefore, it 
is not only the state apparatus that is considered but also the complex and evolving 
relation between state and civil society, and the patterns of exclusion and inclusion 
characterising this relation, and particularly so in the Arab world (Ayubi 1995).  
But if this theoretical framework is deployed in the national scale, how am I 
supposed to keep the international in? Indeed, some scholars argue that the 
extension of the Gramscian framework to the international scale is over-ambitious 
                                                 
37 To date, the best study of Gramsci’s theory of the state is still Buci-Glucksmann (1980). 
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and substantially unfeasible, on the ground that his concept of hegemony could not 
be easily transposed to the international scale because it is intimately connected 
with the state-civil society distinction, and in the international realm we do not have 
neither a political authority comparable to the state (Germain and Kenny 1998), nor 
a global civil society proper (Femia 2005). I argue that the concept of articulation 
provides a way out of this deadlock, by allowing us to relate the national and the 
international scale.38 As we will see in the discussion in 2.3.1, the choice of scale is an 
empirical rather than an ontological question, and always a relative one, in that 
interscalar relations must be taken into account in the measure in which they are 
relevant for answering the research question at hand. Within this spatial framework, 
hegemony – as we will see in the next section – emerges on the national scale, but 
always in a dialectical relation with other forms of hegemony existing both in other 
national scales and in the international scale. 
 
1.4. Hegemony 
The term ‘hegemony’ has already been used several times, and now the time has 
come to explore it in its different facets and define it for the purpose of this study. 
This section tackles this task. The starting point is to be found in a detailed analysis 
of the Prison Notebooks, and in the discussion of the multiple sources from which 
Gramsci draws in elaborating his own conception of hegemony. Such eclecticism, 
coupled with the continuous development of his thought, leads Gramsci to use the 
term in three ways that, despite their inconsistencies (Anderson 1976), can be 
reworked to get to a cohesive definition of what hegemony represents for Gramsci. 
The Gramscian definition of hegemony is then compared with the use of the term in 
IR and IPE. In this respect, I concur with Joseph who maintains that ‘it is better to 
say that there are two different concepts of hegemony in IR, rather than two aspects 
of the same concept’ (2008: 109). Thus, I deal in the first instance with the concept of 
hegemony in mainstream IR, before moving on to the way hegemony is inflected in 
                                                 
38 Following Jessop, ‘scale comprises the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of 
bounded spaces of differing size: for example, local, regional, continental and global’ (2008: 
105). In this study, I use the term ‘scale’, rather than the more common ‘level’, for two 
reasons. Firstly, scale much more than level gives a sense of a necessary connection between 
differing spaces; in other words, whereas levels could be separated one from the other, the 
intimate relation with other spatialities is constitutive of the concept of scale. Secondly, 
despite this necessary link, the use of scales does not rule out the possibilities for a 
differentiation among spatialities, or – in Gramscian terms – for a non-correspondence between 
them and the forms of articulation that follow. 
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critical IR and IPE. Finally, I outline the main elements that characterise the 
definition of hegemony adopted in this study, with particular emphasis on the ways 
in which the method of articulation can help us make sense of the unfolding of 
hegemony across the different instances of the structure-superstructure relation. 
 
1.4.1. Hegemony in the ‘Prison Notebooks’ 
Gramsci develops his own conception of hegemony from a wide range of sources. 
Again, the philosophy of praxis constitutes the common matrix within which these 
sources are organically combined. Four of them are particularly important to 
understand Gramsci’s conception of hegemony: (i) the use of the term within the 
Russian social-democratic circles; (ii) the Crocean concept of ethico-political history; 
(iii) the twofold influence of Machiavelli; (iv) his studies in linguistics, and 
particularly the relation between dialect and national language. Dealing briefly with 
these sources and how they are re-elaborated in the Prison Notebooks ‘helps contrast 
often unilateral and debatable interpretations of the concept, either by friendly 
commentators, who tend sometimes to overlook or deny economic and class factors, 
or by hostile ones, who neglect consensual aspects’ (Boothman 2008: 33). 
Hegemony is first used within a Marxist framework by Plekhanov in 1883-4 in 
the context of Tsarist Russia, as a successful slogan for the Russian working class 
calling for a unification of political struggle against the regime and economic 
struggle against employers (Anderson 1976: 15-7). The ideational connotation of the 
term emerges through a slight shift of meaning only a couple of decades later. 
Hegemony starts to refer to the leading role that the working class has to take in the 
alliance with other exploited groups, and peasants in particular. It is with this 
connotation that the term reaches Gramsci in the formulation by Lenin, considered 
‘the greatest modern theoretician of the philosophy of praxis’, who ‘reappraised the 
front of cultural struggle and constructed the theory of hegemony as a complement 
to the theory of the State-as-force’ (Gramsci 1995: 357, Q10I§12). It is exactly this 
ideational element distinguishing leadership from domination that Gramsci draws 
from the Russian use of the concept.39 
                                                 
39 Also Trotsky, in his History of the Russian Revolution, uses hegemony with this meaning, 
and more specifically opposing the hegemony of the proletariat over the peasantry to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie (1980: 296-7). 
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The second source of inspiration for Gramsci is arguably the most neglected 
one. However, the Crocean concept of ‘ethico-political history’ is vital to understand 
the conceptual extension produced by Gramsci (Boothman 2008: 40-1). Through this 
compound concept, Croce pointed out the main flaw of historical materialism as he 
saw it, that is: considering ‘economic life as the substantive reality and moral life as 
an appearance’ (Croce 1946: 67). Thus, ‘ethico-political history’ focuses on what 
historical materialism treats as mere epiphenomena. As usually happens with 
Gramsci’s engagement with the Italian idealist, this concept is firstly thoroughly 
criticised, as ‘an arbitrary and mechanical hypostasis of the moment of hegemony, 
of political leadership, of consent in the life and development of the State and civil 
society’. A couple of paragraphs later, however, Gramsci asks whether the 
philosophy of praxis should give any room to the concept of ‘ethico-political 
history’, reaching the conclusion that it is indeed necessary to translate this concept 
into the language of the philosophy of praxis,40 with the aim of ‘asserting the 
moment of hegemony as essential to the concept of the State and in attaching “full 
weight” to the cultural factor, to cultural activity, to the necessity for a cultural front 
alongside the merely economic and political ones’ (Gramsci 1995: 345, Q10I§7). 
Through this conceptual movement away from the Russian meaning, hegemony can 
now also account for the reorganisation of society on the part of the state, rather 
than refer only to a social alliance that aims at overthrowing a particular form of 
state. 
The influence of Machiavelli on Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, on the 
other hand, is very well documented (Femia 1981 and 2005; Cox 1983; Fontana 1993 
and 2008). In particular, two elements of The Prince are particularly influential. 
Firstly, the much-used metaphor of the centaur – half-animal and half-man – to 
characterise the combination of force and consent typical of hegemony. Secondly, 
the consideration that the success of the prince lies in his ability to negotiate with his 
people, or at least with relevant groups within it, and to share common goals. Only 
a successful outcome of this negotiation can transform a moltitudine sciolta (untied 
multitude) into a populo (people), a collective subject. Therefore, the consensual 
aspect of hegemony does not rely solely on ideational persuasion, but has within it a 
                                                 
40 If I understand correctly, Boothman sees the translation of a concept as more than its 
simple adaptation. Rather, it is considered as a radical alteration of its meaning, which 
conserves only a somewhat arbitrarily selected part of it, and reworks the rest in order to 
make it compatible with one’s own philosophical conception (2002). 
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material component, which can take the form of cooptation of new groups within 
the hegemonic bloc, but also of spoil distribution among supporters. This opening 
of the consent box into its ideational and material components, is by no means 
marginal and has great implications for this work. 
A fourth and more direct source of inspiration were the linguistics studies 
Gramsci undertook at the University of Turin, which had a fundamental impact in 
shaping his conceptualisation of the relation between hegemonic and subaltern 
groups, and more specifically regarding the discursive production and reproduction 
of hegemony and subalternity (Ives 2004). Brought up mostly speaking the local 
dialect of Sardinian language, yet ‘fundamentally Italian’ in his culture and 
politically committed to internationalism, Gramsci was extremely interested in the 
dialect-national language nexus (Lo Piparo 1979). More specifically, even though 
entirely aware of the particularistic and often folkloristic tendencies of minority 
cultures, he soon recognised the power dimension implicit to language, and how 
dominant languages, though not necessarily co-extensive with hegemonic cultures, 
have a fundamental role in discursively shaping asymmetric relations between 
rulers and ruled, as each language constitutes ‘an integral conception of the world’ 
(1975: 644, Q5§123), whose affirmation is also a way of entrenching power relations 
putting the subaltern in what is deemed to be its place. 
These four aspects find a common matrix in Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis 
intended as historical dialectical materialism. Indeed, the Russian conception of 
hegemony is historicised and dialectically transformed through reference to the 
Crocean ‘ethico-political history’, allowing the state into the equation and 
overcoming the fixed contraposition between social classes typical of the Russian 
use of hegemony. In much the same way, the Crocean interpretation of history 
interacts with a socio-economic history typical of historical materialist approaches. 
Then, the Machiavellian legacy is deprived of its conjunctural aspects (preference 
for the prince over the republican form) and revived in its organic elements (dual 
view of hegemony as both force and consent). Lastly, the dialect-national language 
nexus leads to a mediated understanding of the discursive construction of the 
relation between hegemonic and subaltern subjects, showing once more the 
relevance of the dialectic to Gramsci’s thinking. 
Gramsci’s eclecticism is a potential explanation for the critique moved by 
Perry Anderson (1976), who in a very influential piece argues that in the Prison 
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Notebooks Gramsci provides at least three different answers to the question: where 
does hegemony operate? Anderson is certainly right when he argues that this 
seeming incongruence derives from another inconsistency in Gramsci’s work. 
Namely, the three conflicting descriptions of the relation between state and civil 
society: 
1. The state in opposition with civil society; 
2. The state as ‘the massive structure’ cancelling the autonomy of civil 
society; 
3. The state as an ‘outer surface’ of civil society. 
There are two underlying elements that unify these three versions. First, 
hegemony is confined to the superstructures. Second, two fundamental 
superstructures are identified, namely political society and civil society. But the 
relation between them varies in each of the interpretations. In the first case, civil 
society is pitted against the state, even though it is never completely detached from 
it. In the second case, the distinction between political and civil society is denied as a 
product of liberal ideology, and civil society ends up being subsumed within the 
state itself. In the last case, ‘the state = political society + civil society’ (Gramsci 1971: 
263, Q6§88), with the distinction between political and civil realm being maintained, 
but the state encompassing both of them. 
Shifting interpretations of state-civil society relations lead to shifting 
conceptions of hegemony, with the concept sometimes equated with consent and 
opposed to coercion, and sometimes including both: 
1. Hegemony pertains to civil society, and coercion to the state; 
2. Hegemony is operated by the state over both political and civil society; 
3. Hegemony is a synthesis of coercion and consent and operates both across 
political and civil society. 
Each of the three interpretations has advantages and drawbacks. The first, by 
reproducing the neat distinction between state and civil society, confines hegemony 
to the private realm. Moreover, being clearly opposed to coercion, hegemony is in 
the last instance equated with consent. Through this double distinction, the primacy 
of the state over civil society is assured by mere coercion. Such an understanding is 
extremely problematic as it underestimates the ideological power of the state. 
Moreover, a look at our complex societies is enough to falsify this view, as everyone 
can see that states do not have to resort to violence on their citizens to collect taxes 
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or even to exert violence against other states. Putting things within context, 
however, allows us to better understand Gramsci’s case. This separation of state and 
civil society, and the limitation of hegemony to the latter, is part of a longer 
elaboration on the main difference between East and West, and even more 
specifically between Tsarist Russia and Western European parliamentary systems. 
In the latter, Gramsci finds that there is ‘a proper relation’ between the state and 
civil society, whereas in Tsarist Russia ‘the state is everything’. One can already see 
here that the distinction between state and civil society has mostly an analytical 
value, rather than an ontological one. This analytical distinction has crucial 
implications in terms of political strategy, as it leads to the distinction between ‘war 
of manoeuvre’ and ‘war of position’, with the former more suited for situations 
where civil society is ‘gelatinous’ and relatively underdeveloped, and the latter 
more effective where civil society is ‘sturdy’ (1971: 235-8. Q7§16). 
The second definition goes in the opposite direction. Hegemony is still a 
synonym for consent, but – by subsuming civil society within the state – the latter 
becomes coextensive with the whole social formation, and cancels it. This 
conception is exemplified by an early note titled The Concept of State, where Gramsci 
argues that ‘by “State” should be understood not only the apparatus of government, 
but also the “private” apparatus of “hegemony” or civil society’ (1971: 261, Q6§137). 
Following from this, any potential autonomy of civil society is denied in the last 
instance. The problem with this conception is that by cancelling the state-civil 
society distinction, it forecloses the analysis of different forms of state, which are 
indeed shaped by the way the political and juridical apparatuses relate to the wider 
social formation. In other words, ‘in strict logic it becomes impossible and 
unnecessary to distinguish between bourgeois democracy and fascism’, and such 
choice undermines ‘any scientific attempt to define the specificity of bourgeois 
democracy in the West’ (Anderson 1976: 34).41 
Finally, the third definition is certainly the most complex one, with hegemony 
operating both across political and civil society, and – more interestingly even – 
with both the state and civil society having the possibility to exercise, resist or 
transform it. The primacy of the state is still related to the monopoly of coercion, but 
                                                 
41 This is the all-encompassing definition of the state retrieved by Althusser, with his concept 
of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’, controlled by the state, as much as coercion is, and 
diffused through both political and civil society, largely conceived as passive terrains of state 
activities. 
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– crucially – it is mostly maintained and exercised though consent. And hegemony 
is therefore defined as ‘the combination of force and consent, which balance each 
other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent’ (Gramsci 
1971: 80, ft.49, Q13§37). However, even this last definition is problematic. In 
particular, broadening hegemony both in its meaning (coercion + consent) and in its 
terrain of operation (political + civil society) in principle means giving coercive 
powers to civil society as well. However, in modern capitalist states, the monopoly 
of coercion is in the hands of state alone. To summarise with Anderson, ‘[i]deology 
is shared between civil society and the State; violence pertains to the State alone. In 
other words, the State enters twice over into any equation between the two’ (1976: 
32). 
Putting graphically the position of hegemony on the two dimensions of its 
conceptual extension and terrain of operation, we get to the following three 
matrixes: 
1. Hegemony pertains to civil society, and coercion to the state. 
Figure 1.1 – Gramsci’s hegemony (Take 1) 








Coercion   
Consent ?  
 
2. Hegemony is operated by the state over both political and civil society. 
Figure 1.2 – Gramsci’s hegemony (Take 2) 








Coercion  ? 
Consent   
 
3. Hegemony is a synthesis of coercion and consent and operates across both 
political and civil society. 
Figure 1.3 – Gramsci’s hegemony (Take 3) 








Coercion  X 
Consent   
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The questions marks and crosses point to the logical and/or empirical 
inconsistencies in each definition of hegemony given by Gramsci. How do we get 
out of this deadlock? I argue that this is possible only by accepting a differentiated 
understanding of hegemony, which allows to consider it as a combination of coercion 
and consent when it is exercised by the state, while the coercive element is lost when 
hegemony is exercised by civil society. A differentiated understanding also accounts 
for the additional difficulties in building hegemony without having political power, 
and hence without having access to the coercive apparatus. Moreover, a close look 
at the Prison Notebooks seems to support this choice. Gramsci gives coercive power to 
civil society only in one specific instance, when commenting on the borderline case 
of Fascist Italy: ‘In the current struggles, […] a weakened State structure is like a 
flagging army; the commandos – i.e. the private armed organisations – enter the 
field, and they have two tasks: to make use of illegal means, while the State appears 
to remain within legality, and thus to reorganise the State itself’ (1971: 232, Q1§133). 
Apart from this very isolated case, hegemony is consistently interpreted as consent 
when attributed to civil society (1975: 751-2, Q6§81; 1056, Q8§191). The mature 
conception of hegemony, with the state entering into the equation without 
cancelling civil society, finds expression in the later notebook on Machiavelli, and 
through the study of the Florentine thinker and diplomat the concept of hegemony 
becomes applicable to the state, subsuming within itself also the coercive aspect of 
state activity, as exemplified in the following matrix. 
Figure 1.4 – Gramsci’s differentiated understanding of hegemony 








Coercion   
Consent   
 
1.4.2. Hegemony in mainstream IR: Gramsci unheard? 
Students and scholars of IR and IPE need not be ‘Gramsciologists’ to be familiar 
with hegemony. Indeed, the term is very common within the discipline. So much 
that all the main schools of thought have developed a version of the concept. As a 
consequence, hegemony is found analytically useful by self-proclaimed realists and 
neo-realists (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1981 and 1987) and by liberals (Keohane 1984; 
Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). The heuristic value of the concept of hegemony is 
also witnessed by the recent effort by Ian Clark to develop an ‘English school theory 
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of hegemony’ (2009 and 2011). If we add to these the discursive conception of 
hegemony developed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), the take on the term typical of 
human geographers (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Agnew 2004) and of course neo-
Gramscian applications of various kinds (Cox 1981, 1983 and 1987; Gill 1991; 
Overbeek 1993; Rupert 1995; Morton 2007a), one can see that hegemony has a 
foothold in all the main approaches to IR and IPE. 
However, when a term becomes very popular, it is always worthwhile asking 
whether those that make so much use of it all mean the same thing. In the case of 
hegemony, it does not take long to realise that this is not the case. This is indeed 
rather surprising, considering that most studies of hegemony within mainstream 
IR/IPE tend to spring from the same source: the seminal study of Charles 
Kindleberger on the stabilisation of the world economy after systemic crises (1973). 
Although he never uses the term ‘hegemonic stability theory’, coined by Robert 
Keohane in his influential interpretation, Kindleberger provides the basic argument 
on which such theory is based. Succinctly stated, the most powerful state within a 
given international system has the incentive to provide financial stability to the rest 
of the system, because such stability will benefit the prominent state as well. 
Financial stability is therefore perceived as a public good (e.g.: non-rival and non-
excludable), and its provision is in the interest of the dominant economic power, 
because it will put it in the conditions to make the most out of its economic 
preponderance. And as outlined by Kindleberger in a famous quote: ‘for the world 
economy to be stabilised, there has to be a stabiliser, one stabiliser’ (1973: 305). 
Despite the common source of inspiration, it is possible to identify at least four 
different meanings for the term ‘hegemony’ within mainstream IR and IPE.  
Depending on the author and the context, hegemony is variously defined as: (i) 
preponderance of material resources; (ii) preponderance of material resources and 
willingness to exert them; (iii) leadership; (iv) material incentives and socialisation. 
The first definition originates in realist and neo-realist circles, so much that for 
Gilpin a hegemon is a state that ‘controls or dominates lesser states’ (1981: 28). 
Considering the immediate translation of material capabilities into power 
underlying neorealist theory, preponderance of material resources is taken to be a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the establishment of an hegemonic order. The 
second definition adds a voluntary element to hegemony, in that it combines the 
preponderance of material resources with the willingness by the dominant state to 
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use it in order to establish an hegemonic system (Keohane 1984: 35). Despite this 
new element, the conditio sine qua non allowing a state to pursue an hegemonic 
project is still material supremacy. The ideational element gets into the picture with 
the third definition, where hegemony is equated with leadership (Pahre 2005).42 In 
this case, hegemony is defined as ‘a relationship of legitimate domination exercised 
by one country over the others’ (Mjøset 1990: 21). The material element is still the 
fundamental prerequisite for the exercise of hegemony, but in this case it is coupled 
with the ability of the dominant state to be considered legitimate by those included 
in the hegemonic system. The fourth definition, finally, brings socialisation into the 
definition of hegemony, by arguing that hegemony should be understood as a 
combination of material and non-material incentives (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). 
Again, material incentives can be offered only by states that are in a position of 
relative superiority. However, this perspective significantly takes into account non-
material elements, such as ideology and norms. 
To sum up, within mainstream IR and IPE we have some rather different 
conceptions of hegemony. If one is to find the common core, as it happens in the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, hegemony ends up being 
simply ‘the occupation of a dominant position within any system’ (2001: 669). 
However, I deem worthwhile engaging with the mainstream conceptions of 
hegemony from a Gramscian perspective, at least in order to measure the distance 
between the dominant approaches to hegemony within the discipline and the one 
adopted here. At best, each of these definitions highlights one of the specific aspects 
of the broader Gramscian definition, be it raw power, willingness to exert it (largely 
implicit in the Gramscian conceptualisation, as hegemony is a social construction, 
and therefore it requires an underlying will on the part of those who establish it), 
ability to lead rather than simply dominate, and socialisation as one of the 
mechanism through which hegemony is produced and reproduced.  
Despite these ostensible similarities, there is one ontological difference 
between what hegemony means for Gramsci and what it means for mainstream 
IR/IPE, and such difference makes any fruitful comparison hopeless. Whereas for 
Gramsci hegemony is a phenomenon requiring a state and a society to which the 
                                                 
42 Starting from a realist perspective, Lake argues strongly against the identification of 
hegemony with leadership. In his own understanding, ‘hegemony is necessarily coercive 
and based on the exercise of power’ (1993: 469). 
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state relates, within mainstream approaches states are considered as black boxes, 
and hegemony is a possible condition mostly between them, and not inside them, as 
is the case for Gramsci. This neglect of the social dimension of hegemony, which 
goes well beyond the ability to persuade other states, and finds its roots in the 
system of social relations has another major consequence on the way hegemony is 
conceived within mainstream IR/IPE: hegemony can only be exerted by states in a 
situation of material preponderance. That is, the possibilities of a counter-
hegemonic project are entirely dependent on the acquisition of material 
predominance. Once again, ideas and ideologies are welcome only if they accept the 
back seat. Summing up, from a Gramscian perspective, mainstream conceptions of 
hegemony replicate the twin flaw typical of the political and philosophical theories 
from which they arise: state-centrism and mechanical materialism. 
 
1.4.3. Hegemony in critical IR and IPE: Gramsci misheard? 
It appears now quite clearly that Gramsci has not influenced much the way 
hegemony has been employed in the discipline. Difference in sources – with 
mainstream IR and IPE scholars referring to Kindleberger, and Marxists, critical 
theorists and post-structuralists referring to Gramsci – probably accounts for the 
presence of two different concepts with the same name mentioned by Joseph (2008). 
When we turn our eyes to the fringes of the discipline, on the other hand, the name 
of Gramsci recurs with a staggering frequency. Among the plethora of 
interpretations inspired by his work, this subsection will focus on the use of 
hegemony by Cox and by the two main strands of the neo-Gramscian school. 
In the first piece of his Gramscian triptych, Cox defines hegemony as ‘a fit 
between power, ideas and institutions’, with power being seen in the following page 
as ‘emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of 
accumulated material capabilities’ (1981: 140-1, original emphasis). Thus, in this first 
phase of development of his critical theory, hegemony is related to social relations 
through the mediation of power. Interestingly, in this definition of hegemony social 
relations are excluded both from ideas and institutions. Moreover, the coercion-
consent spectrum which is key to the Gramscian conception of hegemony is left 
implicit. By the time Power, Production and World Order goes to print, Cox’s 
definition of hegemony has reached its maturity. Now hegemony is ‘dominance of a 
particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a 
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broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact 
ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social 
classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the 
less powerful’ (Cox 1987: 7). In this formulation, the consensual aspect of hegemony 
is made explicit, and is put at the service of the predominant actor or actors, be they 
states or social classes. When compared to the first definition, however, this second 
one does not produce any significant advancement when it comes to the 
conceptualisation of the social substratum of hegemony. Indeed, the reference to 
‘leading social classes’ as an alternative to dominant states seems more paying lip-
service to the historical materialist tradition rather than really informing Cox’s 
conception of hegemony. 
As always, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. It is here that the Cox’s 
definition of hegemony fails its litmus test, leading to conclusions which are not 
qualitatively different from those reached by scholars using hegemony in 
mainstream IR (Worth 2011: 381): a state has to be powerful enough to establish its 
hegemony on the international scale, and when this is not possible anymore we 
have a hegemonic decline and eventually a crisis, which can take the form of 
economic or military conflict, and is often followed by a non-hegemonic period, 
until another state is strong enough to internationalise its hegemonic project and so 
on. Despite its best intentions, Cox’s empirical application of hegemony suffers from 
the same state-centrism which it was meant to overcome in order to focus on the 
social constitution of hegemony.43 
In my view, the main flaw of Cox’s approach lies in the mis-conceptualisation 
of the Gramscian conception of the state-civil society relation, which inevitably – as 
Anderson showed for Gramsci himself – affects the way hegemony is defined. More 
specifically, Cox is caught in an ambiguity characterising most Marxist studies of 
the international, as it was typical of Marx himself, who in his fleeting references to 
the international never fully clarified how society was to be conceived beyond the 
national scale. In his exchange with Alex Callinicos, Justin Rosenberg points this out 
very clearly: ‘Nothing requires that the conception of “society” presupposed by 
Marx’s concept of the capitalist mode of production should be a singular one. 
                                                 
43 This is particularly visible in the chapter of Power, Production and World Order dealing with 
the ‘world economic crisis’ (1987: 273-291), where the understanding of hegemony in state-
centric terms leads Cox to reach the same conclusion of several mainstream accounts: that 
already by the mid-1980s US hegemony and the related Pax Americana were declining. 
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Equally, however, nothing in Marx’s thought prevents it from being assumed to be 
such. And most Marxist approaches in international theory have in fact left this 
assumption itself untouched’ (2008: 87). In his extension of hegemony to the 
international scale, Cox implicitly takes society as singular, being trapped in a 
‘many states-one society’ logic that oversimplifies – sometimes minimising, some 
others magnifying – the impact of social relations of production. 
These opposing tendencies, towards state-centrism and towards class-
centrism, are visible respectively in the Coxian and in the Amsterdam school. 
Within the first strand, the working assumption is the existence of a consolidated 
domestic hegemony, whose construction and contestation is rarely touched upon. 
Whereas this might be understandable in that after all we are dealing with 
international studies, this approach has an unwelcome consequence. Looking at the 
internationalisation of domestic hegemonies translates into looking at how 
leadership, usually springing from core states, is exercised either through the 
‘internationalisation of the state’ or through formal or informal international 
institutions.44 As a consequence, even at the international scale very little attention is 
paid to patterns of bandwagoning, emulation and contestation in relation to the 
dominant hegemony. Thus, this approach suffers from two flaws. On the one hand, 
as noted elsewhere (Hobson 2007), it assumes a pattern of hegemonic diffusion from 
the core towards the periphery, thus resolving itself in a heavily Western-centric 
account of how hegemony works in the international system. On the other hand, 
hegemony is supposed to work in a top-down fashion even in social terms, 
conceived as it is as hegemony of statesmen representing the dominant classes, 
giving subaltern groups very little room to make their voices heard, if not in the 
defensive form of resistance (Gill 2003). 
Whereas the Coxian school proper veers towards state-centrism in its 
conclusions, Van der Pijl and his followers rely on a more traditional class-based 
account. In their work, hegemony is more of an ancillary concept, as it constitutes 
one of the ways in which the emerging transnational capitalist class – the key 
explanatory tool – establishes and consolidates its position in the globalising 
                                                 
44 The thesis of the ‘internationalisation of the state’ has been best developed by Stephen Gill 
(2003). Gill himself was a pioneer in the focus on the role of informal institutions, such as the 
Trilateral Commission (1990). Craig Murphy, on the other hand, provided the most 
comprehensive study of how historical blocs are constructed – and thus hegemony is 
affirmed – through the work of international organisations (1994).  
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political economy. In this case, the ‘many states-one society’ logic pursues the 
opposite solution, with the more internationalised fractions of capital gradually 
untying themselves from state structures and reconstituting a new hegemony 
beyond the state, relying on an already global society. The final result is not 
different from that achieved from the Coxian School, as the transnational capitalist 
class is treated an unambiguously transatlantic (Van der Pijl 1984 and 1998; 
Overbeek 1990 and 1993), and thus Western-centric, and its position in the 
elaboration, construction and diffusion of hegemonic projects is considered as 
relatively unchallenged from below. 
If these traditions are caught in the opposing poles of the ‘many states-one 
society’ dilemma, and yet they share the same problems of Western-centrism and 
elitism, how is it possible to move beyond this deadlock? 
 
1.4.4. Hegemony in this study 
As out main unit of analysis, the national scale, tends to be dominated by the state 
in the Arab world at large (Ayubi 1995: 31-2), in this study hegemony is mostly 
considered in its exercise on the part of the state, and of the social groups with 
access to political power. Following Figure 1.4, this means that hegemony is to be 
intended as a combination of coercion and consent, which ‘balance each other 
reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent’ (Gramsci 1971: 
80, ft.49, Q13§37). The strong subjective element carried by the adverb ‘excessively’ 
is to be seen as an invitation to explore the different forms that hegemony takes, 
being from time to time more or less inclusive, more or less ideologically 
compelling, and in the last analysis more or less successful. Elaborating on Femia’s 
typology (1981: 46-50), it is also possible to observe the evolution of hegemony in 
time as oscillating between the extremes of integral hegemony and failed hegemony.45 
We are closer to the former when the overall society exhibits a substantial degree of 
‘moral and intellectual unity’, and thus the ruling bloc obtains an almost unqualified 
commitment on the part of subaltern groups. Failed hegemony, on the other hand, 
sees the dissolution of this political and ideological bond cutting across social forces, 
                                                 
45 Femia (1981: 46-50) proposes three types of hegemony: (i) integral; (ii) decadent; (iii) 
minimal. I maintain that the moment in which an hegemony dissolves, and thus fails, still 
needs to be considered within this continuum. 
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leading either to raw coercion taking centre-stage to ensure the survival of the 
political order or to political disintegration. 
Hegemony as a balanced combination of coercion and consent does not take 
place in a vacuum. This is where the method of articulation, employed by Gramsci 
and explicitly developed by Laclau and Mouffe,46 becomes of vital importance in 
understanding how the specific configuration taken by hegemony is shaped by the 
articulation of structure and superstructure, encapsulated in the hitherto neglected 
concept of historical bloc,47 intended as form of asymmetrical yet mutual constitution. 
As with the other compound concept discussed earlier (‘philosophy of praxis’), 
there is a dialectical understanding of reality underlying the very definition of 
historical bloc, considered as the ‘interrelated and reciprocal development of 
structure and superstructure’ (Morton 2007a: 96). On this ground, the historical bloc 
is to be understood as both holistic and relativistic, as totalising and self-limiting. 
On the one hand, the term ‘bloc’ refers to what Croce called ‘unity of the distincts’, 
thus as the inescapable relation between the realm of production and the realm of 
state-civil society relations, with its political and ideological implications. On the 
other hand, the term ‘historical’ refers to the conjunctural conditions which define 
the specificities of any given relation between structure and superstructure, and 
thus the form taken by the historical bloc. From this starting point, hegemony 
becomes ‘the component that transforms Marx’s somewhat static structure-
superstructure metaphor into Gramsci’s more dynamic one of historical bloc’ 
(Boothman 2008: 33). 
For the sake of analytical clarity, in this study the relation between structure 
and superstructure at the heart of Gramsci’s thought is disaggregated in its three 
fundamental instances, in order to better grasp the different forms of articulation on 
which hegemony is constituted. First, the articulation between the economic and the 
political, which leads to a conception of hegemony as inescapably related to social 
relations of production, but at the same shaped by the struggle of social forces in the 
political arena. Second, the articulation of the international and the national scale, 
                                                 
46 Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as ‘any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (2001: 
105). 
47 Following Morton (2007a: 218, ft.8), the adjective ‘historical’ is preferred to the alternative 
‘historic’ used by Cox and other neo-Gramscian scholars. This is because whereas ‘historic’ 
tends to give ‘a static or “snapshot-like” description’, the term ‘historical’ points to the 
dynamic development through which an historical bloc develops. 
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with hegemony emerging as an essentially national phenomenon, but whose 
conditions of existence – and interscalar extension, when possible – are determined 
in the first instance by the international scale, and by the patterns of uneven and 
combined development characterising capitalist relations of production. Third, the 
interaction between material factors and ideas, with the discursive construction of 
hegemony intertwined with material exchanges equally important in rendering 
hegemony acceptable to subaltern groups.  
With respect to the first form of articulation, the concept of historical bloc – by 
relating structure and superstructure in a reciprocal way – allows us to avoid the 
quagmire of economic determinism. At the same time, it also prevents the slide into 
multi-causality, ‘for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, 
must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in 
the decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (Gramsci 1971: 161, Q13§18). In this 
respect, Gramsci’s conception is better exemplified in Stuart Hall’s phrase of 
‘economic determinism in the first instance’ (1996a: 45). From this perspective, the 
economic structure is seen as a first moulding influence defining what Braudel 
called the ‘limits of the possible’, thus setting the boundaries of a playing field 
within which political agency develops its strategies and projects. Thus, as pointed 
out by Jessop (1990: 208-9), an hegemonic project cannot be successful if it does not 
relate in some way to an existing or prospective strategy of capital accumulation, as 
we will see in 2.2.3. At the same time, the relative autonomy enjoyed by the political 
means that in its interaction with the economic it does have the chance to reshape 
those very boundaries within which agency works. This is displayed most clearly in 
Gramsci’s remarks about the political nature of laissez-faire policies and yet their 
ability at the same time to reshape the economic structure and affect the distribution 
of wealth within a state (1971: 159-62, Q13§18). 
The interplay between determination in the first instance by the economic 
structure and relative autonomy of the political, and particularly of the state, is 
probably best illustrated with reference to an empirical example. Up until the late 
1960s, Egypt pursued a state capitalist model, with an accumulation regime 
revolving around the central position of the state in production, management and 
redistribution. Sadat’s infitah, launched in 1973, while responding to the shifting 
imperatives of global capital accumulation, also provided the state with the 
opportunity of creating its own capitalist class, the so-called infitah bourgeoisie that 
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plays such a central role in the argument developed in this thesis. In turn, this 
exercise of relative autonomy on the part of the state fed back on the economic 
structure, partially restructuring the accumulation regime and thus social relations 
of production.48 
On the second dimension, the relation between national and international 
scale is also conceived in an interactive way. Though related to the economic 
structure, hegemony is shaped, asserted and contested in the political arena, still 
organised by territorial states and their boundaries. Thus, contrary to proponents of 
transnational hegemony such as Robinson (2005), hegemony is better understood as 
originating at the national scale, arising from the evolution of state-civil society 
relations. But if we accept the national nature of hegemony, how is it possible to 
conceive of its outward expansion? First of all, one should not forget that the 
national scale, and the hegemony emerging within it, is not placed in a void, but 
rather within a global political economy where capital accumulation is organised 
around – and further reinforces – processes of uneven and combined development. 
Gramsci is adamant in maintaining that international factors have a causal role in 
shaping constraints and opportunities that will guide actions at the national scale, 
and all the more so in peripheral states.49  
Also in this case one can identify a form of determination in the first instance, 
with the international scale defining the boundaries of action within which the 
national scale is allowed to devise and put into practice its strategies and projects. 
Within this context, the national scale retains its relative autonomy, and might as 
well exercise it in order to influence those very international conditions. Under this 
framework, it is possible to conceive how national hegemonies may extend beyond 
their scale of origin, and how once internationalised they penetrate into other states 
and other national scales. Following from this, the global political economy can be 
understood as a system of interlocking hegemonies between and across different 
spatial scales. These hegemonies might be nested into each other, but sometimes 
might also be pitted against each other. 
To illustrate the workings of interscalar articulation with respect to this issue 
of affinity or opposition to the prevailing hegemony at the international scale, it is 
                                                 
48 This empirical example is discussed much more extensively in Chapter 3. 
49 In a note on the causes and consequence of the Great Depression, Gramsci expresses this 
view most clearly: ‘The history of the subaltern states is explained by the history of the 
hegemonic states’ (1975: 1759, Q15§5). 
 59 
worthwhile to sketch a comparison between two moments of Egyptian republican 
history. On the one hand, Nasser’s attempt to develop hegemony at the national 
scale and extend it at the regional scale was obviously influenced by the 
international climate of those decades, in economic, political and ideological terms. 
Yet, the Nasserist project developed in opposition to both the post-war Pax 
Americana based on Keynesianism and the coercion-intensive domination of the 
Soviet bloc by the USSR. On the other hand, the move away from Nasserist 
principles and the attempt to develop hegemony on new foundations saw both 
Sadat and Mubarak trying to articulate the national scale along the lines advocated 
by the emerging form of neoliberal capitalism in the core economies. 
On the third dimension, whereas hegemony is usually conceived in terms of 
‘intersubjective meanings’ and ‘collective images of the world order’ (Cox 1981: 
136), the articulation of material factors and ideas reminds us that the construction 
of hegemony also takes place at a more down-to-earth level. Following Anne 
Sassoon, hegemony is to be understood as an exchange, intended in its broadest meaning 
(2001: 6). Most of the neo-Gramscian literature has focused on the ideational side of 
exchange, with subaltern groups absorbing or resisting the conception of the world 
developed and promoted by the ruling classes. However, it is equally important to 
keep in mind that exchanges are also material, regarding the delivery (or promise) 
of real (or prospective) improvements in the life of those involved, be they different 
fractions within the ruling bloc or subaltern groups. 
Beyond the two dimensions of exchange, the general relation between material 
factors and ideas is once more best encapsulated in the concept of determination in 
the first instance, in this case by the material, and in the corresponding relative 
autonomy of ideas. In other words, and not particularly surprisingly from a Marxist 
perspective, material conditions do constrain the range of ideas and conceptions of 
the world that can be successful in a given context. At the same time, and in this 
case moving away from the Marxist orthodoxy, ideas and ideologies develop a 
significant autonomy, mostly displayed in two forms. On the one hand, it is not 
uncommon to see ideas and ideologies produced arising from specific material 
conditions outliving the change in those very conditions which initially determined 
their existence. On the other hand, ideologies are also a device through which we 
decode reality and frame it in order to make sense of it. Thus, successful ideologies 
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end up influencing the way we perceive material factors, and by this they influence 
their evolution.50 
Articulation takes place not only within each of these dimensions, but also 
across them. The increased interconnection of the global economy, with the 
resulting ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey 1989: 240-2), produced a change in the 
scalar dimension with significant consequences for material and ideational factors 
that is worth delineating by way of illustration. The existence of more integrated 
national economies means ruling blocs of different states intensifying their relations 
with each other. Even more than before this means that the very exchanges outlined 
by Sassoon may take place not only within the national scale, but also across scales. 
In material terms, a typical case of interscalar exchange is the decision on the part of 
ruling blocs in the periphery to open up their economy, with consequent shift in the 
capital accumulation regime, to allow foreign investment and foreign aid, with the 
prospect of benefitting from the deriving economic growth at best, or from the 
division of spoils at worse. In ideational terms, interscalar exchange is usually 
translated in the reliance on a ‘conception of the world’, as Gramsci would put it, 
which has already become ‘common sense’ among the major players on the 
international scale.  
Looking back at the main sources which inspired Gramsci’s elaborations on 
hegemony, and taking seriously Anderson’s charge of theoretical inconsistency 
allows to move towards a differentiated understanding of the concept. Hegemony is 
on the one hand equated with consent only when it emerges from within society, 
more often than not in opposition – a counter-hegemonic project – to an existing 
economic and political order. On the other hand, hegemony is best seen as a 
combination of coercion and consent when it is exercised by the state and by those 
which have access to state power. This latter meaning is the one on which this work 
focuses. Other than being differentiated, hegemony here is also understood as 
articulated on three dimensions, which correspond to the three fundamental 
                                                 
50 I find Colin Hay’s comparative application of this argument to the 1970s and current crises 
particularly instructive. In the Leonard Shapiro memorial lecture (2011), Hay shows how the 
discourse about the economy was able to depict the 1970s crisis as structural, thus requiring 
a substantial restructuring of the global political economy. On the contrary, over the past 
few years discursive construction was key in portraying the crisis as related to single 
components and not to the system as a whole, thus requiring adjustment measures at the 
national scale (i.e.: austerity), without putting into question the overall structure of the 
global political economy. 
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instances of the structure-superstructure relation, involving respectively the 
economic and the political, the international and the national, the material and the 
ideational. The exploration of these dimensions is inescapable if one is to 
understand whether in the specific empirical case hegemonies in the plural collude 
or collide, and with what results. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
The best prospects for a move beyond the neo-Gramscian school are already implicit 
in Gramsci’s work, and starting from this assumption this chapter has developed an 
alternative interpretation to the one dominant within IR and IPE. The foundations 
for this different take on Gramsci have been identified in the crucial yet neglected 
philosophy of praxis, which emerges from the Prison Notebooks as a peculiar version 
of historical dialectical materialism. Understood on these terms, Gramsci’s thought 
can be reinterpreted in counterpoint to the ‘Coxian Gramsci’, which has been 
criticised on epistemological, methodological and substantive grounds. The end 
result of this process is a substantial reworking of the concept of hegemony, 
analysed in this study mostly as constructed, performed and preserved by the state 
and its ruling bloc. Not dissimilarly from the Coxian perspective, hegemony is 
defined as a combination of coercion and consent. However, the main difference 
from existing accounts is that hegemony is conceived as an articulated 
phenomenon, which is shaped on three different dimensions, namely in the relation 
between structure and superstructure, national and international scale, material and 
ideational factors. 
This triple articulation allows to take hegemony outside of the dilemmas 
which have thwarted neo-Gramscian efforts at understanding the evolution of the 
global political economy. With respect to the relation between structure and 
superstructure, thinking in terms of determination in the first instance by the 
economic and relative autonomy of the state allows to escape the twin problems of 
state-centrism and class-centrism, which still weaken the research agenda 
respectively of the Coxian school proper and of the Amsterdam school. Looking at 
the relation between international and national scale, the determination in the first 
instance by the international need not see the national scale as passive recipient of 
external forms of hegemony, as it happens with both the main strands of neo-
Gramscian theory. Rather, the national scale is seen as directly engaged in the 
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adaptation, domestication and potentially also subversion of external pressures, 
using the relative autonomy from the international to devise its own specific path to 
capital accumulation. Lastly, on the material-ideational dimension, arguing for the 
relevance of the material constitution of ideology permits to understand how 
hegemonic projects are constructed and maintained not only by virtue of their 
ideological appeal, but are in the first instance determined by existing material 
conditions, though ideas then become a force of their own, eventually able to 
influence those material conditions that shaped their emergence in the first place. 
The differentiated (between state and civil society) and articulated (on the 
three dimensions just discussed) conception of hegemony adopted in this study 
allows on the one hand to paint a more nuanced picture, particularly if we pin 
down the consensual aspect of hegemony to the actual benefits, however marginal, 
accruing to subaltern groups to gain their acquiescence to the existing order. On the 
other hand, the Gramscian approach developed here unveils the fragmented nature 
of hegemony, both at the national scale, exploring the conditions of existence of a 
system that is hegemonic towards some social groups and coercive and exclusive 
towards others, and in terms of interscalar articulation, with interlinking 
hegemonies moving across a spectrum ranging from identity to opposition. Yet, 
neither nuance nor fragmentation are meant to hide in any way the fundamental 
exploitative character of hegemony. After all, we are still referring to a ‘heretic 




THE GRAMSCIAN ARTICULATION APPROACH IN PRACTICE: 




This study aims to analyse the transformations in the constitution and reproduction 
of hegemony in Egypt during the last two decades of economic reforms. One of the 
risks of referring to a much used concept such as hegemony is to consider it as a 
working assumption, rather than a phenomenon – or better: the phenomenon – to 
be explained itself. This chapter takes the somewhat uneasy route of pushing 
hegemony to the background, in order to focus on the social and spatial relations 
providing the conditions for its emergence and shaping the forms that it may take. 
In the previous chapter we have seen how hegemony emerges from a 
dialectical relation between structure and superstructure. We have also seen how 
this relation can be disaggregated in its three main instances. This chapter analyses 
how the relations involved in each of these three instances – between the economic 
and the political, the international and the national, the material and the ideational – 
are treated in the respective literatures, and makes the case that the articulation 
approach is a more fruitful entry point to understand the three dimensions on 
which hegemony is constituted, reproduced, transformed and potentially also 
destroyed. 
Looking at these wider debates in the literature serves two important scopes. 
Firstly, it allows to concretise the highly theoretical approach developed in Chapter 
1, bringing it closer to that ‘effective reality’ always at the heart of Gramsci’s 
concerns. Secondly, it gives the chance to put into sharper focus the added value of 
the approach developed in this work vis-à-vis the merits and limits of other 
approaches, particularly in critical IPE, which have dealt with the impact of 
neoliberal globalisation on the political economy of peripheral countries. 
The first section takes a detour away from the literature to which this study 
aims to contribute, focusing on the conceptualisation of the relation between 
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economic and political change according to modernisation theory and to the 
accounts focusing on rent-seeking elites. A discussion of these mainstream 
approaches is useful not solely, or not particularly, because of their intellectual 
merits, but rather because of their influence on generations of policymakers, 
shaping their perception of processes of economic and political co-evolution, and 
thus effectively playing a performative role. The discussion of these mainstream 
approaches is followed by a further development of the Gramscian approach 
focusing on the articulation of accumulation regimes and political regimes. The 
second section looks at the workings of interscalar articulation, firstly discussing the 
body of literature on uneven and combined development on the differentiation of 
space within a single logic of capitalist development, and then moving to the 
discussion of how this issue has been tackled in critical IPE and area studies. The 
third section focuses on the articulation of material and ideational factors firstly in 
the understanding of world system theory and the Amsterdam school, and then in 
the positions expressed by the Coxian school and by constructivist literature. The 
final section discusses what sort of evidence is needed, and which methods are more 
appropriate, to assess the validity of the various approaches taken into 
consideration. 
 
2.2. Forms of change: from accumulation regime to political regime? 
The first instance of the structure-superstructure relation fundamental for 
understanding how hegemony is constituted, but also reproduced and transformed, 
refers to the articulation of economic and political factors. Indeed, one of the most 
common discussions in mainstream political economy, and even more so among 
practitioners, concerns the way in which economic transformations could spur 
political change. For example, the extremely influential literature firstly on 
modernisation and then on democratisation identified a causal link by which a 
certain type of economic changes, and most eminently the growth of a large and 
independent middle class, would also constitute a social pre-condition for the move 
towards democratic systems of rule (Lipset 1959 and 1994).51 The first two parts of 
this section discuss how modernisation theory and elite-centred approaches 
                                                 
51 On the influence of modernisation theory, and of the literature on political development 
born out of it, on the way policymakers think about the relation between economic and 
political change, see Cammack 1997. 
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respectively conceptualise the relation between economic and political change, with 
each of them providing a causal relation that will be discussed at length in Chapter 
4 in the light of the empirical material presented. The third subsection criticises the 
conceptualisation of the relation between the economic and the political provided in 
this mainstream literature, arguing that it starts from the naturalisation of a 
separation between the two realms which instead is an apparent one (Morton 2007a: 
130), promoted by the concomitant affirmation of capitalist relations of production 
and the interstate system. From this position, the relation between the economic and 
the political, and between accumulation regime and political regime as their forms 
of regulation, can be reconceptualised from a non-reductionist yet class-based 
perspective. This account argues that pre-existing class relations determined in the 
first instance the extent of the change in the accumulation regime, which eventually 
produced a shift in the relations of class forces. This shift provided the boundaries 
within which relative autonomy could be exerted in the form of the reconfiguration 
of power relations within the political regime. 
 
2.2.1. Modernisation theory: development, democratisation and the middle class 
Structural change, variously defined, is at the heart of the considerations of a 
sizeable literature that has also considerably influenced policymakers.52 
Modernisation theory, and then democratisation theory as its most influential 
offspring, provided an explanation of how changes in the economic structure might 
also lead to political change. In its most synthetic formulation, modernisation theory 
argues that all societies go through five stages of economic development: 
traditional, transition, take-off, drive to maturity and age of high consumption 
(Rostow 1960: 4-11).53 Whereas their core interest is in identifying the conditions for 
successful economic development, it is possible to read between the lines an implicit 
argument on the potential transmission of economic change to the political sphere. 
As economic development occurs, society becomes functionally more complex and 
socially more mobilised,54 and centralised forms of government are likely to be 
                                                 
52 The following part on modernisation and democratisation theory relies heavily on Roccu 
(2011). Hinnebusch (2006) provides an excellent review of the literature on the apparent 
misfit between democratisation theory and authoritarian resilience in the Middle East. 
53 Whereas some flexibility in the timing is allowed, there are little doubts that all these five 
stages are necessary, and in this specific sequence, for successful modernisation to occur. 
54 The expert eye will notice the striking similarity between this formulation by 
modernisation theory and Parsons’ structural functionalist approach to sociology (1951), 
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increasingly under strain, thus making more likely the transition towards more 
open political regimes.55 
Building on this argument, in his 1959 study Lipset identified a positive 
correlation between economic development and democracy. To put it in his own 
terms, ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy’ (1959: 75).56 Why does this happen? According to Lipset, economic 
development influences significantly ‘the political role of the middle class through 
changing the shape of the stratification structure so that this shifts from an 
elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing 
middle-class’. Thus, a consequence of economic development is the increased size of 
the middle class, and a ‘large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating 
conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalise 
extremist groups’ (Ibid: 83). During his 1993 presidential address to the American 
Sociological Association, Lipset further developed his argument, by maintaining 
that industrial capitalism ‘produces a middle class that can stand up to the state and 
provide the resources for independent groups’ (1994: 2). Through this extension, 
Lipset brings into the picture another element supporting the democratic orientation 
of the middle class in developed countries: its autonomy from political power. 
In the literature on democratisation spurred by the ‘third wave’, Huntington 
also identified the middle class as the key agent of democratic transition. With the 
weakening of radical rural movements and the strengthening of the urban middle 
class produced by industrialisation and urbanisation, Huntington argued, ‘[t]he 
potential threats democracy posed to middle-class groups thus declined, and those 
groups became increasingly confident of their ability to advance their interests 
through electoral politics’ (1991: 67). At the same time, economic development can 
undermine authoritarian regimes in the form of rapid growth building up a set of 
                                                                                                                                          
which had become extremely influential in US academia during the first years of the Cold 
War. 
55 The first approaches of this type on the Middle East came as early as in the late 1950s. See 
in particular Issawi (1956) and Lerner (1958). 
56 More specifically, Lipset unpacks economic developments into what he considers its four 
basic components: wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation and education. Several indicators 
for each of these components are identified, and the empirical analysis shows that the higher 
the value of each of the four components, the more likely that the country under 
examination will sustain a democratic political system. 
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pressures that the incumbent regime is unable to manage and contain.57 Crucially, 
and as illustrated with reference to the Brazilian case, if these pressures are tackled 
through opening up the economic system to foreign trade and investment, 
democratisation will follow. On the other hand, the Chinese and Iranian examples 
show how when rapid growth is confronted with sustained economic closure, either 
repression or revolution ensues (Ibid: 70-2). 
The passage from economic liberalisation and strong private sector 
participation in the economy to economic development and then to democratic 
transition constitutes the causal chain maintained by modernisation and 
democratisation theory. After all, ever since Rostow, the open economy was widely 
seen as the end state ‘natural’ to democracies. Thus, if economic and political 
openness are related, so must the processes leading to them. This correlation 
became ever more appealing since the 1970s with the increase of economic 
interdependence on a global scale. In particular, three mechanisms leading from 
economic to political openness have been hypothesised: political openness further 
encourages economic development, and thus beneficiaries of the latter will push for 
the former (Lipset 1994; Im 1996); economic development empowers capital owners 
and entrepreneurs with a stake in the smooth operation of international business 
and thus less conflict, an outcome better achieved through democratic means (Oneal 
and Russett 1999; Boix 2003); political development levels down economic 
inequality, thus widening the domestic market and providing a further source of 
economic development. 
In sum, we can see a set of three main claims emerging with regard to the 
relation between economic development, democratisation and the role of the middle 
class. Firstly, capitalist development leads to the emergence of a strong and 
autonomous middle class. Secondly, in virtue of being both strong and autonomous, 
the middle class has a strong interest in leading democratic transitions. Thirdly, 
both in times of recession and of rapid economic growth (as they both unsettle the 
pre-existing social structure), economic opening improves the prospects for 
successful democratic transition. Once again, this happens because the middle class 
is the main beneficiary of economic liberalisation and private sector strengthening. 
In sum: 
                                                 
57 In much the same way, economic recession can rattle the existing social structure and thus 
lead to similar consequences (Ibid: 59). 
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Changes in the capital accumulation regime lead to a strengthening of the middle class (more 
inclusive social structure), which pushes for a change in the political regime. 
 
2.2.2. Predatory elites: development, rent and the power of the powerful 
The promotion of economic reforms on the part of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) since the 1980s led to the emergence of a literature analysing the 
relation between economic development and political regimes from a remarkably 
different position. This perspective is held together by a specific focus on agency 
rather than structure, and on some agents more than others. Three main strands 
may be identified in this literature, focusing respectively on elites and distributional 
coalitions, the state as an actor, and informal networks. All these accounts start from 
the assumption that actors are driven by considerations of self-interest, but they 
differ significantly with respect to their conceptualisation of their social groups of 
reference and of their interactions. 
The most influential accounts on the political economy of IFIs promoted 
reforms in developing countries were informed by a focus on elites and 
distributional coalitions (Nelson 1989; Haggard and Kaufman 1992 and 1995). 
Following a well-established tradition in the literature on pressure groups and 
collective action (Olson 1971; Becker 1983), both elites and distributional coalitions 
are assumed to base their actions on considerations of welfare maximisation. When 
it comes to closed economic regimes, this assumption translates into a rent-seeking 
behaviour, as elites want to use the positional advantage acquired in the previous 
regime to consolidate their position within the reformed economic system (Krueger 
1974).58 Thus, according to these accounts the interaction of elites, and their ability of 
reaping most of the benefits of reform, plays against a potential spill-over from the 
economic to the political sphere. 
A second strand looks at the requisites that the state must possess for 
economic reforms to be successful. The focus on elites and distributional coalitions 
was perceived as being too narrow, in that it tended to conceptualise the state – 
                                                 
58 A similar focus on elites and distributional coalitions also characterises a substantial 
portion of the literature on democratic transition, even though in this case the attention shifts 
towards the purely political domain (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989; Linz and Stepan 1996). 
The neglect of economic dynamics is usually replaced by simplistic assumptions, as pointed 
out by a commentator arguing that ‘much of the current theorising in the political 
development literature eschews economic variables while assuming that market reforms will 
enhance democratic prospects’ (King 2003: 133). 
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along the lines of pluralist theory – as an arena where interest groups compete for 
achieving their objectives. Already during the mid-1980s thus there was a call for 
‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985). Following this 
spirit, scholars such as Evans, Waterbury and Kahler have identified the 
institutional qualities facilitating successful economic development, for example 
referring to concepts such as the embedded autonomy of the state (Evans 1995). Yet, 
despite being conceptualised in institutional terms, the empirical analysis tended to 
collapse on the study of ‘strategic state elites’ (Heydemann 2004: 10), and their 
pursuit of private interests through state instruments. By conflating the state with its 
most relevant decision-makers, these accounts explain successful economic 
development in terms of sufficient isolation of the state from societal pressures 
combined with some basic accountability and responsiveness. The discussion of the 
democratic prospects is very rarely touched upon, perhaps based on the 
consideration that state elites do not have much interest in opening up the political 
system as long as economic development provides enough rent to them and 
marginal benefits to the population, preventing social unrest. 
Informal networks are at the core of the analytical toolkit of the third strand of 
agential explanations. According to Heydemann, existing literature on the political 
economy of reforms explained the outcome of the reform process – its winners and 
its losers – solely on the basis of the prior structure of the political economy. Because 
of their flexible and cross-cutting nature (Granovetter 1992; Degenne and Forse 
1999), networks are better suited to explain the politics of economic reforms in the 
developing world, and even more so in authoritarian settings. From such a 
standpoint, and against the consideration of rent-seeking as detrimental to 
successful economic development, Heydemann argues that rent-seeking should be 
seen as a precondition for the success of market-oriented reforms, as appeasing 
rentiers may be an appropriate strategy for policymakers to secure support for and 
compliance with reforms that ‘broaden the scope of markets and of economic 
inclusion even if they do so imperfectly’ (2004: 11). Thus, informal networks have a 
positive impact in that they produce suboptimal outcomes, leading to the 
emergence of liberalised yet not entirely liberal economic systems. Again, as the 
process is carried out through the alliance with well-placed networks, the possibility 
of the spill-over from the economic to the political domain is considered unlikely. In 
short: 
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Changes in the capital accumulation regime lead to a different structure of incentives where 
actors in a privileged position are able to appropriate most of the benefits, without significant 
repercussions on the political regime. 
 
2.2.3. Gramscian approach: regimes, social classes and articulation 
The debate on how the relation between economics and politics should be 
conceptualised is also at heart of much debate in critical IPE. Neo-Gramscian 
accounts have been criticised from an orthodox Marxist standpoint for their 
‘pluralist empiricism’, with the state and the market being treated as separate, and 
indeed opposed, forms of social organisation (Burnham 1991 and 1994). In this 
respect, Coxian approaches fall into the same trap of mainstream approaches: the 
naturalisation of a separation that, while useful if treated as an analytical 
distinction, becomes misleading exactly in the moment in which it is essentialised 
and taken as the starting point of analysis. Rather, the separation between capital 
and state, and thus between economics and politics, is better treated as apparent, 
and as promoted by capitalist relations of production. In this respect, it is not 
inappropriate to conceptualise the relation between capital and state as emergent, as 
done by critical realist scholars (Jessop 2010; Joseph 2010), thus conceiving of them 
as intimately related yet irreducible to each other.59 
Following Jessop, both capital and state are to be understood as social 
relations, and more specifically as form-determined social relations (1990 and 2010). 
This move is perfectly consistent with Gramsci’s insistence on looking at the state, 
and by implication at the economy, in ‘its inclusive sense’, and thus away from any 
reified or fetishistic conception (1975: 1358-61, Q10§61). If the state is considered not 
merely in terms of state apparatus, but as ‘an institutional ensemble’, then state 
power can be defined as ‘a form-determined condensation of the changing balance 
of forces in political and politically relevant struggles’ (Jessop 2010: 192). Similarly, 
if capital is conceived inclusively as a form-determined social relation, then ‘capital 
accumulation is the complex resultant of the changing balance of class forces in 
struggle as they interact within a framework determined by the value-form’ (Jessop 
1990: 197), intended as the fundamental relation linking together different elements 
                                                 
59 The debate on the relation between tendentially global capital and tendentially national 
forms of territorial organisation is discussed in the next section, being this the main reason 
for thinking in terms of spatial scales rather than relying on the more common IR distinction 
of levels of analysis. 
 71 
– from production to circulation to redistribution – and defining the parameters of 
capitalist development. 
The process of capital accumulation cannot proceed unfettered, as its chances 
of succeeding are related to the management of what Jessop calls ‘the changing 
balance of class forces’, and thus ultimately to the management of social conflicts 
arising from contradictions embedded in the capital relation. This necessity of 
managing the process of capital accumulation is the core concern of the regulation 
school.60 In this regard, the concept of accumulation regime is proposed, defined as 
the ‘institutional ensemble and complex of norms which can secure capitalist 
reproduction pro tempore despite the antagonistic character of capitalist social 
relations’ (Jessop 1990: 308).61 
Capital accumulation does not come with a regime of regulation attached, and 
the latter is usually constructed by political and economic actors. Bob Jessop has 
fleshed out the relation between capital accumulation and hegemony left implicit by 
Gramsci, providing us with the concepts of accumulation strategy and hegemonic 
project. The former is defined as ‘a specific “growth model” complete with its 
various extra-economic conditions’ (1990: 198). On the other hand, hegemonic 
project refers to the mobilisation of support behind a concrete political, social and 
cultural programme that ultimately advances the long-term interests of the 
hegemonic class. The distinction between the two is best elucidated in the following 
passage: 
 
While accumulation strategies are directly concerned with economic expansion on 
a national and international scale, hegemonic projects can be concerned 
principally with various non-economic objectives (even if economically 
conditioned and economically relevant). The latter might include military success, 
social reform, political stability or moral regeneration. Moreover, while 
accumulation strategies are oriented primarily to the relations of production and 
the balance of class forces, hegemonic projects are typically oriented to broader 
                                                 
60 As with neo-Gramscian approaches, regulation school is split into several strands. In their 
extremely accurate review, Jessop and Sum identify and discuss seven different schools 
within the wider regulation approach (2006: 13-57). 
61 By focusing on the accumulation regime only, I am purposefully simplifying the 
conceptual apparatus of regulation school, which usually refers to the triad of accumulation 
regime, mode of regulation and mode of development (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1988; Boyer 
1990). I deem this simplification to be necessary in order to avoid getting bogged down in 
the details of regulation school, losing sight of the main aim of the discussion. 
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issues not only in economic relations but also in the field of civil society and the 
state (1990: 208). 
 
Each accumulation strategy can be related to several alternative hegemonic projects, 
and on the other hand the success of the latter is dependent on their ability to relate 
to an existing or prospective accumulation strategy. Once again, this is entirely 
consistent with Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, which ‘must also be economic, 
must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group 
in the decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (1971: 161, Q13§18). 
In this study, the discussion focuses on the change of accumulation regime in 
Egypt from étatism towards neoliberalism. Étatism is defined as an accumulation 
regime characterised by the predominant role of the state in the economy. More 
specifically, state intervention encompasses all the main aspects of economic 
activity: incentive-setting, planning, coordination, production and management 
(Wahba 1994: 16-7; Ayubi 1995: 31).62 Étatism relies on the state also with respect to 
the management of ‘the antagonistic character of capitalist social relations’. More 
specifically, it is the task of the state to provide for a corporatist and/or populist 
arrangement able to contain social conflicts (Hinnebusch 1985: 28-9; Ayubi 1995: 
191-4). On the other hand, neoliberalism is used here to identify a regime of capital 
accumulation characterised by a minimal direct intervention of the state in the 
economy, limited to setting up the legal, political and military functions required to 
guarantee the proper functioning of markets and their creation in those sectors 
where markets do not exist (Harvey 2005: 2).63 According to Harvey, 
neoliberalisation – that is: the process by which a neoliberal regime of capital 
accumulation is established – is characterised by four features: privatisation of 
                                                 
62 Being defined as an accumulation regime, étatism is not a mode of production, but rather 
one of the forms of regulating capital accumulation under capitalism, and is thus located at a 
lower level of abstraction than the mode of production. At the same time, étatism has been 
used as an analytical category to understand the Middle Eastern economies even before the 
spread of capitalist relations of production. This shows that étatism as an accumulation 
regime can exist also within other modes of production, such as the tributary mode 
eminently discussed by Samir Amin (1974 and 1976). 
63 A review of the rich and detailed literature on the genesis and diffusion of neoliberalism 
on the international scale lies beyond the scope of this study. However, the two inescapable 
starting points to understand the emergence of neoliberalism are the excellent and 
surprisingly complementary accounts provided by Blyth (2002) and Harvey (2005).
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public assets, financialisation of the economy,64 management and manipulation of 
crises, state redistributions in favour of the upper classes (2005: 159-65). The overall 
result of neoliberalisation amounts to what Harvey calls ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’, that is: the persistence of forms of primitive accumulation, ranging 
from resource extraction to privatisation of property rights to asset-stripping, 
within the capitalist mode of production. 
The chances of success of any given hegemonic project, and the functioning of 
any given accumulation regime, are related to the way in which political power is 
organised, and thus the specific form taken by the state. The form on which the 
literature insists the most is the political regime, intended as a combination of 
procedural rules, formal or informal, determining in which way which actors can 
access which decision-making position regulated by which rules, and the 
acceptance, strategic or normative, of this system by all the major actors involved 
(Munck 1996: 5-11). In our specific case, we need a definition for authoritarian 
regimes, and on this issue the classical definition by Linz is still unsurpassed, 
describing authoritarian regimes as ‘political systems with limited, not responsible, 
pluralism, without elaborate or guiding ideologies, but with distinctive mentalities, 
without extensive nor intensive political mobilisation, except at some points in their 
development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power 
within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones’ (1964: 255). 
Even though such a definition was obtained by contrasting the features of 
democracy and totalitarianism, the virtual disappearance of the latter does not 
make this definition any less valuable. 
Beyond the institutional definitions above of accumulation and political 
regimes, one should not forget that both capital accumulation and state power are 
social relations. Thus, it is imperative to look at the specific social groups and how 
they are represented in the political regime, and at the balance of class forces and 
how they are embedded in the accumulation regime. With respect to the political 
regime, the strategic selectivities of the state allow some actors to influence 
decisions more than others.65 Gramsci’s concept of ruling bloc identifies a coalition of 
                                                 
64 Financialisation is defined here as ‘a pattern of accumulation in which profit making 
occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production’ (Krippner 2005: 174). 
65 The concept of strategic selectivity has also been developed by Jessop (1990 and 2008). The 
assumption behind it is that structures are not neutral in two fundamental ways. Firstly, 
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social groups constituting the base of support of a given political regime. 
Depending on its composition and on its ability to win the consent of the majority 
of the population, a ruling bloc can also be a hegemonic bloc. The hegemony of the 
ruling bloc is then the precondition for the emergence of the conjunction between 
structure and superstructure at the heart of the concept of historical bloc discussed 
in Chapter 1. Indeed, the relation between these social forms leads to one of the key 
research questions investigated in this study, and namely: was the ruling bloc in 
Egypt under Mubarak also a hegemonic bloc? 
On several occasions the reader will notice that the term elites will be used 
interchangeably with the more precise ruling bloc. Elites are to be intended as 
referring to the social forces that ‘wield political influence and power in that they 
make strategic decisions or participate in decision-making on a national level, 
contribute to define political norms and values (including the definition of “national 
interest”), and directly influence political discourse on strategic issues’ (Perthes 
2004: 5). Is this study of elites incompatible with a Gramscian approach? The Prison 
Notebooks contain numerous passages against elite theorists such as Mosca, Pareto 
and Michels. Yet, Gramsci’s critique is a qualified one, as it suggests not the 
uselessness of the concept, but rather its neglect of ‘relations of force’, which belies 
the political objective of elite theory: discrediting the Marxist concept of the ruling 
class and replacing it with concepts such as ‘political class’ and these such as the 
‘iron law of oligarchy’, which obfuscate the class dimension implicit in the political 
rule (1971: 6n, Q8§24; 150, Q13§21; 176, Q13§2). 
It is thus important to look at social groups, and at their position in relations 
of production. Referring to the classical Marxian concept of classes, and class 
fractions, allows us to understand the link between social structure, accumulation 
regime and political regime. Class fractions are defined with reference to the 
fraction of capital they represent in the circuit of capital accumulation: productive 
capital, commodity capital (commercial), money capital (banking/financial) (Van 
der Pijl 1984: 3). This differentiation significantly enriches the traditional distinction 
                                                                                                                                          
similarly to path-dependency approaches, past decisions always have an impact on current 
decisions, and this creates pressures bearing upon the courses of action that might be 
pursued by different actors. Secondly, structures also have a path-shaping power over actors, 
differentially empowering and disempowering specific actors, thus creating an unevenly 
distributed configuration of opportunities and constraints. 
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between the rentier class, the bourgeoisie and the working class,66 showing 
potential fault lines within the same class. In this respect, the constitution of a ruling 
bloc to support a given political regime which in turn enforces an accumulation 
regime is to be considered as a ‘truce’ beyond these clashes of interests in order to 
ensure the reproduction of capitalist social relations. 
The social structure in Egypt at the end of the 1980s, the starting point of this 
research, could be characterised as follows. The ruling bloc included three main 
components.67 The first, both in terms of size and actual power, was the public 
sector. It could be further subdivided into the army, which held the main levers of 
power since 1952, and the bureaucracy, including both managers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and civil servants. The second component was the state-
dependent bourgeoisie which had been created by the infitah reforms carried out by 
Sadat during the mid-1970s. The third component was the landed elite. Regardless 
of their disparate positions with respect to social relations of production, these 
groups – and the coalition they had created – constituted the linchpin for the 
preservation of the authoritarian regime when Egypt faced the late 1980s fiscal 
crisis. Increasingly outside of the unravelling corporatist social pact one could see 
both the working class and the peasantry. 
Regulation theorists often focus on the incremental changes operated by 
policymakers within a given accumulation regime, but there are also some cases in 
which a regime of capital accumulation is not workable anymore, as, for reasons 
which may be located on the national scale or beyond it, the contradictions of the 
capital relation cannot be managed any longer within the given accumulation 
regime. What happens when the ruling bloc realises that what is needed is not a 
change within the accumulation regime, but rather a change of regime? How is this 
change influenced by pre-existing class relations? And what are the consequences of 
this shift on the political regime? These are the questions addressed by Chapter 4. 
And this is the main thrust of the argument supported: 
                                                 
66 One should keep in mind that whereas the definition of both bourgeoisie and working 
class derive directly from relations of production, the rentier class is based on the ownership 
of land and property, and thus on relations of distribution rather than production strictly 
conceived. 
67 In the mid-1980s, Hinnebusch provided an excellent empirical study of the 
transformations in the Egyptian elite under Sadat, and in particular with reference to a first 
wave of technocratisation in the bureaucracy, with engineers becoming significantly more 
important (1985: 78-157). 
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Changes in the capital accumulation regime are influenced by the pre-existing class 
structure, and themselves lead to changes in relations of class forces, providing the 
conditions for a reorganisation of power in the political regime. 
 
2.3. Sources of change: the issue of spatial scale 
The second dimension on which hegemony is constituted, reproduced and 
transformed is the articulation between different spatial scales. If hegemony always 
originates on the national scale, how does it extent beyond this? Similarly, once an 
hegemonic project is internationalised, how does it penetrate into national scales 
other than the one it originates from? We must bear in mind that this discussion has 
to build on the consideration that hegemony is inescapably related to social 
relations of production and to capital accumulation. However, when the variable 
‘space’ is brought into this debate, one often stumbles on one of the fundamental 
dilemmas in Marxist social theory: what is the relation between the inherently 
globalising tendencies of capital68 and the persistence of relatively fixed forms of 
territorial organisation?  
Starting from an inclusive definition of ‘the international’, this section analyses 
the debate on the relation between capital and state with respect to the key 
geographical concept of spatial scales. It then discusses how the existing literature 
conceptualises the relation between the international and the national scale in the 
age of neoliberal globalisation, before suggesting the reasons that make the 
articulation approach a more fruitful starting point for analysing interscalar 
relations. 
 
2.3.1. ‘Swallowed’ by capital? Debates on economic change, scale and the state 
The focus on accumulation regimes, political regimes and social classes examined in 
the previous section requires a definition of ‘the international’ that allows to keep in 
both the spatial dimension implicit by the very idea of territorial organisation, and 
the social dimension at the heart of class structure, and of the regulatory tasks of 
both the accumulation and the political regime. The definition provided by 
Rosenberg, considering the international as ‘the dimension of social reality which 
                                                 
68 This tendency was eminently summed up by Marx in these terms: ‘The tendency to create 
the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a 
barrier to be overcome’ (1973: 408). 
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arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society’ (2006: 
308), is concise and inclusive enough for the purpose of this study. At the same time, 
it is also compatible with one of the few annotations made by Gramsci on the 
relation between ‘the international’ and the social (1971: 176, Q13§2):  
 
Do international relations precede of follow (logically) fundamental social 
relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the 
social structure […] modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the 
international field too. Even the geographical position of a national State does 
not precede but follows (logically) structural changes, although it also reacts 
back upon them to a certain extent (to the extent precisely to which 
superstructures react upon the structure, politics on economics, etc.). However, 
international relations react both passively and actively on political relations (of 
hegemony among the parties). 
 
How is it possible to reconcile the fragmentation of space, implicit in both the 
definitions provided above, with the globalising tendencies of capital accumulation 
suggested by Marx? This concern is at the heart of a substantial literature in IR 
theory focusing on the relation between the emergence of capitalism and that of the 
interstate system (Rosenberg 1994; Teschke 2003). In what is a wide-ranging critique 
of the realist orthodoxy in IR theory, and particularly of the myth of the self-
generated and self-sustaining Westphalian system, Teschke points out how state 
formation in the XVII and XVIII century, and thus the emergence of the wide 
interstate system, has to be located within the tracks of capitalist modernity. More 
specifically, he suggests that the rise of the interstate system would not have been 
possible without the concomitant emergence of capitalist relations of production, 
which in turn were strongly shaped both by the crisis of the feudalist system and by 
the affirmation of the absolutist state (2003: 7-8). Thus, also the fragmentation of the 
political space – and hence one of the key distinctions of mainstream IR theory, 
between domestic and international politics – is the naturalisation of an historical 
process whose analysis reveals patterns of complex causation and mutual 
constitution.69 
                                                 
69 Indeed, Rosenberg argues convincingly that the emergence of the distinction between state 
and market, and thus between the political and the economic, is a result of the twin 
emergence of capitalism and the interstate system, with the transformations brought about 
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According to these accounts, the affirmation of capitalist relations of 
production in England by the end of the XVII century created an uneven playing 
field for the implicit expansionist tendencies of capital accumulation. As a 
consequence, state formation and consolidation elsewhere became influenced by the 
uneven social development brought about by the spread of capitalism, forcing states 
configured by pre-capitalist relations to combine different forms of development 
(Rosenberg 1996: 8-10; Rosenberg 2005: 68-9; Morton 2007a: 47-8). This is what 
Trotsky meant when arguing that processes of uneven and combined development 
(U&CD) shaped the peculiar developmental path followed by Tsarist Russia (1980: 
3-15). 
If the relation between capital accumulation and state power is to be 
conceptualised as internal, then we might as well dispose of the levels of analysis 
characteristic of mainstream IR theory (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961). This study prefers 
to speak of spatial scales rather than levels of analysis for two reasons. Firstly, much 
more than ‘level’, the term ‘scale’ gives a much better sense of the necessary 
connection between different spatialities. In other words, whereas levels could be 
separated from one another, the relation with other configurations of territorial 
organisation is constitutive of the concept of scale. Secondly, thinking in these terms 
allows to ask the question of how different spatial scales – global, international, 
national, local – are nested into one another, leaving at the same time room for 
differentiation at each scale, and thus suggesting that what is to be investigated in 
the last instance are the mechanisms driving interscalar articulation (Jessop 2008: 
104-6). 
The specific role of the state in the tendentially endless and limitless process of 
capital accumulation has been thoroughly investigated by the French social 
geographer Henri Lefebvre. In his view, spatial scales are better conceived as both 
boundaries (‘space envelopes’) and hierarchies of social relations. Among several 
spatial scales, the state has a privileged position as over the last centuries it has 
consolidated itself as ‘a relatively fixed and immobile territorial configuration upon 
which each round of capital circulation is grounded’ (Brenner 1998: 468-9). Within 
the hierarchy of nested scales, the relative fixity of state territorial organisation 
                                                                                                                                          
by capitalist development leading to an abstraction of state sovereignty from civil society: 
‘an abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the market, and hence 
inseparable from capitalist relations of production’ (Rosenberg 1994: 123-4). 
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provides a safe haven from where capital, commodities and labour attempt to 
increase their own mobility both within and outside the state itself (Lefebvre 1991: 
388-9). This key role of the state for capital accumulation has two main dimensions. 
Firstly, the presence of a state coercive apparatus is essential to guarantee the 
conditions for primitive accumulation. This in turn allows capitalist relations of 
production to get started in the territory under the control of the specific state, 
eventually extending commodification to other factors of production (land and 
labour) and allowing capital to become self-valorising, with the creation of a credit 
system. The persistence of forms of primitive accumulation also in advanced 
industrial societies suggests that this exercise of state power to facilitate capital 
accumulation is still a relevant feature worth considering today. 
The state is fundamental for capital accumulation also in a second crucial 
respect. As Castells put it, capital accumulation needs not only a ‘space-of-flows’ 
but also a ‘space-of-places’ (1989). Thus, whereas capital can circulate relatively 
unbounded in its credit form, and ever more so under neoliberal accumulation 
regimes, it must also take fixed forms, either in the more traditional shape of 
infrastructures and social expenditure or in the more recent configurations of global 
cities, industrial districts and agglomeration economies. This continuing relevance 
of state power for capital accumulation also implies that Marx’s assertion regarding 
the tendency of capital to ‘annihilate space by time’ (Marx 1973: 539) is bound to 
remain tendential, or, as Harvey put it: ‘spatial organisation is necessary to 
overcome space’ (1985: 145). 
Once we move towards thinking in scalar terms, and we ascertain the 
persisting relevance of the state as one of the crucial spatial scales, the issue becomes 
which scales to consider and how to ‘measure’ them. This study focuses on two 
scales. ‘The international’ as the inter-societal dimension of social reality is taken as a 
single scale,70 whereas the national is the other scale considered.71 Institutions are 
then taken as the most reliable proxy of spatial scales. This is because international 
                                                 
70 Thus, global and international scale are considered as synonymous for the purpose of this 
study. Importantly, Gramsci himself uses the Italian corresponding translations – 
internazionale and mondiale – as synonyms.  
71 I am aware that this choice runs the risk of conflating the state dimension with the national 
dimension, thus once more essentialising a process which is contingent (i.e.: the emergence 
of the nation-state as a form of territorial organisation). Yet, I believe that the Egyptian case 
allows for an exception in this respect, being Egypt one of the few post-colonial states were 
state largely coincides with nation. 
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institutions constitute one of the mechanisms by which specific accumulation 
strategies and hegemonic projects are projected on the international scale (Morton 
2007a: 120). Gramsci himself, after all, had suggested that international 
organisations such as the Rotary Club, the Catholic Church and to a lesser degree 
the League of Nations had been fundamental for the expansion of capitalism on a 
global scale (1975: 541, Q5§2; 2146-7, Q22§2). 
The way in which scales are articulated is the main point of contention in the 
burgeoning literature on the impact of neoliberal globalisation on developing 
countries. On this aspect, authors tend to coalesce around two positions, discussed 
in Chapter 5 in the light of the empirical material presented. Most of the literature 
broadly inspired by Gramsci, either in the already discussed Coxian and 
Amsterdam School variants or in the more eclectic accounts provided by Sklair 
(2001) and Robinson (2004 and 2006), maintain that the spread of neoliberal 
globalisation on the international scale has led to the increased dominance of 
transnational factors over national ones. Already in the 1981 article Cox had 
identified the roots of globalisation in the internationalisation of production and 
finance, which had led to the emergence of a ‘transnational managerial class’ (1981: 
147). On his footsteps, Stephen Gill had then showed how particularly the 
transnationalisation of production induced a fragmentation of both capital and 
labour into those supporting transnationalisation and those opposing it from a 
national standpoint (Gill 1995: 400-1). According to these authors, this process led to 
a weakening of the state, through the rise of actors beyond the reach of state power, 
such as multinational corporations and informal directorates as the Trilateral 
Commission and the Bildenberg group (Gill 1990), or more subtly through the 
increasing penetration of social forces promoting transnationalisation into the state 
apparatus (Cox 1992: 31). This amounts to ‘a global class structure alongside or 
superimposed upon national class structure’ (Cox 1981: 147), or – more starkly in 
the words of Robinson – ‘the supersession of the nation-state as the organising 
principle of the capitalist system’ (2003: 6, in Morton 2007a: 140). Applied to the 
Egyptian case, the argument maintained by these authors would translate as 
follows: 
The international/transnational/global scale is the main source of the changes experienced by 
the Egyptian political economy. 
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This position could easily be criticised arguing that the role of state is dramatically 
understated. This is what happens for example in most literature focusing on the 
political economy of reforms in the Middle East, which in some cases border what 
Fred Halliday labelled ‘regional narcissism’.72 In the extremely clear exposition 
recently provided by Schlumberger (2008), the argument proceeds as follows. Over 
time, the Middle East has consolidated itself as a region characterised by a 
concentrated political control over the economy, and thus typically by authoritarian 
systems of rule, and by the prevalence of informal modes of interaction, such as 
patronage and wasta,73 over formal ones (2008: 622-3). This provides for a heavily 
hierarchical political system, which puts the state, and thus the regime and its 
support coalition, in an ideal position to defuse the pressures built by neoliberal 
globalisation, and even more specifically by IFIs promoting a specific set of policies 
in order to reform the national economies. Following from this privileged position 
on the national scale, the regime and its main components are largely in control of 
any reform process initiated, and will thus implement only those measures that 
guarantee their survival, or even better the consolidation of their own position. As 
Heydemann put it (1992), the political logic of power maintenance takes precedence over 
the logic of economic efficiency advocated by IFIs. Thus, in times of crisis and under the 
spectre of conditionality, some reforms are implemented because under severe 
economic pressures every form of relief, be it aid package or debt cancellation, is 
welcome. However, policies that are perceived as having the potential of 
endangering the status quo, and thus the stranglehold on political power, will be 
delayed, implemented selectively and/or partially (Schlumberger 2008: 630). As a 
consequence of this, regardless of the intentions of international institutions 
promoting a shift in the accumulation regime, the resilience of the national scale, 
embodied by the regime and its domination of the domestic institutions, will lead to 
a ‘domestication’ of these pressures, and to what is ultimately a manipulation of 
economic processes for political purposes. Translated for the Egyptian case: 
The national scale is the main source of the changes experienced by the Egyptian political 
economy. 
                                                 
72 Defined as ‘the belief that the whole world spends all its time plotting and worrying about 
the Middle East, and that everything that happens in the region is somehow dissimilar to 
that which takes place elsewhere, and is singularly evil or angelic as a result’ (2005: 10) 
73 It means literally ‘intercession’ or ‘intermediation’. Sharabi (1988) provided an 




A Gramscian approach such as the one developed here tries to refrain from these 
extremes. On the one hand, while acknowledging the increased relevance of actors 
and factors beyond the control of states in the global political economy, it would 
point – as mentioned above – towards the continuing relevance of forms of 
territorial organisation for facilitating capital accumulation. On the other hand, 
while recognising the fundamental mediating influence of state institutions as 
expression of the national scale, it would not forget the inherently expansionist 
tendencies of capital accumulation, particularly from the point of view of countries 
at the periphery of the capitalist global economy. Hence, the articulation approach 
pays heed to the advice by Agnew to avoid both the territorial trap of accepting a 
priori the prominence of fixed state territoriality and the opposite tendency of seeing 
fragmented territorial organisation giving way to an undifferentiated global or 
transnational whole (1994: 72-6). 
A way of linking these two processes may be found by looking at the state as 
the point of condensation of social forces on the national scale, conceived as nodal 
scale, defined as ‘the primary loc[us] for delivering certain activities in a given 
spatio-temporal order’ (Jessop 2008: 106). This does not necessarily mean that the 
national scale is also the dominant one,74 but rather that there is an articulation 
among different spatial scales, with organisations at each scale being related to and 
limited by organisations on other scales, but at the same time maintaining a room 
for relatively autonomous action, which feeds back on both lower and higher spatial 
scales. 
The most important, and most used, strategy of interscalar articulation on the 
national scale in peripheral countries is what Gramsci called passive revolution, 
intended as a process of adaptation of the economic structures to the increasingly 
pressing demands of global capital accumulation accompanied by a restoration of 
political relations under the control of a ruling class or ruling bloc headed by a 
specific class fraction. In the specific Egyptian case, this would mean that capitalist 
relations of production were effectively transformed, with the move away from an 
étatist towards a neoliberal accumulation regime. However, this shift was mediated 
                                                 
74 Scale dominance being defined as ‘the power which organisations at certain spatial scales 
are able to exercise over organisations at other, higher or lower scales’ (Collinge 1999: 568, 
quoted in Jessop 2008: 106). 
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in a crucial way by the peculiarities and dynamics of the national scale, hence 
providing one such case where initial unevenness produces the conditions for 
combined development. This has two fundamental consequences. On the one hand, 
the incipient shift towards a neoliberal accumulation regime mobilised the class 
forces empowered by it towards exploiting reforms for their own economic and 
political advantage. On the other hand, the interaction of these two dynamics 
provided for a form of neoliberalism substantially different both from the form seen 
in early ‘neoliberalisers’ and from that hoped for by its international supporters.  
According to this perspective, the relative influence of different spatial scales 
on the economic course followed by Egypt is crucially linked to transformations in 
the class structure. More specifically, a first phase of reforms in which the national 
scale was mostly the executor of decisions taken elsewhere produced a relative 
alignment of the class structure on the national scale (empowering private 
capitalists over the public sector component) with prevailing class relations on the 
international scale. This shift eventually allowed the national scale to gain more 
autonomy with respect to its own developmental path. Reduced to its essence, this 
is the argument deriving from this approach discussed in Chapter 5: 
Change in relations of class forces (towards a relative alignment with prevailing class 
relations on the international scale) is the main factor for understanding the changing role of 
different scales in the Egyptian political economy. 
 
2.4. Reasons for change: instrumentality and belief 
Because of Gramsci’s emphasis on coercion and consent, the third dimension upon 
which hegemony is articulated, as a relation between material factors and ideas, is 
the one most treated in critical IPE literature. Yet, this relation has been 
conceptualised in starkly different ways. This section discusses critical and 
constructivist IPE approaches,75 arguing that they might be grouped into two main 
perspectives. It then enucleates the added value of the Gramscian approach 
developed here, which, while grounding ideas in material conditions, it gives them 
                                                 
75 Whereas it arguably started on the margins of the discipline, it is now undeniable that over 
the past two decades social constructivist approaches have increasingly made their way into 
the mainstream of the discipline, with works such as Ruggie (1982), McNamara (1998) and 
Blyth (2002) becoming essential readings in most IPE syllabi on both sides of the Atlantic 
and beyond. 
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the opportunity to feed back on those, and eventually play out a relatively 
autonomous role also in the constitution of material reality. 
 
2.4.1. ‘Capital ideas’ or ideas for capital? Debates on economic change and ideas 
The conceptualisation of the relation between material factors and ideas is one of the 
thorniest issues in Marxist theory, as the very label of historical materialism lends 
itself to misinterpretations. As a proof of this, there are nearly as many conceptions 
of how ideas relate to the material factors as there are Marxists.76 For this reason I 
deem useful to group accounts on this issue into two main positions. On the one 
hand, world system theory and the Amsterdam School tend to conceive ideas as 
subordinate to the material structure, and at best grant them a legitimising function 
for the domination of the ruling class, or fraction thereof. On the other hand, both 
the Coxian School and constructivist approaches tend, in very different ways, to 
divorce ideas from material factors and give entirely autonomous causative power 
to the former. 
In what Van der Pijl calls ‘strong’ systems theory (2009: 167), best exemplified 
by the work of Wallerstein (1974), the role of both class struggle and ideas is almost 
entirely forsaken. The former is left aside already from the very definition of 
capitalism as profit-driven economic activity, with the following understatement of 
the role of exploitation and thus asymmetry in social relations of production in the 
constitution of capitalism. Ideas instead never seriously factor into these accounts, if 
not as epiphenomena still ultimately determined by capitalism intended as a 
comprehensive structural constraint on the global scale. It is thus difficult to 
disagree with Van der Pijl when he maintains that ‘the thrust of Wallerstein’s 
analysis is materialist and deterministic’ (2009: 178), in a way which resembles 
closely Bukharin’s mechanistic materialism much criticised by Gramsci. 
Starting from within this tradition, Robinson attempts to construct a bridge 
with the emerging neo-Gramscian scholarship. Thus, ideas are an important factor 
in his theorisation firstly of the promotion of polyarchy on the part of the US in 
Central America (1996), and then of the rise of global capitalism (2004). This is 
particularly evident in his reference to hegemony in order to account for the 
consensual aspects allowing the transnational capitalist class to take centre-stage in 
                                                 
76 And even more, one might add, considering the call by Randall Germain to develop a non-
Marxist historical materialism (2007). See also the reply by Adam Morton (2007b). 
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the global political economy. Yet, Robinson’s use of ideas as explanatory tools is 
problematic in at least two respects. Firstly, with regard to relations with material 
factors, the ideational dimension of hegemony is largely read off from modifications 
in the class structure, and does not appear to feed back on such structure in any 
significant way. Secondly, with respect to the social function of ideas, this is limited 
to legitimising and whenever possible building consensus around the global 
accumulation strategy pursued by the emerging transnational historical bloc, 
defined in purely materialist terms (2004: 75-7). Whereas the legitimation function is 
certainly one of the main features of hegemony as identified by Gramsci, it is hardly 
the only one, and leaves the door open to changes of instrumentalism for the way 
ideas are employed, without allowing from any autonomous causative power or 
unintended social effect. 
Similarly, within the works of the Amsterdam School, and particularly of Kees 
Van der Pijl (1998), ideas play a fundamental role in lending legitimacy to the 
interests of the dominant class, or fraction thereof, by portraying them as the 
general interest within the global political economy. Once again, however, this 
function of ideas is entirely dependent on material conditions, as Van der Pijl 
himself clarifies: ‘the capacity of fractions of capital to appropriate a share of the 
total mass of profits shapes the sense of identity of a particular segment of collective 
capital with the momentary functioning of the system, short-circuiting the general 
interest with the special one’ (1998: 58). Also when accounting for the role of the 
Mont Pelerin Society in the spread of neoliberalism, Van der Pijl denies any 
constitutive effect on the part of this intellectual organisation, and rather suggests 
that it became an important factor ‘[o]nly when the corporate liberal concept and the 
class configuration supporting it unravelled’ (Ibid: 129).77 Thus, also in this case 
identities and ideologies are derived from positions in the class structure, with very 
little autonomous influence or possibility of feeding back on the material structure. 
If applied to the Egyptian case, both approaches above would thus support the 
following argument: 
Material factors are the main driving force in the evolution of the Egyptian political 
economy. 
 
                                                 
77 For an alternative view of the role of the Mont Pelerin Society in the rise of neoliberalism, 
see Harvey (2005: 19-22). 
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Even though also starting from Gramsci, scholars belonging to the Coxian school get 
to a conception of the relations between material conditions and ideas which is 
remarkably different from the one espoused by transnational historical materialists. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, for Cox hegemony is configured as ‘a fit between 
power, institutions and ideas’ emerging from social processes (1981: 140-1). This 
emphasis on the social constitution of hegemony provides the basis for overcoming 
the functionalist understanding of hegemony, and thus ideas, typical of the 
Amsterdam school. Ideas are primarily conceived as shared intersubjective meanings. 
Whereas the construction of these meanings cannot be understood if not in terms of 
a social process, it is unclear how in Cox ideas are related to ‘the decisive nucleus of 
economic activity’. More importantly, as outlined by Worth (2011: 381), ideas are 
gradually untied from the social structure producing them, and in the form of 
hegemony they become an attribute of a state-led project, still deemed socially 
grounded but fundamentally independent from class relations. This ‘isolation’ of 
ideas is also visible in the separation posited with both power and institutions. 
Rather than constituting one another through a ‘philosophy of internal relations’ 
(Ollman 2003), these three elements are merely juxtaposed, eventually producing 
hegemony in a combinatory, rather than dialectical, way. Through this movement, 
ideas – while still ‘for someone and for some purpose’, much like theories – free 
themselves from the social relations from which they emerged. 
A similar stance can be found also in constructivist IPE, even though posed in 
substantially different terms. Despite their neglect of class relations, the focus on 
social constructivism is warranted in that it allows to unveil a dimension of the 
causal power of ideas which has been neglected by most neo-Gramscian literature. 
Whereas in the approaches discussed above the role of ideas is largely limited to 
legitimacy- and consensus-building, social constructivists show the relevance of 
ideas as a key framing device, shaping the way we perceive reality, its problems, 
and our actions to tackle them, thus having very real consequences on material 
conditions. Much as with the Coxian school, the power of ideas is identified in the 
ability to socially construct a shared intersubjective understanding of material 
factors. As shown by Blyth in his discussion of the affirmation of neoliberal norms 
in the US and Sweden (2002), the construction of shared meanings is a deeply 
political process, where several alternative sets of ideas strive for relevance. In this 
struggle for meaning, a crucial role is played by epistemic communities, defined as ‘a 
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network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue-area’ (Haas 1992: 3). Epistemic communities, and in a similar way academic 
and professional networks, are able to define the boundaries of a specific policy-
relevant debate by using their ‘authoritative claim’ to knowledge towards defining 
problems, identifying potential solutions, and assessing policy outcomes. This is 
particularly true with respect to economists and to the construction of the popular 
understanding of how economies work (MacKenzie et al. 2007).  
This power in the hands of those possessing specialist expertise has some 
drawbacks, as these networks are more often than not subject to a cognitive bias, 
intended here as an adaptive behaviour disabling potential options on grounds of 
desirability. In the specific case of economic policy-making under examination here, 
this translates into reliance on cognitive shortcuts usually oriented by what 
Chwieroth calls ‘hypothesis-confirming’ bias (2010: 46). Particularly when the time 
for taking a decision is short, for example in the face of an economic crisis, 
processing all the information and options available is costly, and as a consequence 
experts tend to fall on received wisdom, thus discounting both theoretical 
arguments and empirical facts disconfirming their basic assumptions and the 
hypotheses derived thereof. This is why, in the eyes of constructivist scholars, times 
of crisis and uncertainty are fundamental in that they allow to establish what Peter 
Hall calls policy paradigm, whose main characteristic in this respect is that it is 
‘embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate 
about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for 
granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole’ (1993: 279).  
As Bieler and Morton point out (2008: 104), constructivist approaches provide 
a convincing account of how certain ideas might become embedded in the overall 
structure. However, they are much less convincing on the issue of why these ideas, 
and not others, made it into the very constitution of reality and of our 
understanding of it. The five reasons advanced by Finnemore and Sikkink to explain 
why ideas reach what they call ‘tipping point’ and become widely accepted on the 
international scale, do not address adequately this issue (1998: 906-9).78 Conceiving 
                                                 
78 These five factors are legitimacy, prominence, intrinsic characteristics of the norm, 
adjacency and world time. However, the position on each of these five dimensions cannot be 
assessed if not in relation to social relations themselves, thus to an aspect extrinsic to norms. 
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successful ideas such as sovereignty or in our specific case neoliberalism only in 
terms of inter-subjective consensus-based understanding is not enough, as one must 
also strive to ‘identify broader social forces with antagonistic interests that drive 
political and geopolitical change in conflictual, often violent, domestic and 
international processes’ (Teschke 2003: 31). 
However, the value of constructivist approaches cannot be discounted 
entirely. To summarise the ideational argument in a nutshell,79 following and 
broadening Wendt’s trademark argument that ‘anarchy is what states of make of it’ 
(1992), one could argue that neoliberalism itself is what social actors make of it. In 
brief: 
Ideational factors are the main driving force in the evolution of the Egyptian political 
economy. 
 
What can the Gramscian approach based on articulation offer in this respect? In the 
beginning of a note significantly subtitled ‘Economic and ideology’ (1971: 407, 
Q7§24), Gramsci recalled the example of Marx: 
 
The claim, presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism, that 
every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as 
an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as 
primitive infantilism, and combated in practice with the authentic testimony of 
Marx, the author of concrete political and historical works. Particularly 
important from this point of view are The 18th Brumaire and the writings on the 
Eastern Question, but also other writings (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in 
Germany, The Civil War in France and lesser works). 
 
Thus, a focus on the historical writings of Marx would show a more fine-grained 
approach to the relation between material factors and ideas, as shown for example 
in the relevance given to the very idea of Caesarism in influencing domestic and 
foreign policy developments in France under Louis Napoleon. At the same time, 
Gramsci also warns against the risks of falling into the trap of discursitivity. As put 
                                                 
79 The term ‘ideational’ is not considered here as synonym with ideological. The former 
refers to the more general role of ideas in society, whereas ideology is to be considered as a 
more or less coherent system of ideas influencing one’s goals, expectations and actions. 
Thus, the adjective ‘ideational’ encompasses what we consider ‘ideological’, but also 
includes non-systematised ideas. 
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by Stuart Hall (1997: 31, quoted in Bieler and Morton 2008): ‘everything is within the 
discursive, but nothing is only discourse or only discursive’. 
This means broadening the relevance of constructivist insights while at the 
same time anchoring them more firmly to social relations of production. This can be 
done through two theoretical moves. On the one hand, it is crucial to refer to the 
Gramscian concept of organic intellectuals to move beyond the undertheorisation of 
the social basis of epistemic communities. Organic intellectuals are opposed to 
traditional, and they indicate a group of ‘intellectuals by social function’ arising 
from a specific social group, with the task of clarifying and organising the interests 
and ideology of their social class, or fraction thereof (Gramsci 1971: 6, Q12§1; 330, 
Q11§12). Once elaborated into a relatively coherent cultural, political and economic 
programme, the ideology of the ruling class, or class fraction, becomes operative 
and produces substantive effects also on material conditions, for example in the 
form of policies adopted and implemented. In this way, the fundamental intuition 
of ideas also as framing devices with effects on material conditions is absorbed into 
the Gramscian framework developed here. 
On the other hand, also the other concept borrowed from constructivism – 
policy paradigm, - can be reworked in Gramscian terms and related to common sense. 
The uncritical acceptation of received wisdom constitutes a first important link 
between these two concepts. In the notebooks, Gramsci points out that even in 
common sense, defined following the editors of the English translation as the more 
or less coherent set of generally held assumptions and beliefs common to any given 
society (1971: 323), there is a ‘healthy nucleus, residing in ‘overcoming the bestial 
and elemental passions through a conception of necessity which gives conscious 
direction to one’s activity’ (Ibid: 328, Q11§12). Hence, there is an aspect of common 
sense which is strikingly similar to that of policy paradigms: the ability to enhance 
the power of rational thinking within the parameters of its own existence. Yet, it is 
the duty of each researcher to keep in mind ‘the historicity of any conception of the 
world’ (Ibid: 324, Q11§12), and thus work towards understanding the limits of any 
given paradigm. Thus, on the other hand, it is important to understand for whom a 
given policy paradigm becomes common sense. This is particularly relevant in 
authoritarian contexts, where meaningful political action is usually restricted for 
few social groups. When a policy paradigm becomes common sense only the eyes of 
a section, however relevant, of society, it is then more appropriate to speak of 
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ideology, intended as a more or less coherent system of ideas influencing one’s goals, 
expectations and actions. On the other hand, the analysis of the cognitive biases of 
academics, professionals and policy-makers promoting neoliberalism in Egypt is 
also extremely important because of its material consequences, as outlined by 
constructivists. Through this move, the emergence of neoliberalism as common 
sense within a section of the ruling bloc and thus as an ideology driving economic 
policymaking is traced back to class relations and the transformations they 
experience over time. 
In this way the interaction between material and ideational factors can be 
conceptualised in a more dynamic form. The articulation among these is itself 
dynamic, and the increasing or decreasing autonomy of ideas – and their impact on 
materiality – is determined in the first instance by the opportunities and constraints 
provided by the material structure. In other words, within a given balance of class 
forces, a certain range of alternative ideational paths are possible, each with its own 
chances of succeeding depending on its suitability to existing class relations. With 
reference to the Egyptian case, ideas and ideology become relatively more 
autonomous from the material structure when: on the one hand, power 
reconfiguration on the national scale follows shifts in the class structure produced 
by the change of the accumulation regime; on the other hand, changes in class 
relations on the national scale produce a relative alignment with prevalent class 
relations on the international scale. In brief: 
Change in the national relations of class forces is the main driving force in the evolution of 
the Egyptian political economy, as with relative alignment and power reconfiguration ideas 
become relatively more autonomous from material factors. 
 
2.5. From theory to practice: evidence and methods 
Before the empirical analysis moves on to the study of the three dimensions on 
which hegemony is constituted, reproduced and transformed, the essential 
assumption on which this study is based – i.e.: the shift in the Egyptian 
accumulation regime – ought to be established as a plausible one. This is the task of 
Chapter 3, which tracks down the modifications in the accumulation regime 
referring to the fourfold definition of neoliberalisation provided by Harvey and 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Thus, privatisation and withdrawal of state from 
the economy are analysed with reference to all the main facets of this process, from 
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the privatisation of all the forms of input in agriculture (thus: credit, crops, 
fertilisers), to the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the manufacturing sector, 
to the divestiture of stakes in joint-venture banks and the privatisation of Bank of 
Alexandria, the smallest of the four public sector banks. Financialisation is 
measured looking at the substantially increased role of finance, visible in the 
consolidation of the banking sector and in the relaunch of the stock exchange.80 The 
third aspect, labelled by Harvey ‘management and manipulation of crises’, is 
discussed by looking at the reactions of the Egyptian government to the fiscal crisis 
of the 1980s, and at the measures undertaken in order to turn a phase of serious 
economic distress into an opportunity to restructure economic relations in favour of 
the incumbent ruling bloc, and especially of the private capital faction within it. 
Lastly, the main cases of state redistributions in favour of the upper classes are also 
considered, for example with reference to land seizures in agriculture, to tax breaks 
in favour of both industrial and financial companies, to various measures 
implemented to favour large banks and their most affluent clients in the financial 
sector. 
Once the assumption of the neoliberalisation of the Egyptian economy has 
been adequately supported, we can move to the transposition of the theories 
discussed in this chapter into empirical referents. This is done separately for each of 
the three dimensions analysed. 
 
Economic-political. Modernisation theory, elite-centred accounts and the Gramscian 
approach based on articulation have rather different expectations on how economic 
reforms, and the deriving modifications in the accumulation regime, impact on the 
social structure. To see whether the expectation of modernisation theory of a 
stronger middle class holds, the distributional impact of reforms is analysed in its 
macro-effects, thus investigating how the main social groups in Egypt have been 
affected by reforms. On the other hand, the expectations of elite-centred approaches 
are scrutinised by looking at micro-effects, thus studying how reforms changed the 
balance of forces between the different components off the ruling bloc. 
As the Gramscian argument looks at the reciprocal relations between class 
relations, accumulation and political regime, its assessment requires a more 
                                                 
80 In this respect, it is important to always keep in mind that the Egyptian financial sector is 
still dominated by banks, rather than by the capital market and its actors (Beck et al. 1999). 
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complex ‘experimental’ apparatus. Whereas the research also refers to some 
quantitative indicators, particularly in tracking down the rise of the capitalist 
oligarchy, most of the empirical work relies on qualitative methods. More 
specifically, two potential channels – institutional and informal – by which changes 
in economic relations might have produced a reconfiguration of political power are 
identified. With respect to the former, reliance on secondary sources is combined 
with interviews carried out in Cairo during a four-month fieldwork from April to 
July 2010. The driving interest on this issue has been the attempt to uncover changes 
in the balance of power between different institutions and within them. The most 
important transformation in inter-institutional relations was the empowering of the 
Ministry of Finance vis-à-vis the Ministry of Planning that had been the heart of 
economic policy during the long étatist phase. On intra-institutional relations, great 
attention has been devoted to understand changes in the composition of the main 
political institutions – thus: the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), parliament 
and government – with respect to the various components of Egyptian society, with 
particular emphasis on the rise of large private capitalists. 
With respect to informal channels, I have tried to discern on the one hand how 
the previous relations of class forces impact, and to a good extent hybridised, 
neoliberal reforms. On the other hand, I have also focused on the practices of the 
rising capitalist oligarchy in order to translate its economic power into political 
power. These practices include the appropriation of state functions in the hands of 
private entrepreneurs still belonging to the wider ruling bloc, the increasing 
technocratisation of economic policy-making and the persistence of old patterns of 
opaque relations between banks and the larger business conglomerates. Also in this 
case, the use of secondary sources has been combined with first-hand accounts from 
researchers and journalists interviewed in Cairo. 
By referring to these forms of empirical articulation of economic and political 
factors I aim to assess the plausibility of the three main claims advanced by the 
Gramscian approach. First, prior class relations determined in the first instance the 
way neoliberalism could be implemented in Egypt. Second, neoliberal reforms as a 
political project reshaped class relations themselves, thus showing the relative 
autonomy of the political. Third, changes in class relations led to a reorganisation of 
political power (thus, another form of determination in the first instance), whose 
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content is open-ended and decided by the struggle itself (another example of 
relative autonomy). 
 
International-national. The decision to focus on institutions as reliable proxies of 
interscalar relations is based on two considerations. The first one, of a theoretical 
nature, has already been discussed above and refers to the role of institutions, both 
on the national and international scale, as forms of condensation of social relations 
from which specific accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects arise – in the 
national scale – and are promoted and diffused – in the international scale. The 
second consideration has more to do with the difficulties of empirical research, and 
more specifically with the very limited accessibility to material regarding the role of 
private capital beyond the aggregate data provided with respect to foreign direct 
investment (FDI).81 
If the focus is on institutions, the dominance of international over national 
elements is to be assessed in the light of the relations between the Egyptian 
government, and the relevant ministries, and international organisations such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. In particular, documents produced on both sides, and the 
content of the actual policies adopted, are carefully scrutinised in order to 
understand the forms and patterns of institutional articulation across scales. 
The empirical study is carried out on two more specific dimensions. On the 
one hand, I have attempted to grasp the quality of institutional relations, in order to 
understand whether there was cooperation (if yes, to what extent) or whether 
relations were mostly characterised by various forms of coercion on the part of 
international institutions or again in which cases confrontational stances were taken 
preventing reforms from being implemented altogether. Thus, inevitable reference 
to historical and analytical sources analysing these evolving relations is 
complemented with a more systematic study of the degree of correspondence 
between reforms suggested and reforms implemented with respect to both their 
content and timing.  
On the other hand, institutional relations have also been evaluated with 
respect to who was leading and who was following in the reform process. In this 
case, attention was mostly focused on the positions taken by the Egyptian 
                                                 
81As mentioned in the introduction, in my specific case this difficulty was compounded by 
my very limited knowledge of Arabic. 
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government on specific issues on the table, including the full implementation of the 
new tenure law with respect to agriculture, the management and divestiture of 
SOEs in the manufacturing sector, and both exchange rate management and 
privatisation of public sector banks as far as finance in concerned. On each of these 
issues, empirical research has attempted to ascertain in which cases the government 
was mostly reactive to proposals coming from international organisations and 
donors, and in which circumstances instead the cabinet took the initiative in the 
reform process. To this effect, I have carried out several interviews with officials 
working for international institutions in Cairo,82 and the material emerging from 
these first-hand accounts has been contextualised in the light of the material 
provided by the two most important English-language outlets with respect to the 
Egyptian economy, namely: the reports drafted by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) and news, dispatches and articles from the Middle East Economic Digest 
(MEED).  
The focus on these two aspects is crucial to assess the two main insights 
provided by the Gramscian approach with respect to interscalar articulation. On the 
one hand, we should be in the position to evaluate whether the international scale 
determined in the first instance the possibilities for action on the national scale, 
effectively pushing the Egyptian government down the reform path. On the other 
hand, once the relative alignment in local class relations to those prevalent on the 
international scale is established, we should also see the national scale becoming 
relatively more autonomous with respect to timing but also increasingly content. 
The evaluation of these two dynamics should also provide enough material to 
discuss whether the transformations experienced by Egypt could be characterised as 
a passive revolution.  
 
Material-ideational. On this dimension, the transposition of the conceptual apparatus 
into empirical referents takes place in three steps. Firstly, the most relevant Egyptian 
organic intellectuals with respect to economic policy-making are identified. This 
study focuses specifically on the work of two economic think tanks established in 
Egypt in the early 1990s: the Economic Research Forum (ERF) and the Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies (ECES). The study of the publications produced by 
                                                 
82 More specifically: the World Bank, the Delegation of the European Union to Egypt and 
USAID.  
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these two research centres,83 indispensable to grasp the penetration of neoclassical 
norms and neoliberal policies in Egypt, is preceded by an analysis of the genesis of 
these two think tanks, in order to get a sense of the power relations and interests 
embedded in them. 
The second aspect to be evaluated is whether policies implemented were 
effectively influenced by neoliberal principles. I rely on the three different types of 
policy change defined by Hall with respect to what happens to three fundamental 
variables in the policy-making process: ‘the overarching goals that guide policy in a 
particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and 
the precise setting of those instruments’ (1993: 278). According to which elements 
change, we have first-order change if the setting of the instruments varies, but the 
instruments themselves and the overarching goals remain the same. We speak of 
second-order change when both instruments and their setting vary, but the main 
goals do not. Lastly, third-order change appears when goals, instruments and 
setting of instruments change. Despite this classification might evoke some 
incremental process of change, Hall is clear when he maintains that: 
 
If first and second order changes preserve the continuities usually found in 
patterns of policy, third order change is often more of a disjunctive process 
associated with periodic discontinuities in policy. One striking implication of 
this analysis would be that first and second order changes in policy do not 
automatically lead to third order changes (1993: 279). 
 
For this reason Hall suggests an analogy with scientific revolutions, and particularly 
with ‘paradigm shifts’. Following his analogy, and to avoid the idea of incremental 
change implied by ordering policy change with cardinal numbers, I speak of 
paradigm change when dealing with change of the overarching goals of a policy. 
In empirical terms, policy change is evaluated with reference to what are 
arguably the most relevant reform bills in the three sectors under consideration. 
Thus, I focus on the implications of Law 96 of 1992 (the new tenancy law) with 
respect to agriculture, of Law 203 of 1991 (reorganising public sector companies and 
                                                 
83 Particular emphasis was placed on their working papers series, providing the most 
advanced aspect of their research activity. Interviews with Hanaa Kheir-el-Din, ECES’s 
former director, Cairo, 4 May 2010, and Ahmed Galal, ERF’s former director, Cairo, 6 May 
2010. 
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mandating their privatisation) in industry, and of Law 88 of 2003 (new central 
banking law) in finance. The question asked is whether these bills provide a 
paradigm change in policy-making in their respective sectors, or whether it amount 
to some form of first- or second-order change. 
Thirdly, the power of ideas is also studied with reference to the internalisation 
of two fundamental neoliberal norms and the cognitive biases deriving thereof. The 
first norm concerns the consideration of the private sector as inherently more 
efficient than the public sector in terms of welfare maximisation. Such an argument 
rests on the neoclassical assumption that sees markets as characterised by perfect 
competition and full availability of information to all the actors involved, and 
further defines actors as fully rational and able to process all the pieces of 
information provided by the market. Within this setting, public actors’ choices are 
always necessarily distorted by extra-economic priorities, whereas this does not 
happen for private actors. Driven exclusively by self-interests, the latter are better 
suited to achieve welfare-maximising outcomes. For this reason it is economically 
rational to allow national economies to be dominated by the private sector. 
The second norm concerns the preference for capital account liberalisation 
over restrictions to capital flows. As eminently put by Chwieroth (2010: 44-7), 
theoretical arguments for and against capital freedom are equally powerful, and 
equally supported by economic theories, and the preference of each economist 
largely depends on the economic doctrine he/she subscribes to.84 Similarly to what 
happens with the first norm, the controversy revolves around the issues of 
information availability and behaviour on the part of market actors. In brief, 
supporters of financial liberalisation assume that perfect information is used 
efficiently by market actors, whereas proponents of capital controls maintain that 
market actors take their decisions according to conventions in an environment 
characterised by imperfect information. 
The internalisation of these norms has been assessed with reference to the 
scientific production on the part of ERF and ECES, which has required the 
construction of a database of all the working papers published until 2010 and the 
                                                 
84 This was witnessed in the late 1990s by an independent evaluation carried out by the IMF 
surveillance system, which argued that within the Fund the opposition to capital controls 
‘was based more on ideology than on a careful consideration of the evidence and the policy 
alternatives’ (IMF 1999: 39). 
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evaluation of their theoretical foundations.85 The cognitive biases deriving from 
embracing these two neoliberal norms are then evaluated both through interviews 
with policy-makers, academics and representatives of the private sector and, with 
reference to the norm of capital freedom, through a survey conducted among the 
members of the Basel II task force within the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE).86  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The three instances of the relation between structure and superstructure on which 
hegemony develops mentioned in Chapter 1 have been discussed at length in this 
chapter. I have thus left hegemony itself in the background in order to focus on the 
interactive dimensions from which it emerges, and namely: the economic and the 
political, the international and the national, the material and the ideational. This 
step was considered necessary in order to avoid the risk of assuming hegemony 
rather than understanding its social construction, reproduction and transformation. 
In this way, the articulation approach hopefully provides the instruments to 
understand cases in which the role of hegemony is limited, its constitution 
incomplete, imperfect or unravelling, and ideally also cases where hegemony is 
absent altogether. 
The method of articulation has thus been deployed on all the three 
dimensions, leading to a differentiated yet coherent understanding of how 
hegemony comes about. The key mechanisms driving articulation have been argued 
to be the same on all the dimensions considered. The economic, the international 
and the material all have a significant shaping power, best encapsulated in the 
concept of determination in the first instance, somewhat defining what Braudel 
called ‘the limits of the possible’. At the same time, the element whose boundaries 
were established – respectively, the political, the national, and the ideational – might 
be characterised as the places where various forms of agency strive for relevance. 
While determined in the first instance, all these aspects maintain the chance of 
exerting a relative autonomy, feeding back in various forms on the economic, the 
international and the material, and eventually reshaping those very limits of the 
                                                 
85 I have referred to a qualitative analysis software – Atlas.ti – to evaluate most of the 
working papers, whereas I have evaluated personally all the finance-related papers. See 
Appendix. 
86 This task force is in charge of developing the tools for implementing a banking sector 
regulatory system compliant with the Basel II Agreement. 
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possible. The key for evaluating the extent of this relevant autonomy has been 
identified in pre-existing class relations and the modifications they went through. 
More specifically: firstly, on the articulation of the economic and the political, 
changes in class relations produced by the first wave of reforms ‘forced’ a 
reconfiguration of political power, but its content was shaped by political struggle 
itself; secondly, on interscalar articulation, the first wave of reforms produced a 
relative alignment of the Egyptian class structure to that prevalent on the 
international scale providing the conditions for a second, endogenous, wave of 
reforms; thirdly, on the articulation of material and ideational factors, changes in 
class relations deriving from the first wave of reforms provided the conditions for 
the rise of neoliberalism as the ideology of the emerging capitalist elite. I believe that 
such a differentiated understanding provides a much more dynamic, yet still 
structurally grounded, account of the relation between structure and superstructure, 
much as Gramsci himself intended with his metaphor of the historical bloc. 
It is now possible also to see the distinctiveness of the approach developed 
here vis-à-vis existing neo-Gramscian approaches with respect to the Egyptian case 
study. With respect to the economic-political dimension, the dualism between state-
centrism and class-centrism is abandoned in favour of an approach that, whilst 
appreciating the power of structural change, also acknowledges that political 
dynamics are irreducible to it and to a significant extent feed back on these very 
structures, providing the conditions for the emergence of a very peculiar 
combination of regimes which I term neoliberal authoritarianism. With respect to 
interscalar relations, the tendency on the part of both the Coxian and the 
Amsterdam schools to see the state as increasingly transnationalised, or as plainly 
irrelevant in the case of peripheral countries, is corrected in favour of an 
understanding of the state as the core of a nodal scale operating a passive revolution 
which it at once adaptation to the global imperatives of capital accumulation and 
domestication of some of its potential effects. Lastly, with reference to the relation 
between material and ideational factors, the performative role of neoliberalism as an 
ideology is taken beyond the functionalist interpretation of the Amsterdam school, 
but contrary to what happens with Coxian studies is still tied to social relations of 
production, even though relatively autonomous from it. 
Before comparing these approaches in the light of the material emerging from 
fieldwork in Egypt, it is necessary to focus on the evolution of the Egyptian political 
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economy, and to establish that our working assumption of an ongoing 
neoliberalisation of the Egyptian economy holds to careful scrutiny. This is the task 
of Chapter 3, which also provides the chance to fine-tune some of the theoretical 




MOVING AWAY FROM THE ETATIST PARADIGM? 




The previous chapter located the contributions of the Gramscian approach 
presented here in the relevant debates in critical IPE. Discussing the three 
dimensions along which hegemonies articulate, the main concepts forming the 
analytical toolkit of this study have been outlined. One more step is needed before 
the value of the conceptual apparatus is evaluated in the face of empirical material. 
This step requires establishing beyond any reasonable doubt that what the Egyptian 
economy experienced over the past two decades is best configured as a process of 
neoliberalisation. Thus, the main task of this chapter is to identify the instances of 
this process between 1991 and 2010 and their relevance with respect to the 
transformation of the accumulation regime and of class relations. 
Establishing the presence of the four politico-economic processes identified by 
Harvey as constitutive of neoliberalisation is a conditio sine qua non before 
proceeding with the empirical part. Some influential scholars, particularly Middle 
East specialists, still need to be convinced on this fundamental issue. In fact, there is 
a rather substantial literature supporting the view that what Egypt went through is 
more the derailment of the reform project, rather than its implementation and the 
following transformation of the national economy (Hinnebusch 2001; Kienle 2001 
and 2003; Schlumberger 2004 and 2008; Wurzel 2009). I believe that coming to terms 
with their position, and convincing the sceptics about the plausibility of the view 
expressed here, is indispensable before moving to the empirical part. 
In its essential terms, this chapter argues that over the past twenty years the 
Egyptian political economy experienced a dramatic shift from an étatist towards a 
neoliberal regime of capital accumulation. Whereas this process of neoliberalisation 
was far from completed, its effects on the Egyptian political economy were clearly 
visible. In order to show this, the first section outlines the evolution of the Egyptian 
political economy since the Free Officers coup in 1952, suggesting that despite the 
 101 
to-and-fro in economic policies the Egyptian accumulation regime in 1990 was still 
better interpreted under the rubric of étatism. The following section reviews the 
impact of the IMF-promoted ERSAP firstly with respect to macroeconomic 
stabilisation, and then with reference to privatisations and liberalisations. The last 
section focuses on the specific sectors analysed in this study and suggests that the 
Egyptian economy has been substantially neoliberalised with reference to all the 
four aspects outlined by Harvey: privatisation, financialisation, management and 
manipulation of crises, state redistributions in favour of the upper classes. By the 
end of the chapter, the doubts regarding the appropriateness of neoliberalism as a 
way of defining the Egyptian regime of capital accumulation will hopefully be 
dispelled. 
 
3.2. Egyptian vagaries in brief, 1952-1990 
Despite having achieved formal political independence after World War I, it is only 
with the 1952 revolution ushered in by the Free Officers coup that Egypt gained 
control over its own economic policy (Hussein 1973: 20-4). However, during their 
first years in power the Free Officers ‘had no action programme that would have 
provided some conception of the society their revolution aimed at creating’ (Baker 
1978: 101). This was all the more true with respect to economic policy, where the 
determination to let the state play a central role in the modernisation process was 
the only clear aspect in the eyes of these army officers suddenly turned into policy-
makers (Wahba 1994: 49-50; Ayubi 1995: 107-8). By 1990, the centrality of the state, 
and particularly of the oversized public sector, in national development was still 
one of the main characteristics of the Egyptian political economy, in spite of the 
ostensible turnaround experienced by its policies, ranging from foreign relations to 
economic development. 
This section discusses the evolution in the Egyptian economic policy, and in its 
political economy, from the ousting of King Farouk in July 1952 to the beginning of 
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank that led to ERSAP. This means 
focusing first on the political economy of Nasserism and then on infitah and its 
political and economic repercussions. The picture emerging from this retrospective 
is one highlighting the tensions and inconsistencies characterising both projects. 
Three aspects can be said to characterise the Egyptian political economy in 1990. 
Firstly, an economy structurally dependent on the developed world. Secondly, in 
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contrast with most peripheral countries, an economy largely controlled by Egyptian 
nationals, with private foreign capital playing a remarkably minor role. Thirdly, a 
political economy that despite the evolutions experienced during the first four 
decades as a republic was still better understood referring to the étatist paradigm. 
 
3.2.1. The doomed route to Arab socialism, 1952-1973 
In 1952, the Free Officers took over a country where the share of the economy in the 
hands of the private sector was significantly higher than in most neighbouring 
states. Mead estimates that when the king was dethroned the public sector 
accounted for only about 13 per cent of GDP (1967: 272-3). The economic weakness 
of the public sector suggested that the fundamental changes advocated had to be 
pursued through collaboration with private actors. Indeed, the period from 1952 
and 1956 could be characterised as a phase of ‘public-private partnership’, where 
the newly established regime relied on capitals provided by the established business 
sector in order to modernise and industrialise the country (El Kammash 1968: 282; 
Bush 1999: 11). The push towards industrialisation was the main point of contact 
between military officers and local businessmen, confirming the hegemonic role 
acquired by economic nationalism as the main driver of industrialisation already 
since the 1920s (Wahba 1994: 37-43; Vitalis 1995: 47-9).87 The symbol of this phase – 
Law 178 of 1952, commonly known as the Land Reform – despite focusing on 
agriculture was itself geared towards speeding up the process of industrialisation, 
particularly in its intention to transfer agricultural surpluses away from the 
countryside towards financing urban growth (Bush 1999: 11). 
Already in 1956, Nasser’s dissatisfaction with the private sector and 
conversely businessmen’s worries about the constant policing of their activities on 
the part of the security apparatus showed that the state-business partnership could 
not work for much longer. The successful conclusion of the Suez crisis had the twin 
effect of raising Nasser’s status to that of a demigod and of unifying the Egyptian 
masses against the interference of former colonial powers. This situation provided a 
must-take window of opportunity, leading the regime to step heavily into the 
economic arena, with a series of measures ranging from the sequestration of French 
                                                 
87 In a study on the birth of economic nationalism in the Egyptian elites that will lead in the 
1920s to the ‘Egyptianisation’ movement, EzzelArab maintains that the roots of economic 
nationalism in Egypt should be traced back to the end of the 1870s (2002: 3). 
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and British assets, to the nationalisation of foreign banks and the introduction of 
five-year plans to guide economic development (Tignor 1998: 114-42). This was the 
phase that Bush labels ‘directed capitalism’ (1999: 13), lasting approximately until 
1961. The widespread support generated in the rest of the Arab world by the Suez 
crisis also provided Nasser with the chance of spreading in the region what he 
called the Egyptian ‘social revolution’. The union with Syria and the creation of the 
United Arab Republic were meant to be the first steps towards extending Nasser’s 
hegemonic project to the whole region. However, the Pan-Arab project was to prove 
short-lived, as the non-accession of Iraq after the Ba’athist revolution, the Syrian 
secession in 1961 and the disastrous involvement in the Yemeni civil war gave three 
heavy blows to Nasser’s regional ambitions, putting them to rest (Baker 1978: 63). 
The Syrian secession itself was the reaction to a new wave of nationalisations 
amounting to what is called the ‘socialist revolution’ and signalling the beginning of 
the third and last phase of Nasserism, that of ‘state capitalism’ (Cooper 1982: 18). In 
February 1960 the two largest national banks – Banque Misr and the National Bank 
of Egypt – were nationalised entirely, showing a qualitative change in the process of 
state intervention in the economy, as this was the first case of nationalisations 
concerning companies owned by Egyptian nationals (Ikram 2006: 6). By the end of 
1961, most large and medium-sized industrial and financial enterprises had been 
nationalised, with the state substantially increasing its role in production as well as 
establishing an extensive system of price and cost controls. At the same time, there 
was a significant broadening of welfare provisions, with measures ranging from 
urban rent control to free health care and education. Even though one would have 
to wait 1973 to see infitah and thus a significant change in the relation between state, 
private actors and economic development, the end of the phase of state capitalism is 
usually found in the devastating defeat in the Six Day War (Bush 1999: 13-5). 
The first decade of Nasserite policies (1955-65) provided Egypt with a 
impressive growth rate, averaging about 7 per cent a year, before slowing down to 
about 3 per cent a year in the following decade (Ikram 2006: 85-8). Growth was 
accompanied by the development of welfare measures well beyond regional 
standards. However, as common to most countries pursuing import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI), these improvements in macroeconomic indicators came at the 
price of a staggering growth in the stock of external debt. The twin commitment to 
both growth and equality meant that heavy importing and borrowing forced both 
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the balance of trade and the balance of payments to suffer substantial deficits (Amin 
1995: 2-5; Ikram 2006: 117-23). When in swift succession both the Soviet Union and 
the United States backed out of this dysfunctional pattern,88 the unsustainability of 
this situation became apparent. 
Regardless of its eventual failure, the Nasserite project produced significant 
modifications on all the three instance of the relation between structure and 
superstructure analysed by this thesis. With respect to the relation between 
economic and political factors, the aggressive policies adopted were aimed at 
changing the very structure of the economy, and were able to do so, even though 
with some negative consequences, both economic and political. The partnership 
between state and business towards industrialisation was accompanied by an overt 
war to landlords, best exemplified by the Land Reform (Baker 1978: 200-1; Bush 
1999: 10-4), and to the merchant class closely linked to foreign capital (Soliman 1998: 
10-2). Over time, as we mentioned, local capital became unreliable in the eyes of the 
army, leading to the nationalisation of Egyptian-controlled companies. Thus, the 
policies adopted were from the outset designed to produce a shift in relations 
between class forces, and were remarkably successful in doing so, disempowering 
landlords and merchants and improving, albeit only marginally, the position of both 
peasants and industrial workers (Abdel-Fadil 1975: 89-94; Bush 2002: 8-11). 
However, the most relevant change in class relations was the rise of what has been 
elsewhere defined as a ‘state bourgeoisie’ (Zaalouk 1989: 30) or a ‘state class’ (Ayubi 
1995: 14), formed by a military and a bureaucratic wing. These shifts in class 
relations were mirrored in the consolidation of an étatist accumulation regime, with 
the state extending its reach from planning and coordination towards the absorption 
of managerial and productive functions. As modifications took place in the 
structure, the composition of the ruling bloc also changed, with the emergence of an 
authoritarian regime heavily dominated by the two wings of the public sector. 
With respect to scale, Nasser’s aim became over time to end the structural 
dependence of the Egyptian economy by putting it in the hands of Egyptian 
nationals. This led the regime to expel foreign private capital after Suez and to 
replace it first with private and then with public capital. Thus, there was a clear 
                                                 
88 In 1964, the Soviet Union refused to postpone the repayment of part of the loan disbursed 
for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. One year later, the United States abrogated the 
delivery of wheat under the ‘Food for Peace’ programme (Bush 1999: 20). 
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change in the control of the economy, which effectively went into the hands of 
Egyptian nationals. However, this and the ISI strategy pursued proved insufficient 
to reach the ultimate end of breaking structural dependence. In other words, the 
constraints set by the international scale, constituting the Egyptian economy as 
structurally dependent, provided the initial boundaries within which change on the 
national scale could take place. A similar form of determination in the first instance 
by the international could also be seen in the political sphere, with the Cold War 
setting up the constraints within which Egypt – emerging as one of the leaders of 
the Non-Aligned Movement – could pursue its national experiment. In turn, this 
proved to have significant reverberations also on the international scale, for example 
in providing Egypt with a positional rent from its leadership of what was perceived 
as a third emerging bloc (Mohamed Mahmoud 2009: 35). 
Lastly, with respect to the relation between material factors and ideas, the 
material conditions of exploitation and dependence provided a fertile ground for 
economic nationalism as an ideology to prosper well before the Free Officers coup, 
particularly among local elites (EzzelArab 2002). With economic nationalism already 
dominating as an ideational paradigm, the field of contestation within the ruling 
bloc was limited to the dominant form of ownership in the economy, i.e.: private or 
public. The acceleration of the industrialisation process inspired by economic 
nationalism led to a change in material conditions, particularly in terms of welfare 
provision, which reinforced the dominance of the nationalist discourse, and was at 
the same time instrumental in the resolution of the private vs. public dilemma in 
favour of the latter (Wahba 1994: 85-6).  
 
3.2.2. Opening the door, but not quite, 1973-1990 
Since the beginning of his presidency, Sadat had been constrained significantly both 
internally and externally. On the national scale, Nasser’s death was expected to 
unleash a power struggle between the different factions he had been able to keep in 
check (Baker 1978: 86-7). On the international scale, Egypt’s positional rent deriving 
from its leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement was rapidly dissolving due to 
superpower détente, compounding the ever more impelling debt problem 
(Mohamed Mahmoud 2009: 56). In this respect, it is not misleading to consider the 
October War as Sadat’s Suez, as it boosted his status at home allowing him to 
pursue a bolder path than would have otherwise been the case. 
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The infitah (opening) policy found its official elaboration in the October Paper of 
1974. This made the case for a major redirection of policies in both the economic and 
political spheres, based on the consideration that the October War put Egypt in front 
of its next challenge, defined as a ‘construction battle’, whose main aim was the 
modernisation of the country by 2000. The rationale behind infitah was remarkably 
straightforward: acquiring access to hitherto inaccessible Western technology, 
attracting the emerging glut of Arab petrodollars, and employing the Egyptian 
workforce both at home and in the Gulf countries, thus increasing consumption and 
raising additional revenues through remittances (Cooper 1982: 91). 
The content of infitah was twofold, as economic liberalisation was conceived as 
linked to a parallel process of political opening. On the first front, Law 43 of 1974 
(Law for Arab and Foreign Investments and Free Zones) signalled the effective 
launch of this new course. Through the creation of tax-free zones, the establishment 
of much greater foreign exchange freedom also for companies operating outside of 
the free zones,89 and the provision of explicit protection for new investors,90 the 
regime aimed at creating an economic environment conducive to greater private 
investment. On the second front, the new season started with the liberation of 
political prisoners and culminated in the movement away from the one-party 
system of the Nasser era towards a form of controlled pluralism, with a five-party 
system where competition was still substantially limited (Waterbury 1983: 366-84). 
This was a period of lively exchange of ideas, with the right-wing Liberal Party on 
the one hand advocating more and more liberalising reforms, and on the left the 
National Progressive Unionist Grouping defending the multi-party system yet 
warning against the dismantlement of the public sector that infitah policies might 
have entailed. Sadat and his Egypt’s Party sat rather comfortably in the middle.91 A 
repositioning on the Cold War chessboard was the final element of infitah, with the 
Camp David agreement and the following normalisation of relations with Israel 
being the seal on Egypt’s new international position. 
The results of infitah were mixed to say the least. Despite swift approval of a 
significant number of projects, only a handful of them were effectively carried out. 
                                                 
89 Those operating in the free zone were exempted from any foreign exchange control. 
90 Art. 7 of Law 43 says: ‘Projects may not be nationalised or expropriated, nor may invested 
capital be confiscated, seized or sequestered except through lawful processes’ (quoted in 
Baker 1978: 145). 
91 In 1978 the president’s party was renamed National Democratic Party (NDP). 
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Most importantly, they tended to focus on sectors, such as tourism, construction and 
housing, with a limited long-term developmental impact (Baker 1978: 145). At the 
same time, the small share of domestic private capital that had survived 
nationalisations by retrenching in labour-intensive and low value-added sectors 
such as textiles and foodstuffs proved unwilling to move towards other sectors 
(Wahba 1994: 166). More worryingly, the open door policy was not successful in 
attracting Western and Arab capitals, with the partial exception of international oil 
companies and banks. On the positive side, the lack of foreign investment was 
compensated by the increase in foreign aid, fundamental in explaining the 
emergence of a mass consumption society, considered by many the hallmark of 
Sadat’s presidency (Amin 1995: 11-2; Shechter 2008). This allowed on the one hand 
the fastest economic growth in the history of republican Egypt in the period 
between 1975 and 1985, at the average rate of 8 per cent a year, but at the same time 
meant that it was also a ‘jobless growth’, mostly based on various forms of rent 
(Radwan 1998: 16). On the other hand, being growth mostly debt-financed, the 
Egyptian balance of payments was in ever greater troubles, forcing negotiations 
with the IMF that would provide loans in exchange for measures including the 
removal of subsidies on basic foodstuffs. Sadat’s decision to follow this route found 
widespread popular opposition. For the first time since Nasser’s death, the 
demonstrations mobilised an entire country. This time the lower classes were not 
taking it to the street in mourning, but rather to express their grievances. As a 
consequence, the government backtracked and kept subsidies in place, with a 
decision taken by some to symbolise the end of infitah. Yet, this is probably better 
seen only as a temporary halt, as the opening process moved on, albeit very 
gradually and in a piecemeal way (Ayubi 1995: 346; Amin 1999: 45). 
If it is true that Sadat’s ‘gamble on the future’ was short-lived, it nonetheless 
spurred fundamental transformations on all the three dimensions taken into 
consideration by this study. With respect to the relation between the economic and 
the political, infitah policies revived the old liberal bourgeoisie sidelined by Nasser 
while at the same time leading to the creation of a new business class. However, 
both these groups heavily relied on the state for their survival, fitting into the 
category of crony capitalists (Sadowski 1991: 138-40; Bush 1999: 88-9). Seemingly in 
contradiction with this trend, the infitah also produced a significant expansion of the 
public sector, which continued well into the 1980s (Ayubi 1995: 298-300). The 
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limited growth of the private sector led to a phenomenal increase in informal labour 
(Oweiss 1990; Rizk 1991), which effectively became the ‘employer of last resort’ in a 
system where job creation was unable to keep up with the growing workforce. The 
economic regime also changed, with an ever-increasing reliance on rent.92 With 
respect to the political regime, the glaring rigging of the 1979 parliamentary 
elections in favour of the president’s party led to a wave of dissent that, together 
with the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood, led the regime to abandon the 
reform track, with political deliberalisation swiftly sweeping in. Also in this case, 
the economic structure set the conditions within which political action could take 
place, in the form of infitah. As it had happened with Nasserism, the policies 
adopted did feed back on the economic structure, leading to a shift in class relations 
and to the insertion of private elements within an accumulation regime still 
undoubtedly falling into the étatist camp. Shifting class relations also had an impact 
on the composition of the ruling bloc, with both the remnants of the old liberal 
bourgeoisie and the ranks of the emerging infitah class playing second fiddle to the 
still dominant public sector (Ayubi 1995: 351-2). 
With regard to the relations between international and national scale, two 
changes in international conditions provided Egypt with a chance to reposition itself 
abroad and to pursue different policies at home. Firstly, the already mentioned 
détente forced the Egyptian government to shift its allegiance, as it rapidly eroded 
the positional rent enjoyed through the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Secondly, the stagflation of the 1970s and the rise of neoliberalism in the economies 
of the core in the early 1980s led to a change in the capital accumulation regime 
prevalent on the international scale, pushing Egypt to restructure its economy. The 
infitah however did not lead to any contestation of the condition of dependency, 
which was indeed aggravated by increased reliance on foreign aid.93 The relative 
autonomy of the national scale can be seen in that, despite the ever-more pervasive 
pressures towards the liberalisation of capital flows, by the end of the 1980s the 
economy was still largely dominated by locals, as foreigners gaining access to the 
                                                 
92 Five forms of rent were particularly relevant: oil exports, Suez Canal earnings, remittances, 
tourism receipts and the already mentioned external assistance. 
93 To put it in the terms of Zaalouk, if Nasser failed in delivering development through de-
linking, Sadat’s route was not even able to allow Egypt to follow what Cardoso calls a 
process of ‘associated dependent development’ (1989: 159) 
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Egyptian market did so as minority partners in joint ventures, thus playing only a 
marginal role in the development of the Egyptian economy (Waterbury 1983: 200-1). 
Lastly, on the relation between material factors and ideas, the pressures built 
by the ineffectiveness of the Nasserite strategy led to a reorganisation of the 
discourse about economic policy, with the decoupling of the welfarist and 
developmental functions, up until them both controlled and administered by the 
state (Ayubi 1995: 340-1). A strong emphasis on the virtues of liberalism in both its 
political and economic meaning followed swiftly, in the attempt to reorganise the 
discourse around the ability of the private sector to provide better than the state and 
its agencies for economic growth and job creation. The limits of this approach were 
to become apparent soon, and have been analysed at length elsewhere (Zaalouk 
1989; Ayubi 1991). On the one hand, the lack of success of the new discourse was 
certainly instrumental in producing the gradual demobilisation and growing apathy 
which characterised the Egyptian society at the end of the 1980s (Ayubi 1995: 197-8). 
On the other hand, it also fed back on the material structure, by providing the 
ideological foundations for the emergence of a mass consumer society. 
 
3.2.3. Change and continuity in the Egyptian political economy 
By the end of the 1980s, the Egyptian political economy was characterised by three 
elements. Firstly, during the whole period between 1952 and 1990 the Egyptian 
economy was a structurally dependent one. The forms of its dependency might 
have changed over time - from socialist to capitalist, as Waterbury put it (1983: 391-
405) – but its essence was altered neither by Nasser’s nationalisations nor by Sadat’s 
joint ventures. However, it is possible to argue that this structural condition 
worsened under Sadat’s presidency. With infitah, the decision to forsake the 
developmental function keeping the welfarist one had crucially damaging 
consequences, as the rise in consumption came together with the maintenance of 
social programmes, crucial to regime legitimation, leading the state to over-borrow 
and eventually to build up an unmanageable stock of debt. 
Secondly, ever since the sequestrations and nationalisations following the Suez 
crisis, activities in the Egyptian economy have largely been controlled by locals, be 
they public sector managers or the infitah bourgeoisie. This aspect is of particular 
relevance as it separates Egypt from most other peripheral countries, characterised 
as they were by the domination of foreign capital (Cardoso 1979). At the same time, 
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the dominant position of Egyptian capital in the economy should also make the 
Egyptian economy more resilient to pressures towards neoliberalisation, as none of 
the partners in the state-business alliance produced by infitah had much to gain 
from a more open economic system. 
Lastly, despite the infitah itself, and the elements of opening in the Egyptian 
economy, it would be unreasonable to think of the Egyptian economy as a 
liberalised one. At best we could talk of a shift within the étatist paradigm, with the 
state surrendering only part of its functions with respect to production and 
management, and doing so resorting to strategies such as contracting out services 
and activities, that is: allowing private entrepreneurs to manage state-owned assets 
in return of a fee (Ayubi 1995: 333). In sum, the public sector not only preserved its 
dominant role with respect to incentive-setting, planning and coordination, but was 
also able to retain a major role in management and production, and even more so in 
sectors deemed strategic such as steel production and the energy industry. By 1990, 
the total capital of all private companies amounted to less than 10 per cent of the 
book value of the state sector (Ibid: 349). 
These three aspects could be seen as a set of asymmetrical relations interacting 
with each other. The first element placed the Egyptian economy in a dependent 
position with respect to the core of the capitalist system. The second sees foreign 
capital in a subordinate position with respect to local capital, both public and 
private, somewhat weakening the pressures coming from the core towards a 
thorough change in the accumulation regime. Lastly, in the relation between public 
and private sector, the latter was in a subordinate position, being better conceived as 
a ‘junior partner’ in the ruling coalition, as Ayubi put it (1995: 352). Hence, also in 
this case the demands towards a change in the regime of capital accumulation 
should be weakened further, or at least will not be raised with consistency and 
credibility by a private sector that is too small in size to have any real leverage on 
major policies and lacks any measure of substantial autonomy from the public 
sector. 
Thus, despite the spread of neoliberalism in the developing world since the 
mid-1980s, by 1990 none of the elements included in our definition of 
neoliberalisation discussed in Section 2.2.3 had happened in Egypt to an extent 
which could make think of a shift in the accumulation regime. Étatism seemed as 
entrenched as ever, veering away from socialist developmental dreams towards a 
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more classical rentier economy (Soliman 2011: 22-3). At the same time, the existing 
conditions – and particularly the largely domestic control of the economy under 
public sector dominance – seemed to conjure against a neoliberal turn. 
 
3.3. A success story? Stabilisation and adjustment 
Whereas it probably did not provide the sea change often described in the IMF and 
World Bank publications, the implementation of ERSAP was a fundamental 
moment in the evolution of the Egyptian political economy, and ought to be 
analysed at least for two reasons. Firstly, because this is the point where the 
narrative of Egypt as a successfully reformed economy starts, with the country 
turned in less than one decade from ‘one of the slowest train wrecks in history’ 
(quoted in Ikram 2006: 59) into ‘the Tiger on the Nile’ (Soliman 2011: 45). Thus, it is 
important to understand what happened in this phase, and why both international 
agencies and the Egyptian government were so upbeat about both the type of 
reforms undertaken and their likely outcomes. Secondly, I maintain that ERSAP did 
the groundwork for the thorough neoliberalisation of the Egyptian economy, firstly 
by framing the whole debate on economic reforms around the stark dichotomy 
between state and market, between inefficient public and efficient private sector, 
and then by supporting an encompassing programme of liberalisations and 
privatisations. 
This section looks first at the process of macroeconomic stabilisation, carried 
out between 1991 and 1996, and at the praise that the Egyptian government received 
from IFIs, before outlining what are the problems with this mainstream narrative. It 
then looks at structural adjustment policies, with a specific focus on privatisation 
and liberalisation of both trade and capital movements. 
 
3.3.1. ‘The reckoning’ and macroeconomic stabilisation 
The dominant position of the state in the Egyptian economy in the late 1980s can 
hardly be overstated. In much the same way, the troubles in which the Egyptian 
economy was in that specific conjuncture can hardly be overestimated themselves. 
By the mid-1980s, the chronic indebtedness was worsened by a sharp drop in oil 
prices, forcing the Egyptian government to enter into negotiations with the IMF and 
sign a stabilisation package authorising purchases for up to SDR250 million (Abdel-
Khalek 2001: 25). As had already happened with previous agreements with the IMF, 
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the commitment on the part of the Egyptian government faltered as soon as the 
situation changed. In this specific case, there was both good and bad news. On the 
positive side, the new increase in oil prices took some pressure off. On the negative 
side, the adverse distributional impact of stabilisation measures led the government 
to launch compensatory measures such as a 20 per cent increase in wages for both 
public and private sector workers, triggering an inflationary spiral that brought the 
Egyptian economy in an even worse position by the beginning of the 1990s (Ibid: 
30). 
The 1987 crisis is important for two reasons. Firstly, it represents the first 
attempt on the part of the IMF to push on Egypt a set of reforms that since the mid-
1980s had been promoted actively in most developing countries facing balance of 
payments crises. Secondly, despite the inconsistent commitment to reform, this was 
a phase of ‘reckoning’ for the policy-making circles surrounding the president 
(Amin 1995: 16), leading to the conclusion that tackling such a long-term crisis 
would have required abandoning the tactics of ‘dilatory reform’ (Richards 1991) 
towards a broader restructuring of the Egyptian economy. It is not a case that the 
team negotiating ERSAP was by far the most knowledgeable and better supported 
team that Egypt had ever sent to the IMF (Ikram 2006: 61).94 
The conditions attached to ERSAP were heavily influenced by the Washington 
Consensus, codified by Williamson as a decalogue implicitly developed in the IMF-
World Bank-Treasury complex and promoted in the world as a blueprint for 
economic development.95 In particular, the stabilisation measures required followed 
very closely the first five objectives listed in Table 3.1. More specifically, fiscal 
discipline, and particularly the reduction of the ever-worsening budget deficit, was 
at the very core of the whole stabilisation package. To meet the stringent fiscal 
targets, the government was for the first time forced to cut significantly public 
expenditure, something it had always been very reluctant to do, reminiscent of the 
1977 bread riots. Even though a comprehensive tax reform proved unfeasible, 
                                                 
94 The team was composed by Kemal Ganzouri, Atef Ebeid, Mohamed Ahmed El Razaz, 
Salah Ahmed and Youssef Boutros Ghali. The first two would both serve as prime ministers 
in the following years. Ganzouri also happens to be the prime minister at the time of writing, 
appointed in November 2011 by a military junta increasingly under pressure. Boutros Ghali 
has served as minister of several economic departments between 1993 and 2011. He will 
come back in the following chapters. 
95 A further incentive to meet ERSAP conditions was that the promise by Paris Club 
countries to forgive part of the outstanding debt and to restructure the remaining parts was 
conditional to the Egyptian government meeting the targets set by ERSAP (Ikram 2006: 61). 
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incremental changes in the tax system provided a broadening of the tax base and the 
imposition of regressive taxes such as the General Sales Tax (Soliman 2011: 109-13). 
This was compounded by several changes in monetary policy, with the removal of 
ceilings, the full-fledged liberalisation of interest rates and the unification of the 
exchange rate for the Egyptian pound (LE) at the level of the most devalued rate. 
 
Table 3.1 – Washington Consensus 
 
        Source: Williamson 1989. 
 
The stabilisation programme was remarkably successful when considered along the 
IMF guidelines (1997: 4). By 1997, public finances were in an unprecedented good 
condition (see Figure 3.1). The removal of the direct credit line between the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) and the government led to a rapid deceleration in monetary 
expansion, with a remarkable reduction in the rate of inflation from an average of 
about 19 per cent a year during the 1987-1991 period to 4.6 per cent in 1997 (Zaki 
2001: 1873). Similarly, the budget deficit was drastically reduced, from 15.3 per cent 
in 1991 to 1.3 per cent in 1996, ‘an effort that has perhaps few international parallels 
in recent history’ (IMF 1997: 7). As a result of changes in monetary policy, the level 
of dollarisation of the economy and the annual rate of liquidity growth also shrank 
under the stabilisation programme. The unification of the exchange rate led to a 
substantial increase in revenues, particularly from oil and Suez canal receipts, which 
combined with a reduction of budgetary expenditure by 7.5 per cent of GDP and 
with debt cancellation on the part of Paris Club countries was fundamental to deficit 
reduction (Ikram 2006: 67).  
Fiscal discipline had been established, the exchange rate structure had been 
simplified leading to a more competitive pound making Egyptian exports 
1. Fiscal discipline 
2. Redirection of public expenditure away from generalised 
subsidies and towards education and health 
3. Tax reform (lower marginal tax rate and broadened tax base) 
4. Interest rates liberalisation 
5. Competitive exchange rates 
6. Trade liberalisation 
7. Liberalisation of inflow of FDI 
8. Privatisation 
9. Deregulation 
10. Secure property rights 
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comparatively cheaper, and higher interest rates provided better investment 
opportunities. Real GDP growth at about 5 per cent a year during the stabilisation 
period compounded this rosy picture (Abdel-Khalek 2001: 60). From this 
perspective, after the stabilisation programme, Egypt was in a position ‘to achieve 
high levels of real economic growth that can raise living standards, increase gainful 
employment opportunities, while ensuring that the fruits of economic growth are 
shared by all strata of society’ (IMF 1997: 59). 
 
Figure 3.1 – Key indicators for macroeconomic stabilisation 
 
  Source: IMF (1997). t=1991-92  
 
However, the IMF narrative obfuscates at least three critical elements of the 
stabilisation programme. Firstly, the reduction and reorganisation of public 
expenditure was based on the so-called ‘crowding out’ assumption that simply did 
not work. In other words, reforms were crafted around an opposition between the 
public and the private sector, with the retreat of the former being a necessary 
preliminary step aimed at creating enough room for the private sector to step in and 
generate wealth more efficiently. Secondly, the monetary stance adopted had the 
merit of curbing inflation and rebalancing public finances, but at the same time 
harmed long-term growth. The dollar peg led to a real appreciation of the pound 
that further reduced the rate of savings (chronically low in the Egyptian case), as 
consumers were substituting present for future consumption in anticipation of 
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devaluation, thus being engaged in short-term and high-yield activities rather than 
projects with long-term developmental impact (Abdel-Khalek 2001: 89). Thirdly, 
and more interestingly, dramatic improvements in public finances indicators were 
helped substantially by a rather opaque accounting device. Following Law 203 of 
1991, companies entirely under government control and reorganised under holding 
companies managed by the Ministry of Planning, had their balance sheets taken off 
the state budget while they were restructured before privatisation, thus contributing 
considerably to cut down both public expenditure and budget deficit (Mitchell 2002: 
282). 
Despite the controversies over the degree of success of ERSAP in stimulating 
the Egyptian economy, it is undoubted that macroeconomic stabilisation changed 
the overall stage on which economic policies would be framed, discussed and 
implemented. First of all, macroeconomic stabilisation proved that the Egyptian 
government could be pushed to follow from start to finish a reform programme 
agreed with IFIs, something that had not happened in the previous occasions when 
Egypt approached the IMF. Secondly, it provided a lens – the state vs. market 
dichotomy – that could be used to analyse any economic issue, also providing the 
corollary by which state intervention was the problem and had to be reduced to a 
minimum for the economy for grow faster. Thirdly, measures such as the limitation 
of public expenditure and a stricter monetary policy paved the way for the deeper 
process of neoliberalisation that was starting to unfold. 
 
3.3.2. ‘The IMF’s model pupil’: privatisation and liberalisation 
The structural adjustment programme was similarly moulded on the five remaining 
precepts of the Washington Consensus listed in Table 3.1, with great emphasis on 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the elimination of illiberal 
practices characterising trade and capital movements. The new agreement signed in 
1996 by the government with the IMF acknowledged that after achieving the 
stabilisation targets it was time to accelerate on the front of structural reforms.96 
The legal framework for privatisation was established at the very outset of 
stabilisation with Law 203 of 1991, or Public Business Sector Law. This created a 
                                                 
96 The same message was already contained in the US-Egyptian Partnership for Economic 
Growth and Development, signed in 1996 and considered by some to be the main inspiration 
of the way structural reforms were conducted (Aidi 2009: 140). 
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three-tiered structure, with the Public Sector Office (PSO) overseeing the process of 
restructuring carried out by twenty-seven Holding Companies (HCs) over 314 
affiliate companies, before their eventual sale to the private sector.97 Yet, it was not 
until 1996 that the privatisations gathered some momentum, under the leadership of 
the prime minister Ganzouri (Ikram 2006: 79). 
The numbers of the first wave of privatisations look rather impressive. By June 
2000, the government had sold controlling interest in 118 enterprises and a minority 
interest in 16 more, with a total sales value of more than LE14 billion. In 1998, the 
Egyptian programme was ranked fourth in the world in terms of privatisation 
receipts as a share of GDP (IMF 1998: 52).98 The slowdown of the economy following 
the shockwaves of the East Asian crisis and the difficulties in selling remaining 
SOEs brought privatisations to a halt by the end of the decade.  
The second wave of privatisations would only take place after 2004, when the 
prolonged sluggishness of the economy pushed Mubarak to appoint a new cabinet, 
headed by the ‘reformist’ Ahmed Nazif. The launch of the Asset Management 
Programme (AMP) on the part of the newly created Ministry of Investment 
produced the impetus hoped for. Between 2004 and 2007, the new programme 
oversaw the sale of 130 state-owned assets,99 with proceeds amounting to LE35 
billion.100 The success of the programme was such that between 2005 and 2009 Egypt 
was included for four years out of five among the top ten reformers in the Doing 
Business Report by the World Bank.101 Once again, exogenous shocks, this time in the 
form of the global financial crisis, halted privatisations, leading the government to 
move to ‘an approach based on private-sector management of state-owned assets’ in 
the wake of growing social unrest in newly privatised companies (EIU 2010b: 6). 
With respect to trade liberalisation, the removal of non-tariff barriers had 
started already before ERSAP, and proceeded at a faster pace as the programme 
                                                 
97 Already in 1993 there was a first streamlining of the HCs, which became seventeen (Ikram 
2006: 80), before being further reduced to the nine existing today. 
98 Not long after these rankings were published, The Economist gave an account of the 
virtuous relation finally developing between international lending agencies and the 
Egyptian government, defining Egypt ‘the IMF’s model pupil’ (18 March 1999). 
99 It is worthwhile noting that the definition of state-owned assets is significantly broader 
than that of SOEs, as it also includes stakes in joint ventures with the private sector. 
100 Estimated as about LE21 billion for the fiscal years 2004/05 and 2005/06 (EIU 2006a: 25) 
and LE14 billion for the fiscal year 2006/07 (IMF 2007: 5), excluding the proceeds deriving 
from the privatisation of Bank of Alexandria, discussed in the next section. 
101 See the Doing Business Report website: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reforms/ (first 
accessed on 23 May 2010). 
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took off. In particular, import bans were reduced from 210 items in 1991 to 26 in 
1993, cutting the production coverage of import bans over total manufacturing and 
agricultural production from 37.2 per cent in 1990 to 4.7 per cent in 1993. Similarly, 
the number of items subject to export bans was reduced from 20 to 2 and that of 
products subject to quantitative export quotas from 17 to 4 during the same period. 
During the second phase of ERSAP (1993-96), the government embarked on a three-
year programme that further accelerated trade liberalisation (Abdel-Khalek 2001: 
77-82). Whereas in the first years the nominal tariff rates grew, particularly as some 
non-tariff barriers were converted in their tariff equivalent, in the long run, ‘as the 
programme gained momentum, there [was] a significant reduction in both nominal 
and effective protection’ (Ibid: 81). 
On the front of capital account liberalisation, the government started to 
intervene already in the early 1990s. A number of measures were adopted ranging 
from the liberalisation of interest rates to the abolition of credit ceilings for both the 
private and the public sector to the substantial reduction of foreign exchange 
controls. In 1991, a treasury bill system was established in lieu of the direct credit 
line between the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and the Ministry of Finance. 
Following IFIs pressures, there was a sharp reduction in all the main capital ratios 
for banks, from reserve ratios to be held on foreign exchange deposits, to reserve 
balances held at the CBE, to liquidity ratios on both local and foreign currency 
balances, to capital adequacy ratios brought in line with the demands of the Basel 
Committee. In less than a decade, most restrictions to the movement of capital had 
been dismantled (Ikram 2006: 181-2). 
Overall, structural reforms produced two important movements towards the 
establishment of a neoliberal regime of capital accumulation. Firstly, as Abdel-
Khalek put it, ‘exchange appears to have taken precedence over production’ (2001: 42, 
original emphasis), with international lending agencies placing emphasis on 
reforming trade, interest rates and exchange rates before dealing with the real 
economy. Secondly, structural adjustment led to the removal of two cornerstones of 
étatist Egypt, which had survived infitah and Mubarak’s first decade of hesitant 
reforms. On the one hand, the removal of most subsidies, despite the undoubted 
benefits on public finances, had a negative impact of long-term growth prospects, as 
it damaged both industries, facing a significant increase in energy prices (Abdel-
Khalek 2001: 155-65), and poorer social groups, who could not afford anymore to 
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purchase items whose prices had surged. Secondly, the gradual dismantlement of 
welfare, with the move towards ‘cost-recovery’ systems both in healthcare and 
education (Mitchell 2002: 229; Tadros 2006: 240-6), led to services that were more 
expensive and regressively so. 
 
3.4. From étatism towards neoliberalism? Weighing the evidence 
Indicators at the macro level already provide a significant range of elements 
suggesting that the Egyptian economy changed substantially in the past two 
decades. Yet, it is not until we move into the real economy that we can clearly 
identify these trends as moves towards a neoliberal regime of capital accumulation. 
This section looks more specifically at how reforms unfolded respectively in 
agriculture, manufacturing and finance. The evidence shows that all the four 
features of neoliberalisation occurred with increasing frequency and intensity in 
Egypt between 1991 and 2010. 
 
3.4.1. Structural reforms in agriculture: giving land back to landlords 
The agricultural sector was the pioneer of structural reforms, with the first attempts 
at changing the structure of the sector dating back to the mid-1980s, when the 
minister of agriculture Yusuf Wali started a far-reaching programme under the 
sponsorship and supervision of USAID (Sadowski 1991: 144-54). There are several 
reasons explaining why it all started in agriculture. First of all, the sector had a great 
symbolic value, as it was where the features of the Nasserite social contract started 
to emerge with the 1952 land reform. At the same time, reforming productive 
relations in the countryside was perceived as more easily manageable than that in 
the factories, because of the higher concentration of the workforce in the latter, but 
also because of the long-standing urban bias, that the incumbent elites did not 
intend to put into question. Lastly, and closing the full circle with another measure 
of great symbolic value, a new land reform would give the regime a chance to 
compensate the landed elites dispossessed by Nasser in the wake of the 
implementation of Law 178 of 1952. 
Whereas this was seen by many as ‘Nasser’s gift to peasants’ (Saad 2003: 233), 
with its guarantee of secure tenancy, Law 96 of 1992 aimed at ‘regulating the 
relationship between owner and peasant’, but became known by its opponents as 
‘the law for throwing peasants out of their land’ (Ibid: 229, ft.2). The new Law had 
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three main components. Firstly, rent was revised from seven to twenty-two times 
the land tax for a five-year transitional period, after which rents would be 
liberalised. Secondly, whereas under Nasser’s reform law the tenancy contract was 
valid in perpetuity, and thus heirs of tenants de facto inherited land, under the new 
law owners were allowed to buy back the contract from the tenant, and after 1997 
tenancy could be renewed for only twelve months. Thirdly, at the end of the 
transitional period, land could effectively change hands, with the owner being 
granted the right to evict the tenant if the land was to be sold and there was no 
agreement between the two. In order to settle owner-tenant conflicts, a 
reconciliation committee was established, but its impartiality and thus credibility 
was questioned from several quarters (Bush 1999: 46; Saad 2002: 120). 
At the end of the transitional period land effectively changed hands, 
encountering the disbelief of millions of tenants convinced that the state would 
never fully implement the law (Saad 2003: 230). According to Mitchell, almost a 
million peasants were evicted and more than 700 thousand jobs were lost (2002: 
265). Under the lenses of our definition of neoliberalisation, this could well be seen 
as a case in which a general crisis is managed by the regime in such a way as to 
favour a specific social group. At the same time, it is also a case of state 
redistribution of resources in highly regressive terms, with land taken away from 
small and medium tenants and given to large landlords. 
Other than setting in place the legal instruments leading to a massive change 
in land ownership, the state also decided to withdraw from the sector, with 
measures ranging from the downsizing of the Principal Bank for Development and 
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC), which had historically been responsible for the 
provision of inputs for agricultural production, to the liberalisation of prices of such 
inputs and the elimination of subsidies on many of them (Bush 1999: 34). In other 
words, this was the practical application of the ‘crowding out’ thesis discussed 
above, which emphatically failed its Egyptian test, creating a hole in the provision of 
inputs that the private sector occupied through the extensive use of predatory 
practices, with a rise in prices that proved unsustainable for farmers, forcing the 
state to restart public provision alongside private one in 1995. 
Yet, despite these grey areas, structural reforms in agriculture were soon 
claimed to be a success by both international lending agencies and government 
(Fletcher 1996), which highlighted an increased production of major crops in the 
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years following reforms (Nassar et al. 1996) and the increased role of the private 
sector in input, output and marketing (Goletti 1996). However, these triumphalist 
accounts seriously overlook several aspects which seem to point in a rather different 
direction. Firstly, as Bush aptly argued, the rise in production in the years following 
reforms was not necessarily due to reforms, and this was demonstrated by the fact 
that these increases were not sustained over time (2003: 133). Secondly, whereas it is 
true that Egypt exported more agricultural products, this was more than 
compensated by the increase in agricultural imports, which featured several items – 
wheat, sugar, edible oils – whose demand elasticity is very low, with a consequent 
worsening of the overall balance of trade. Lastly, the removal of subsidies led to a 
hike in production costs, forcing many small tenants to shift their production away 
from cereals and legumes and towards livestock feed (Mitchell 2002: 216). 
To the economic results one should add the social consequences of these 
reforms. Two of them are particularly important. The first one is the staggering 
increase in rural inequality, whose roots are not hard to track down, considering the 
magnitude of the transfer in land ownership, and its repercussions in terms of both 
wealth and power relations more generally (Fergany 2002: 219-29). According to the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MALR 2000), by the turn of the century landholding had 
become more unequal than before 1952, with 2,281 holders (0.05 per cent of total 
holders) accounting for 11 per cent of the total landholding area. The other social 
consequence relates widespread violence which accompanied both the full 
implementation of Law 96 of 1992 and the management of owner-tenants relations 
over the past fifteen years. According to the Land Center for Human Rights (LCHR), 
an NGO devoted to provide legal advice to farmers and raise awareness of 
deteriorating living conditions in rural Egypt, more than 800 tenants were killed in 
land disputes following the full implementation of the new law, and more than 7 
thousand were arrested.102 
 
3.4.2. Structural reforms in industry: ‘no factories, no problems’ 
The bulk of the privatisations conducted under Law 203 of 1991 dealt with 
manufacturing companies. In the first phase of the process, despite the enthusiastic 
                                                 
102 Every six months LCHR issues a report on land disputes occurred in Egypt. The numbers 
above are the sums from the data provided in these reports. They can be found on the LCHR 
website: http://212.12.226.70/indexe.htm (first access on 15 April 2010). 
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reactions on the part of international lending agencies, the strategy pursued by the 
government appeared clear: privatising profitable companies whenever they did not 
belong to what were considered strategic sectors. 
During the second phase, under the Nazif government, the drive towards 
privatisation touched upon previously ‘off-limits’ subsectors, such as cements and 
energy industry. For anyone familiar with Egyptian recent economic history, the 
role of cement in the construction booms systematically engineered by the three 
presidents is not surprising. Thus, the decision on the part of the government to 
surrender the majority share in the Suez Cement Company, allowing Ciments 
Français to increase its share from the 25 per cent acquired in 2001 to 54.2 per cent in 
2005 stands out as the cornerstone of the revived privatisation programme launched 
under the leadership of the minister of investment, Mahmoud Mohieldin. The 
partial privatisation of two oil refineries in the same year also had a powerful 
symbolic value.103 Yet, we are only talking of minority shares in two out of nine 
public sector refineries, which together with foreign multinationals still dominated 
the sector (Richter 2006). 
How privatisation was conducive to neoliberalisation in the specific Egyptian 
case has already been discussed by several scholars (Beinin 1999 and 2009; Mitchell 
1999a, 1999b and 2002). It is worthwhile noting that in its version in the Egyptian 
industry, neoliberalism came with two important peculiarities. On the one hand, 
and this will be discussed at length in Chapter 4, there was a tendency on the part of 
the government to make sure that privatisations would benefit those private sector 
groups that had been loyal to the regime, starting in the first place from infitah 
businessmen (Mitchell 2002: 282-3; Roll 2010: 358-9). On the other hand, by referring 
to a range of methods including private management of public assets and ESAs, the 
state formally divested several companies, but the regime did not lose the ultimate 
control over them.  
Privatisation was only one of the facets characterising reforms in the sector, 
and even in manufacturing the measures mentioned earlier, from trade to price 
liberalisation to the removal of subsidies, had a major effect also on the industrial 
sector. A rather persuasive case has been made supporting the thesis that because of 
                                                 
103 20 per cent of both Sidi Krir for Petrochemicals (SIDPEC) and Alexandria Mineral and Oil 
Company (AMOC) were sold respectively in June and October 2005, through vastly 
oversubscribed Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). 
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such reforms Egypt suffered from de-industrialisation (Abdel-Khalek 2001). Other 
than to rising costs, this also related to the way privatisations were conducted, with 
public monopolies being substituted by private oligopolies at best or monopolies at 
worst. Following from this, the newly privatised companies had little incentive to 
become competitive abroad as long as they were able to dominate the local market. 
Another reform with a strong impact on relations in the manufacturing sector 
was the new tax law, entered into force in 2005 after years of push and pull on the 
tax rate to be applied to companies. Whereas the maximum tax on industrial profits 
was cut by 2 per cent only,104 what most benefited manufacturing companies was 
the preservation of the ten-years tax exemption in the new industrial cities offered 
under Law 43 of 1974. This had two major consequences. The first is that most new 
industrial activities were established in tax-free areas, with no revenues deriving for 
the state their first decade of activity. The second is that a significant number of 
companies dissolve at the end of the tax break and register under new names to get 
ten more years of tax exemption (Soliman 2011: 123-4). In contrast with this, 
industrial workers kept contributing through income taxes as much as they did 
before, facing at the same time the extra weight of indirect taxes, particularly in the 
form of the General Sales Tax. 
All these aspects contributed considerably to the worsening of the position of 
the working class. Together with the transfer of ownership already discussed, and 
the redistribution of resources through reforms in the tax system, in this case we can 
also see a different type of redistribution, with workers being deprived of a series of 
rights that they had enjoyed under Nasser and Sadat. Within the factories, the 
reaction was a surge in labour activism, considered by the foremost expert on 
Egyptian labour movements as ‘the largest and most sustained social movement in 
Egypt since the campaign to oust the British occupiers after World War II’ (Beinin 
2007). 
 
3.4.3. Financial sector reforms: follow the money! 
As mentioned in the general part, the conventional narrative on ERSAP blames the 
poor and worsening performance of SOEs for the foreign exchange crisis of the late 
                                                 
104 The maximum tax rate on industrial profits was reduced from 32 to 30 per cent, whereas 
those on commercial profits and liberal professions were cut respectively from 40 to 20 and 
from 40 to 30 per cent. 
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1980s. Yet, the very documents produced by IFIs in the years following the approval 
and implementation of ERSAP allow to paint a significantly different picture, where 
the banking sector features prominently (IMF 1997 and 1998). Interestingly, in 
1989/90, the fiscal year preceding ERSAP, only 54 out of 415 SOEs were suffering 
losses, and overall state-owned industry produced a net profit of LE1.2 billion. 
Whereas one should not forget that these figures also include petro-industry 
revenues, the sheer size of profits suggests that the main causes of the crisis were to 
be found somewhere else. 
The limited opening of the banking sector effected under Sadat produced the 
emergence of joint-venture banks,105 the proliferation of banks,106 and their increased 
profitability. Yet, little had changed in the way the sector operated.107 By 1985, the 
‘big four’ state-owned banks – National Bank of Egypt (NBE), Banque Misr, Banque 
du Caire and Bank of Alexandria – still accounted for about 75 per cent of deposits 
and more than two thirds of loans (Ikram 2006: 181). More generally, the banking 
sector remained subject to practices that have been defined as ‘illiberal’ and 
‘repressive’ (Bahaa Eldin and Mohieldin 1998: 111; Roe 1998: 87-92), and increased 
profitability could hardly be related to better performance. The inefficiency of 
official banks left room for the affirmation of Islamic money management 
companies, exploiting the principles of Islamic commercial law to escape 
regulations on interest rates. When the foreign exchange crisis started to materialise, 
official banks were short of hard currency and this forced the government to borrow 
at tougher conditions from Islamic companies. Under the pressures of the official 
banking sector, the government waged a one-year battle against Islamic investment 
companies, forcing them to either close down or reorganise themselves as joint-
stock companies, thus subjecting them to much stricter legal and fiscal discipline. 
Whereas the aim of weakening the parallel banking sector was achieved, the 
elimination of the most dynamic players in the sector led to a financial depression 
that worsened the state budgetary position and forced the government to enter into 
negotiations with the IMF. 
                                                 
105 Foreign banks were allowed up to 49 per cent participation. 
106 According to Ikram (2006: 181), between 1970 and 1985 the number of banks grew more 
than tenfold, from 8 to 83. 
107 Sadowski (1991: 234-47) provided a groundbreaking work on the anatomy of the Egyptian 
banking sector and its relevance in the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1980s. The 
following paragraph draws extensively on his account. 
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The measures adopted under the auspices of ERSAP can be characterised as a 
clear example of management and manipulation of crisis on the part of the regime 
in favour of the official banking sector, effectively leading to a redistribution of 
resources on regressive terms. In particular, the very first measure was the 
liberalisation of interest rates, with the government immediately contracting money 
supply, and thus pushing interest rates as high as 14 per cent above international 
market levels (Mitchell 2002: 279). This monetarist turn led to a flood of speculative 
capital, seeking gains from interest rate differential. In an attempt to rescue the 
suffering banks, the government issued treasury bonds (TBs) amounting to about 
5.5 per cent of GDP, and allowed their yield to be tax-free, thus providing banks 
with a further fiscal subsidy that by 1996/97 was estimated to be worth about 10 per 
cent of GDP (IMF 1997: 35). Lastly, reserve requirements were lowered significantly, 
which – considering that reserves were subject to taxation – meant a further fiscal 
cut for banks. 
The reforms carried out in the 1990s made banking extremely profitable. In the 
same way, though, the contribution of the banking sector to overall development 
remained minor. As soon as the interest rates were lowered, speculative capital fled 
Egypt, and the impact of the East Asian crisis further weakened the optimism 
related to a finance-driven development of the Egyptian economy. Indeed, the 
period between 1998 and 2003 was one of stagnation also for the financial sector. 
As will be detailed in Chapter 4, the deteriorating economic situation provided 
the conditions for the emergence of a new generation of economists, policymakers 
and businessmen. By 2003, the tide changed entirely, and within twelve months 
Egypt had a new Central Banking Law (Law 88 of 2003), a new governor for the 
CBE itself and a new government. This was the beginning of the second wave of 
financial sector reforms, supervised by the World Bank, which would be halted only 
in 2008 by the global financial crisis. Once in power, the government proceeded 
with an aggressive programme of divesting state-owned shares in joint-venture 
banks, producing a sea change in the ownership structure of the Egyptian banking 
sector. By the end of 2006, 94 per cent of state-owned shares had been divested 
(World Bank 2006: 11, ft. 10). Even more significantly, the privatisation taboo 
regarding state-owned banks was finally infringed in 2006, with the sale of Bank of 
Alexandria to the Italian Banca San Paolo (later Intesa San Paolo), which paid $2 
billion for 80 per cent of the bank’s equity, leaving the government with a 20 per 
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cent residual share (EIU 2006b: 21).  As shown in Table 3.2, by June 2010 public 
banks accounted for 45 per cent of total assets and 44 per cent of total deposits, with 
private banks holding for the first time since 1960 the majority of both assets and 
deposits (World Bank 2010: 58). 
 
Table 3.2 – Ownership structure of the banking sector (1990-2010)108 





56.8       63.9       63.7       61.6       59.3       58.6       58.6       60.4       47.4       45.4 
49.3       57.0       57.8       55.7       52.8       51.7       52.0       53.9       41.9       40.8 




43.2       36.1       36.3       38.4       40.7       41.4       41.4       39.6       52.6       54.6 
                                                                                                  20.8         1.3         1.7 





61.5       67.6       69.9       66.9       64.0       61.8       60.4       60.1       47.1       44.2 
59.0       65.7       67.5       63.1       60.1       57.3       56.1       54.5       41.9       40.2 




38.5       32.4       30.1       33.1       36.0       38.2       39.6       39.9       52.9       55.8 
                                                                                                  20.7         1.1         1.4 
                                                                                                  19.2       51.8       54.4 
Source: CBE archives; estimates for 2010 from World Bank 2010b. 
 
With respect to the revitalisation of the capital market, every consideration should 
start from the observation that until 1992 the stock exchange was ‘into a deep sleep’ 
(Roll 2010: 352). Seen from this perspective, the modifications brought about by new 
laws and regulations in the sector appear much more significant. In terms of 
performance, both market capitalisation and trading increased considerably (see 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Law 95 of 1992 effectively relaunched the capital market, with 
the aim of improving its role of intermediation before privatisation would take place 
(Shams-El-Din 1998: 147). Interestingly, and suggesting the predominant role of 
public sector banks within the overall financial sector, 40 per cent of sales proceeds 
deriving from the first wave of privatisations was used to pay off non-performing 
loans (NPLs) – i.e.: loans never paid back – held by public sector banks (IMF 1998: 
52). The weakness of the Egyptian capital market vis-à-vis the banking sector is also 
                                                 
108 It was not possible to retrieve the data regarding 2006, the year of the privatisation of 
Bank of Alexandria. No explanation was offered by CBE officials, even though it may well 
be that considering the number of operations they had troubles in recalculating the size of 
the two sectors for that specific year. Also, separate data for joint-venture and private banks 
became available only after 2004, after the entry into force of the new central banking law 
that changed bank classification criteria. Before then, joint-venture banks were considered as 
either public or private sector banks depending on their ownership structure. 
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witnessed by the limited investor base, with most investors being Egyptian and 
about 60 per cent of foreign investors coming from the rest of the Arab world 
(World Bank 2010b: 62), and by the fact that only 15 per cent of the companies allow 
more than 50 per cent of their shares to float freely on the stock exchange (World 
Bank 2009: 6). 
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According to our definition of neoliberalisation, since the late 1980s crisis, the 
Egyptian financial sector experienced at least three of the main processes outlined 
earlier. The crisis itself was used as a way of bolstering the position of the financial 
sector as a whole, and of banks in particular. This resembled very much the 
characterisation made by Wade and Veneroso, who argued that ‘[f]inancial crises 
have always caused transfers of ownership and power to those that keep their own 
assets intact and who are in a position to create credit’ (1998: 23). Thus, the costs of 
the crisis were borne by that large portion of society without access – or with 
minimal access – to financial instruments, with banks reaping the benefits of 
government measures in a textbook case of redistribution of resources away from 
citizens towards those in the ‘commanding heights’ of the domestic financial sector, 
be they public-sector managers or private bankers. With respect to this latter 
distinction, the ownership transfer experienced through divestiture and 
privatisation constitutes yet another point in support of the neoliberalisation thesis. 
Lastly, another element worth considering is the impact of tax reforms on the 
financial sector. Historically, taxes on capital accounted for very little as a 
percentage of tax revenues.109 The Reaganomics approach embedded in the new 
income tax – i.e.: to increase tax revenues you need to lower tax rates – did not lead 
to any major change in the contribution of financial companies to tax revenues, thus 
suggesting that another form of redistribution, once again ratified by law, further 
strengthened the position of financial sector actors. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the political economy of republican Egypt with 
particular attention to the evolution of the regime of capital accumulation. Despite 
the undeniable modifications brought about by infitah, there is an underlying thread 
– that of étatism – linking the Nasser and Sadat presidencies. Together with the 
minor role played by private foreign capital compared to other developing 
countries, this element seemed to be the fundamental reason for why Egypt 
appeared resilient to the pressures towards global economic integration via 
liberalisation and privatisation exerted by IFIs in the developing world. The 
                                                 
109 According to Soliman (2011: 117, Table 4.2), the capital tax accounted for only 0.1 per cent 
of the total tax revenues in 2001. 
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structural dependence of the Egyptian economy, though worsening as witnessed by 
the burgeoning debt, did not seem to prove enough to threaten this configuration. 
ERSAP truly marked a sea change, forcing the government to adapt to the 
changed conditions and pushing it towards a re-orientation of the economic 
structure towards a new regime of capital accumulation (Hill 2003). Whereas it is 
would be erroneous to ignore that there are still conflicting tendencies at play, and 
even more so today in the wake of Mubarak’s fall, it appears that neoliberalism 
gained much ground in the shaping and management of the Egyptian economy. 
This chapter has argued that macroeconomic stabilisation prepared the terrain for 
neoliberalisation, mostly by structuring issues related to public finances around an 
opposition between state and market that proved very influential in the following 
waves of reforms. This analytical dichotomy was first adopted with respect to the 
reduction of public expenditures, a patchy yet steady reform of the tax system, the 
liberalisation of interest rates and the unification of exchange rates at the level of the 
most devalued one. 
Structural adjustment brought a qualitative change in that policies inspired by 
neoliberalism began to be adopted more frequently, and this chapter has discussed 
the increasing occurrence of the four processes identified with neoliberalisation. We 
have seen how privatisation has considerably downsized state ownership in the 
economy, arriving in its second wave to touch sectors once considered highly 
strategic such as steel, cements, petro-industry and also – although marginally – 
banks. The increasing relevance of the financial sector has also been discussed, even 
though a significant difference with neoliberalised Western economies was the 
persisting dominance of the banking sector over the stock exchange, which allowed 
the regime to preserve some degree of control. We have also explored the way in 
which a crisis related to the ever-increasing budgetary pressures was managed and 
manipulated to restructure wider power relations. Deficit and debt problems had 
resurfaced already by the late 1990s (Wurzel 2009), but in the meanwhile power 
relations had changed for good. Lastly, and more eloquently, we have seen all the 
cases in which the state effected redistributions – of land, money and rights – in 
favour of capital and land owners and against the large majority of the Egyptian 
population. 
If a shift towards a neoliberal accumulation regime can be seen in Egypt, what 
were its consequences on the political regime? On which spatial scale should we 
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locate the forces that led to its adoption? And this, was it related to material 
conditions or was mostly driven by ideas? These are the three questions on which 




THE EMERGENCE OF NEOLIBERAL AUTHORITARIANISM: 




One of the advantages of relying on Gramsci, as discussed in the theoretical part, is 
that it allows us to develop an account that is structurally grounded but where at 
the same time agency retains a fundamental role in determining the course of 
history. The importance of political superstructures, and among them of the state, is 
even more prominent in the case of authoritarian regimes, exactly because of the 
central position of state apparatuses in steering, supervising and controlling 
evolutions in most aspects of social life. The relevance of the state is further 
heightened when the country under consideration has a rentier economy, as the 
bulk of the various forms of rent are funnelled towards the state, which as a 
consequence tends to develop a high degree of independence from its society 
(Beblawi and Luciani 1987). 
In the previous chapter we have already discussed the increased reliance on 
rent of the Egyptian state particularly since Sadat’s infitah. While the debate on 
whether the Egyptian economy is a rentier economy strictu sensu is still open, few 
would maintain that Egypt cannot be included at least in the category of semi-
rentiers (Beblawi 1990: 59-62), as its economy is based on a mixture of productive 
capabilities, rents proper (oil, Suez canal receipts, remittances, tourism and foreign 
assistance) and second-order rent, mainly in the form of speculation in the real 
estate and in the stock market. Hence, Egypt falls halfway between the idealtypes of 
allocation and production states provided by Luciani (1990).110 
In the specific Egyptian case, the predominant role of the state has at least two 
major consequences on the relation between the economic and the political. Firstly, 
                                                 
110 Luciani himself has a different position on the issue, maintaining that Egypt constitutes 
the quintessential form of the production state in the Middle East (1990: 79). However, I 
would contend that whereas this description is accurate when referring to Nasser’s Egypt, 
the increased role of rent under both Sadat and Mubarak places Egypt closer to the category 
of ‘induced allocation state’ than Luciani would admit. 
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reliance on rent and dominant position of the state in direct production since Nasser 
led to a blurring of the separation between the economic and the political realm 
constitutive of capitalist social relations. Whereas the last twenty years certainly 
provided a shift with respect to the direct involvement of the state in production, 
the role of rent has gradually increased since the 1970s, thus leaving Egyptians with 
the perception that the state, and those who control it, are still the main actors not 
only in the political but also in the economic sphere. Secondly, this dominant 
position of the state has major implications also on the way we conceptualise it. 
More specifically, theories that see the state either as the functional extension of the 
ruling class, as often happens with Marxist studies,111 or as the arena where conflicts 
about the production and allocation of resources are settled, as typical of pluralist 
analyses,112 are not particularly well-suited to analyse the Egyptian case. In both 
cases, the state is considered as inert and this clashes with Egyptian recent history, 
which shows a state that has been anything but inert. Thus, the state should also be 
considered as an actor in its own right,113 being able to produce independent effects 
both economically and politically. For example, in Egypt the state has been 
remarkably successful in creating its own classes, first in the form of a state class 
proper, made up of army officials and bureaucrats, and then shaping the infitah 
bourgeoisie and largely subjecting it to its whims. 
This is not however to slide towards the opposite side of the argument, with 
the state determining everything also in the economic sphere. Rather, after having 
discussed how the last two decades saw Egypt move from an étatist towards a 
neoliberal regime of capital accumulation and how this impacted on the balance of 
class forces, this chapter focuses on the ways in which political agency has been able 
to act within the boundaries set by a new accumulation regime in order to transform 
neoliberalism and reshape authoritarianism at once. Hence, the first section 
discusses the role of political agency in the reform of agriculture, industry and 
finance. The evidence provided in this section is then used to discuss the main 
                                                 
111 Both in the Marxian famous characterisation of the state as ‘executive committee of the 
bourgeoisie’ in The Communist Manifesto and in the more sophisticated account by 
Poulantzas that sees the state as the instrument by which the capitalist class achieves its 
long-term collective interests, regardless of the short-term individual struggles between 
single capitalists driven by their individual interests.(Poulantzas 1969). 
112 Particularly as embodied in Dahl’s definition of polyarchy (1971). 
113 Historical institutionalism, particularly in the work of Theda Skocpol (1979) and Peter 
Evans (1995), also moves in this direction. 
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mainstream accounts about the relation between economic and political change, 
focusing on modernisation theory and the predatory elite thesis. The second section 
ends with an evaluation of the analytical power of the Gramscian approach 
developed here, by focusing on the role of class forces in shaping the terrain in 
which political agency takes place. In the last section, the implications of this 
approach are fleshed out, particularly with reference to how the concept of 
articulation helps us make sense of the emergence of neoliberal authoritarianism. 
 
4.2. Regimes, policies and politics: empirical study 
There are certainly differences in the way political agency has been deployed in 
order to effect reforms and to control their effects in the three sectors under 
consideration. In agriculture, we see the privatisation of functions once performed 
by the state in the hands of members of the ruling bloc, hence leaving the regime 
with a substantial measure of control. In industry, the regime tended to attract more 
and more businessmen either within the ruling NDP, as members of parliament 
(MPs), and since 2004 directly as cabinet members, leading to a capture of 
institutions on the part of the emerging capitalist elite. In finance, the strategy 
pursued by the ruling bloc saw on the one hand an increasing role for technocrats 
and on the other the persistence of pre-existing practices on the part of the regime 
aiming at keeping businessmen under check. 
Despite these and many other differences, in the political sphere two main 
channels were used to produce this hybridisation of neoliberalism. On the one hand, 
we have institutional channels, ranging from shifts in the balance of power between 
already existing institutions to the creation of entirely new ones. On the other hand, 
it is possible to identify informal dynamics strengthening what has been called ‘a 
political marriage between the state bureaucracy and capitalism under the umbrella 
of the regime and the NDP’ (Soliman 2011: 154). Among these mechanisms, one can 
see the occupation of the newly liberalised companies by infitah families, the 
construction of business alliances in order to raise informal barriers to entry in 
specific sectors, and the organisation of the rising capitalist elite into increasingly 
powerful business associations. The functioning of these channels is premised on a 
well-established fact: being capital concentrated in relatively few hands, it is also 
extremely fungible. Thus, it is anything but surprising that wealthy businessmen 
engage in activities on all the three sectors under consideration, depending on a 
 133 
series of factors ranging from government support to expected gains to international 
prices. 
 
4.2.1. Agriculture: state withdraws, business steps in, regime controls 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, neoliberalisation in agriculture had an 
enormous impact on class relations in the countryside. Accumulation by 
dispossession on the national scale triggered either the proletarianisation of small 
tenants and peasants or their emigration towards Cairo and Alexandria, feeding the 
thriving informal economy. In the countryside, class relations shifted dramatically 
in favour of an extremely thin stratum – estimated as less than 0.05 per cent – of 
landlords owning more than 10 per cent of total landholding area (Bush 2007: 1612), 
in a few cases still living the life of the absentee landlord but more and more often 
turned into entrepreneurs. On the losing end of reforms, it is not too difficult to 
identify small landholders, tenants and peasants increasingly pushed to sell their 
labour force within a system more based on coercion than on demand and supply 
mechanisms (Bush 2000: 242). 
The privileged position of large landlords in the countryside was increasingly 
matched by their central position within the state machine. More generally, there 
were two main institutional mechanisms allowing landed groups to get it their own 
way. Firstly, landlords acquired a dominant position within the Egyptian 
parliament already in the 1970s, organising the formulation of policies in such a way 
as to exclude peasants (Bush 2000: 244). In the 1960s, Nasser decreed that half the 
seats of the People’s Assembly had to be reserved for the lower classes, with two 
seats in each electoral district being filled respectively by either an industrial worker 
or a peasant and by a professional or an official. This provision was never formally 
repealed, but already under Sadat seats reserved for peasants had been 
monopolised by the wealthiest of them or by clients of notables. When the 1992 
tenancy law was issued, ‘[t]he parliament that approved the law did not contain one 
tenant’ (Saad 2002: 106). This allowed landlords to frame the issue according to their 
concerns not only in parliament, but also in the wider public discussion, with 
tenants being ‘collectively accused of laziness, of spending too much on 
entertainment and of enjoying the benefits of cheap rents while not increasing 
productivity’ (Bush 2007: 1606). 
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The second institutional mechanism used by landlords to orient policy 
developments in the preferred direction was the gradual weakening of traditional 
public sector institutions. In the case of agricultural production, the institution to be 
weakened was identified already in the 1980s in the PBDAC, the specialised 
agricultural bank responsible for both credit and input provision (Sadowski 1991: 
201-6). The renaming of the bank in 1976 signalled not only a cosmetic change,114 but 
also a major shift in lending practices, with short-term term loans decreasing from 
97.4 per cent in the 1960-75 period to 71 per cent in 1984 (Ibid: 202). Long-term loans 
had to be covered by collateral in land, and thus were monopolised by rich farmers. 
Rather than addressing the credit shortage faced by smaller farmers and tenants, the 
reform of PBDAC went in the opposition direction, ending its monopoly in input 
provision and liberalising prices. The combination of these aspects with the full 
implementation of Law 96 of 1992 meant very different things depending on where 
you sat on the social scale. Those at the lower end found themselves landless, with 
little or no access to credit and increased input prices. Those at the top had a chance 
to increase significantly the size of their landholdings, access to longer-term loans 
and sometimes become themselves providers of agricultural inputs, thus potentially 
benefiting three times from reforms. 
The informal mechanism most clearly visible in the agricultural sector, and by 
far the most relevant in explaining how neoliberalisation was accompanied by 
authoritarian reorganisation, was the occupation of what is still a niche market – 
export-oriented agriculture – by families belonging to the infitah bourgeoisie, and 
thus strongly linked to the regime. The classical example found in the literature is 
the history of Osman Ahmed Osman (Hinnebusch 1985: 97; Sadowski 1991: 111-6; 
Mitchell 2002: 282). Starting with an engineering company in 1949, over the years he 
was able to retain the managerial control of the company despite its formal 
nationalisation by Nasser and to consolidate a personal link with Sadat. Today, his 
company – Arab Contractors – is one of the largest construction companies in the 
Middle East and Africa, employing over sixty thousand workers.115 Exploiting a 
provision under Law 43 of 1974 allowing public sector firms entering in joint 
                                                 
114 Created in 1930 as the Agricultural Credit Bank, it was renamed General Organisation for 
Agricultural and Cooperative Credit under Nasser. 
115 According to the company website: 
http://www.arabcont.com/english/about/interview.aspx (first accessed on 21 March 2011).  
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ventures with foreign capital to be treated as private companies,116 Osman 
negotiated a deal with Pepsico and entered into the most lucrative business that 
agriculture in Egypt can provide: land reclamation. Once Pepsico decided to sell its 
shares because of serious managerial divergences and administrative problems, 
Arab Contractors was ready to step in, becoming once more a public sector 
company and thus gaining access to subsidised loans, fuel and fertilisers (Sadowski 
1991: 113-5).117 
Whereas Osman’s rise took place during the 1970s, it already suggests how 
economic opening can be managed in such a way as to favour those with strong ties 
to the regime. Reforms carried out in the 1980s and 1990s had a similar twist. John 
Sfakianakis studied the way in which neoliberal reforms were used to their own 
advantage by business groups that started investing in agriculture as it became 
profitable following state withdrawal (2002 and 2004). In particular, his focus was 
on the occupation of the export-oriented agricultural sector by families with close 
ties to the regime and whose core interests were to be found somewhere else. 
Among these, a prominent role was taken by the Diab family, with business 
interests in as varied sectors as oil services, real estate and high-end pastry 
(Sfakianakis 2002: 65-6). Similarly, the business alliance between the Mansour and 
Meghraby families was mostly focused on tourism, real estate and finance. Whereas 
these actors certainly showed remarkable entrepreneurial skills, what is most 
relevant for this study is that they entered this sector mostly out of a combination of 
connections, proximity to bureaucrats and easy access to capital (Ibid: 69). 
Through the extensive use of these mechanisms, the ruling bloc was able both 
to entrench neoliberalism and to reshape power relations within the regime. With 
respect to giving more solid foundations to the neoliberal turn, downsizing public 
institutions such as PBDAC and replacing them with private companies made sure 
that the direct role of the state in the management of agriculture was minimised. 
Under this new framework, the role of the state was curtailed and largely ‘limited to 
setting up the legal, political and military functions required to guarantee the 
proper functioning of markets and their creation in those sectors where markets did 
                                                 
116 Namely this meant: exemption from price controls, independent budgeting authority, and 
most of all ability to retain profits instead of channelling them towards the treasury. 
117 As one American official interviewed by Clement Moore put it: ‘We give Arab 
Contractors low marks. They want to be a private company when it’s good for them and 
they want to be a public company when it’s good for them’ (Moore 1986: 636) 
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not exist’ (Harvey 2005: 2).118 Indeed, the imposition of market relations in the 
management of Egyptian agriculture seems an element that keeps together both 
supporters and critics of the reform process.119 
This is not to say that the regime lost control over the agricultural sector. 
Rather, while the channels used by the regime to affect agriculture changed, its role 
in taking decisions and shaping outcomes did not. Both institutional and informal 
mechanisms are of great importance in explaining how this happened. Replacing 
PBDAC with private sector input and credit providers meant that the regime 
decided to rely less on the state and more on components of the ruling bloc willing 
to have an active role in establishing market relations in agriculture. At the same 
time, the domination of the decision-making process on the part of a parliament 
particularly sensitive to landed interests kept at bay outsiders that could jeopardise 
regime stability. Lastly, the profile of business groups entering into agriculture 
makes it possible to understand which part of the private sector was more likely to 
step in. These actors were already part of the regime’s inner circle or at least of the 
wider ruling bloc. They already had enough capital available to allow them to take 
the capital-intensive functions once performed by public institutions. In other 
words, what we see happening is a privatisation of a different kind from the one 
intended in Washington, but a privatisation nonetheless, with functions previously 
performed by the state carried out by members of the wider ruling bloc in their 
private capacity. This obviously had an impact also on intra-regime relations, as 
these groups taking over socially relevant functions became more important in 
ensuring regime survival, and hence were empowered vis-à-vis other components of 
the ruling bloc. Thus, replacing the state in the agricultural sector allowed select 
businessmen with strong ties to the regime to obtain substantial gains in both 
economic and political terms. This should be demonstrated by a rising number of 
businessmen becoming key players in Egyptian economic policy-making over the 
past two decades, if it is true that ‘[t]he distribution of political positions in Egypt 
obeys a precise equation that reflects the relative weight of various groups in the 
regime’ (Soliman 2011: 150). The next subsection shows that this was the case. 
                                                 
118 The definition of neoliberal regime of capital accumulation given in Chapter 3. 
119 More than twenty years after the beginning of the reform process, the main difference 
between the two camps appears that for its supporters (World Bank, USAID and the 
Egyptian government) market relations have not gone far enough, whereas for its critics 
market relations are the main problem, as they lead to the ‘differential incorporation’ of 
labour within market-oriented economic processes (Bush 2004: 675). 
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4.2.2. Industry: the political rise of the business elite and institutional capture 
Structural reforms in the manufacturing sector over the past two decades 
undoubtedly changed relations of class forces in the sector. In particular, it is 
possible to identify at least two instances of accumulation by dispossession which 
put the big business component in a more favourable position vis-à-vis industrial 
workers. Firstly, the growing number of privatised industries meant that a much 
larger share of the Egyptian working class was not covered anymore by provisions 
characterising private sector workers, particularly with respect to working 
standards, amounting to what we may call a dispossession of rights. The other form 
of dispossession has more direct material relevance, with the minimum wage and 
the bonus for public sector workers being respectively held to LE36 and LE100 
between 1984 and 2010 and thus being at the core of widespread working class 
protests across the country (Beinin and El-Hamalawy 2007a and 2007b; El Amrani 
2011). Under the almost perennial high inflation characteristic of Egypt, the 
purchasing power of the working class had been severely curtailed, and the process 
by which this happened might be characterised as accumulation by dispossession 
authored through government inaction.120 Add to these elements the regressive 
impact produced across the board by tax reforms, and you get a sense of the 
transformations in class relations in the Egyptian manufacturing sector. 
The economic rise of the business component followed from and further 
strengthened its political rise. This mutual constitution is fundamental for 
understanding the forms in which political agency moved towards both the 
consolidation of the neoliberal agenda and the reshaping of power relations within 
the ruling bloc supporting authoritarian rule. Again, it is possible to identify both 
institutional and informal mechanisms driving these two processes, even though in 
the case of industry boundaries are somewhat more blurred, as the long-standing 
state intervention and ownership in the sector made the relation between formal 
frameworks and informal networks much less clear. 
Among the institutional channels, two of them appear the most relevant. 
Firstly, there was a shift with respect to which ministry dominated decisions 
regarding the industrial sector. More specifically, the Ministry of Planning, a key 
                                                 
120 An enlightening and convincing case for the importance of inaction in allowing transfers 
of wealth has been made with reference to the US by Hacker and Pierson (2010: 52-4). 
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actor in the management of the economy during the étatist phase and historically 
characterised by a strong interventionist outlook, was largely replaced by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry,121 one of the most outward-oriented ministries 
(Soliman 2011: 131-5). This shift is even more evident in the customary practice 
developed during the Nazif government to discuss economic policies within a 
smaller subset of ministers, called the Economic Group, dominated by the so-called 
troika: Youssef Boutros Ghali for the Ministry of Finance, Mahmoud Mohieldin for 
the Ministry of Investment and Rashid Mohammed Rashid for the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. As a consequence, dissident voices were gradually sidelined within 
the cabinet,122 whereas at the same time the cabinet itself ‘almost totally dominates 
the decision-making process’ (Soliman 2011: 146). 
The second institutional mechanism is an even more direct one, with 
businessmen becoming increasingly engaged into politics since the late 1990s in 
three different capacities: as members of the ruling NDP, by running – and more 
often than not being elected – for a seat in parliament, and as members of the 
cabinet. During the late 1990s, when the economy was dragged back into high 
deficits and low growth, the ruling party decided to widen its membership, by 
attempting to attract a younger generation of Egyptians who had been successful in 
the private sector. The role of Gamal Mubarak as the catalyst of this newly created 
political class cannot possibly be overestimated (Collombier 2006: 8-10; Soliman 
2011: 3), and the party ranks were effectively beefed up with a number of 
businessmen in their thirties and forties who became prominent in Egyptian politics 
particularly under Nazif.  
A further step would see these businessmen seeking direct political power, for 
example through election in parliament. This is exactly what happened, with the 
ratio of businessmen to total MPs rising from 12 per cent in 1995 to 17 in 2000 to 22 
per cent in 2005 (Soliman 2011: 145-6).123 The rise in numbers was accompanied by a 
rise in their prestige, with big entrepreneurs violating what was once a domaine 
                                                 
121 Interestingly enough, the very name of this ministry is one such instance of putting 
exchange (Trade) before production (Industry), as Abdel-Khalek put it (2001: 42), confirming 
the pervasiveness of neoliberalism even in the language of economic policy-making. More 
on this in Chapter 6. 
122 I thank Holger Albrecht of the American University in Cairo for bringing this point to my 
attention. 
123 In absolute terms, the number of businessmen rose from thirty-seven in 1995 to seventy-
seven in 2000 to one hundred in 2005. 
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réservé for bureaucrats and military officers such as the chairing of parliamentary 
committees. In 2004, the most important one – the Budget and Planning Committee 
– was assigned to Ahmed Ezz, steel magnate and close friend of Gamal Mubarak.  
As mentioned earlier though, heads of parliamentary committees do not get to 
influence economic policies as much as it usually happens in democratic systems. 
Yet, under Nazif businessmen made it directly into the core of the Egyptian policy-
making apparatus, being appointed to head extremely relevant ministries. Rashid 
Mohammed Rashid, minister of trade and industry, was himself a prominent 
businessman, serving as president of Unilever North Africa, Middle East and 
Turkey, the regional branch of the multinational corporation, before being 
appointed to the ministerial post. At the same time, he kept side-interests in as 
varied sectors as food processing and finance, with a large stake in EFG-Hermes, 
one of the largest private banks in Egypt, through a joint venture with two other 
well-connected families, the already mentioned Meghraby and Mansour. These two 
families were also partners in the Palm Hills Development Company, mostly active 
in construction and tourism. Incidentally, Ahmed Meghraby and Mohamed 
Mansour, coming exactly from these families, became respectively minister of 
tourism and minister of transport under Nazif. 
There are also two informal channels further bolstering the position of the 
capitalist elite. The first one was already mentioned in the previous chapter and 
regards the way in which privatisations have been carried out, favouring regime 
cronies up to the point of allowing them to replace state monopolies with private 
quasi-monopolies. The case of Ahmed Ezz is exemplary in this respect, with one 
single entrepreneur capable of ‘building up market leadership out of the blue’ in the 
steel sector, controlling about 60 per cent of domestic steel production a mere 
decade away from the beginning of the privatisation process (Roll 2010: 356-7). 
Other extremely influential families that benefited greatly from privatisation include 
the Bahgat and Sawiris groups, belonging to the infitah bourgeoisie created by 
Sadat. During the 1970s Ahmed Bahgat had been able to use free zones and 
investment incentives to become the largest producer of TV sets in the Middle East. 
During the 1990s, the privatisation process allowed his group to take over some 
SOEs and military production facilities which helped him upgrading his business 
‘from assembling Korean sets to making Philips and own-name brands’ (Mitchell 
2002: 285). At the same time, he launched one of the most ambitious construction 
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projects in Egypt’s recent history, creating ‘Dreamland’, a luxury development 
meant to give a secluded shelter to the nouveau riches who could not cope anymore 
with the crowded life of Cairo (Mitchell 1999a). Similarly, Orascom – the 
construction company owned by the Sawiris family – had become a giant in the 
Egyptian market in the aftermath of Sadat’s infitah. During the 1990s, Naguib 
Sawiris was ready to capitalise from the liberalisation and privatisation of telecoms, 
the first subsector in services to be reformed. Orascom Telecoms became the main 
local partner of the French company Orange in the first mobile operator in Egypt, 
MobiNil, and it also extended its reach overseas, acquiring in 2005 the third largest 
Italian mobile operator, Wind. In both cases, there are little doubts that the 
accumulation of wealth due to infitah and the close ties to the regime were 
instrumental for the Bahgat and the Sawiris business groups to become dominant 
forces in their respective sectors. 
The second informal channel, even though more of a hybrid one, relates to the 
increased role of pressure groups in articulating the demands and proposals of large 
domestic business. These pressure groups articulated themselves as business 
associations somehow detached from governmental control, contrary to what 
happened under Nasser and Sadat.124 In particular, the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Egypt (AmCham), established in 1981 by local businessmen with the 
support of the US embassy, and the Egyptian Businessmen’s Association (EBA), 
created in 1982, became customarily involved in consultations over industrial and 
more generally economic policies, despite their membership being limited to the 
hundreds.125 Through this channel, Egyptian businessmen were able to influence 
both decision-making and the overall framing of issues. Soliman provides some 
evidence with respect to the way the tax reform was carried out, and how in the 
early 1990s EBA lobbied successfully against a comprehensive tax reform and in 
favour of the imposition of the General Sales Tax, thus an indirect tax hitting more 
heavily consumers than businessmen or merchants (2011: 110-1). An interesting 
indication of the power of AmCham in setting the agenda, and one on which I will 
expand in Chapter 6, is the relevance acquired by Business Monthly, a magazine 
                                                 
124 Until the early 1980s, businessmen were organised in two associations – Federation of 
Chambers of Commerce and Federation of Industries – both with heavy representation from 
public sector firms and somehow controlled by the state (Sadowski 1991: 136). 
125 The members databases on the AmCham and the EBA websites contain respectively 925 
and 432 entries as of 8 August 2011.  
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published by AmCham and arguably the most read and influential one on economic 
and business issues in the country. 
Thus, even with respect to the manufacturing sector we see how well-
positioned actors were able to use the constraints and opportunities offered by the 
shift towards a new accumulation regime and eventually shape both economic and 
political outcomes. On the one hand, neoliberalism was reinforced significantly via 
institutional mechanisms, with outward-oriented ministries increasing taking 
charge of economic policies and businessmen becoming ever more prominent in 
parliament and in government. On the other hand, these two mechanisms interacted 
with informal ones to produce a reorganisation of power relations within the ruling 
bloc. Economic empires emerged only in the hands of businessmen strongly tied to 
the regime, and whereas this entailed an empowerment of this component vis-à-vis 
the army, it did not lead to the detachment of these business groups from the regime 
itself.  
 
4.2.3. Finance: technocrats, the infitah class and wealth concentration 
As usually happens with finance, the winners of the reform process were few, 
extremely well-organised and relatively easy to identify, whereas the losers were 
many, dispersed and with limited opportunities to overturn policies. In the previous 
chapter we have seen how reforms in finance produced a massive transfer of wealth 
away from the already limited resources of the common Egyptian citizen in favour 
of a handful of banks and businessmen involved in them. The clearest form of 
accumulation by dispossession in this sector could be seen in the various forms of 
fiscal incentives for companies listed in the stock exchange (Shams El-Din 1998: 153-
4). All of this was compounded by privatisations and other forms of redistribution 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
The implementation and consolidation of a neoliberal path and its congruence 
with the persistence of an authoritarian regime were once again guaranteed through 
a variety of institutional and informal mechanisms. Among the former, the 
empowerment of specific public institutions as opposed to others dominating pre-
reform policy-making is once again our starting point. With respect to the cabinet, 
the last two decades saw a gradual empowerment of the Ministry of Finance and the 
impetuous rise of the newly created Ministry of Investment. The former had become 
increasingly irrelevant under Nasser, who fought for concentrating all economic 
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policies under the control of the Ministry of Planning. Only with ERSAP the 
Ministry of Finance regained some of its pre-coup prestige, being in charge of deficit 
and debt reduction, thus placed at the forefront of the battle for helping Egypt meet 
the criteria of the agreement and thus obtain loans and debt forgiveness. Soon after 
the appointment of the Nazif cabinet, the increased relevance of the Ministry of 
Finance was soon proved when the new minister Youssef Boutros Ghali forced the 
issue to pass the long-awaited income tax law, showing how this ministry had 
finally been able to take fiscal policy under its exclusive control (Soliman 2011: 124-
5). Under the pressures of the Economic Committee of the NDP, the Nazif 
government also created a brand new ministry – the Ministry of Investment – 
pooling together all the competencies regarding the financial sector, previously 
scattered around four different ministries.126 As already suggested, the synergy 
between these two ministries and the Ministry of Trade and Industry was the 
engine behind the second wave of economic reforms between 2004 and 2008. 
Outside of the cabinet, important institutional shifts also took place, 
particularly with respect to the strength and autonomy gained by the CBE. Law 88 
of 2003 went a long way in giving the CBE the instruments and independence 
usually granted to central banking institutions in advanced economies. Firstly, the 
CBE was made formally independent from the Ministry of Finance, breaking the 
age-long trend that had seen government’s borrowing needs dictating monetary 
policy. Secondly, the CBE was given an explicit goal to aim for, price stability, 
following in this respect the neoliberal wave that saw central bank concerns for full 
employment as counter-productive. Lastly, the CBE was given a mandate to 
implement more effective regulations, from prudential measures to settlement of 
non-performing loans (NPL) to a longer term process focusing on making the 
banking sector compliant with Basel II regulations (World Bank 2010b: 13). In other 
words, a clear division of labour was established between the three main actors in 
the financial sector. The Ministry of Finance was put in charge of setting the fiscal 
framework, the CBE was responsible for monetary policy, and the Ministry of 
Investment carried out reforms in order to open up the sector and make it more 
attractive to foreign investors. 
                                                 
126 Namely the ministries involved were: Trade and Industry, Planning, Housing, Economic 
Development. 
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This arrangement with respect to financial sector policies was bolstered by the 
affinities with respect to the technocratic background and the neoliberal outlook 
shared by the three personalities in charge of these institutions between 2004 and 
2010. After a career at the IMF, Youssef Boutros Ghali taught at both Cairo 
University and the American University in Cairo while serving as advisor to the 
CBE governor. He was part of the team that negotiated ERSAP with the IMF and the 
World Bank. During the 1990s he started to cover ministerial posts and came under 
attack from the étatist wing within the NDP for his neoliberal views at the time of 
the 2000 parliamentary elections,127 losing part of his portfolio before emerging 
stronger than ever under the Nazif cabinet as the new minister of finance. 
Mahmoud Mohieldin, on his part, read economics at Cairo University, the 
quintessential institution for studying the subject in Egypt and one with very close 
ties to the regime.128 He then moved to the UK to get a Masters degree at York and a 
PhD in economics at Warwick. Once back in Egypt in the mid-1990s, he started 
lecturing at Cairo University and was involved from the very outset in the creation 
and management of the Egyptian Center of Economic Studies (ECES), becoming 
soon one of its leading economists. At the same time, he began his rise within the 
NDP, belonging to the generation of young and successful Egyptians rallying 
around Gamal Mubarak. Mohieldin co-chaired the NDP’s Economic Committee, 
becoming one of the strongest critics of the ‘illiberal policies’ carried out by the Eteif 
cabinet, and waging a battle that led to the dismissal of the cabinet and the 
appointment of a new one with Nazif as prime minister and Mohieldin himself 
heading the newly created Ministry of Investment. Though older and never directly 
involved in Egyptian politics, Farouk El-Okdah shares the same educational 
background, having been trained as an economist in the US, where he received his 
PhD from the University of Pennsylvania in 1983. He worked for more than a 
                                                 
127 In these elections, Boutros Ghali was forced to run in a district other than his own against 
a strong opposition candidate, forcing him to the second-round to confirm his seat in the 
People’s Assembly. In an interview with Oliver Schlumberger, an advisor close to the 
president said: ‘His plans for reform come too early for Egypt. So we had to show him: “we 
can kill you like we made you”’ (2004: 121). 
128 In his bestselling novel The Yacoubian Building, Alaa Al Aswany provides a very vivid 
description of the elitism of FEPS (Faculty of Economics and Political Science) students: ‘For 
some reason, the Faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University is associated 
in people’s minds with affluence and chic. Its students, if asked which faculty they are in, are 
accustomed to reply: “Economics and Political Science” in a complacent, confident, and 
nonchalant way (as though saying, “Yes, indeed. We are, as you can see, the tops”)’ (2007: 
89). 
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decade for the Bank of New York before returning to Egypt in the late 1990s to head 
the first financial leasing company in the country and then the largest state-owned 
bank, the National Bank of Egypt (EIU 2003: 21-2). 
Whereas these elements may help us understand how neoliberalism was 
entrenched in Egyptian financial policymaking, it is necessary to resort to the 
analysis of informal mechanisms to grasp how this process was hybridised in such a 
way as to produce a reorganisation of authoritarian rule. In particular, three 
channels were very important in this respect. Firstly, non-transparent lending 
practices clearly survived reforms, with privatisations and joint-venture divestitures 
actually worsening the problem of credit concentration. In 2006, about 51 per cent of 
total credit extended to the private sector went to only 0.19 per cent of clients 
(World Bank 2008b: 26). All sorts of banks preferred to lend to the few large 
corporations, with thirty of them accounting for about 40 per cent of the country’s 
credit supply (Osman 2010: 115-6). For public sector banks, lending to large 
businesses without too stringent conditions had always been a good way to allow 
the regime to maintain cooperative relations with the local business class. In the case 
of private sector banks, the same sort of practices developed out of both emulation 
and links between bank and business ownership. Finally, for foreign banks active in 
Egypt, lending to well-known businesses minimised the risks within an 
environment whose inner mechanisms still appeared somewhat obscure. Overall, 
practices of ‘cream skimming’ allowed the perpetuation of old preferential relations 
within a banking sector that was increasingly neoliberalised.129 
Secondly, the problem of NPLs is a logical consequence of easy and 
unscrutinised lending, as lending without any conditions or without any prior risk 
assessment obviously carries a bigger risk of debtor default. Under Mohieldin, the 
government carried an aggressive campaign in this respect, with NPLs as a share of 
total gross loans decreasing from 24 to 15 per cent between 2004 and 2008 (World 
Bank 2010a). This reduction was achieved by adopting a more flexible approach to 
debt settlement, managed by a special unit within CBE allowing banks and debtors 
to reach deals without going to court. Whereas this may appear as a sensible 
approach, as it allows to improve banking sector performance without 
overburdening the judiciary, it also led to a further lack of transparency that 
                                                 
129 ‘Cream skimming’ defines the business practices of a company that provides a given 
product or service only to the high-value or low-cost customers. 
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benefitted large debtors, more often than not corresponding to large businesses 
(Roll 2010: 357-8). Thus, this procedure allowed the government to win the praise of 
IFIs for its efforts in eliminating NPLs while at the same time preserving and indeed 
reinforcing, the close ties between the regime and large businesses. 
Lastly, whereas it is true that the increasing importance of foreign banks has 
the potential of boosting competition in the banking sector as a whole, due to the 
better services foreign banks tend to provide (World Bank 2008b), it is important not 
to lose sight on the ways in which these banks entered into the Egyptian market. For 
example, the entry of Crédit Agricole Egypt was made possible only through the 
alliance with MMID (Mansour and Meghraby Investment and Development), the 
joint investment vehicle created by the already mentioned Mansour and Meghraby 
families to extend their presence from industry and agriculture into finance as well 
(Roll 2010: 359). 
These informal barriers to entry were even more evident in the capital market, 
dominated by a handful of Egyptian business groups. In this case, regime and 
business elite found a balance in which the stock exchange performed well enough 
to be profitable for the big business groups, but at the same time kept potential 
newcomers out. By looking at the ownership structure of companies listed in the 
main stock exchange index (EGX-30), one can fully grasp how neoliberal reforms in 
the financial sector produced an extraordinary concentration of power in the hands 
of very few business groups (see Table 4.1). Most importantly, these business 
groups all had strong ties to the regime dating back to the infitah period, with the 
partial exception of Ahmed Ezz, whose rise has been discussed earlier. 
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Sawiris 30,145 1 18.59 
Orascom Telecom Holding Sawiris 27,396 2 12.69 
TMG Holding Talaat Moustafa 6,212 6 6.47 
Egyptian Company for 
Mobile Services (MobiNil) 
Sawiris 14,686 3 4.23 
Ezz Steel Ezz 5,406 8 3.37 
El Sewedy Cables Sewedy 10,029 5 2.91 




2,870 X 1.69 
Egyptian for Tourism 
Resort 
Kamel 2,017 X 0.89 
Orascom Hotels Holding Sawiris 1,809 X Not included 
Oriental Weavers Carpet 
Company 
Khamis 1,738 X Not included 




Sources: EGX 2008 and 2010; AmCham 2010. 
 
Hence, also in finance it is possible to see how neoliberal policies were combined 
with the reorganisation of authoritarian rule. In particular, the institutionalisation of 
neoliberalism is visible in the empowerment of the ministries in closer contact with 
IFIs, and more sympathetic to their demands. It can also be seen in the reshaping of 
the CBE’s role following the example of already neoliberalised financial systems in 
Western Europe and North America. Lastly, it emerges from the rise of technocrats 
trained in US and UK universities relying on the neoclassical orthodoxy. At the 
same time, the technocratisation of financial policy-making was accompanied by the 
survival of old practices such as preferential access to credit for large businesses, the 
exploitation of new mechanisms such as NPLs settlement procedures again to the 
advantage of large companies, and the survival of informal barriers to entry in both 
the banking sector and the capital market, allowing wealth concentration in the 
hands of a very restricted group. Accumulation of wealth swiftly translated also in 
accumulation of political power, with large entrepreneurs becoming ever more 
important within the ruling bloc.  
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Thus, it appears that in all the three sectors under consideration the 
penetration of neoliberalism led to significant political adjustments, which changed 
the balance of power within the ruling bloc but not its composition nor its support 
for authoritarian rule. In agriculture, this took the form of state withdrawal filled in 
by members of the ruling bloc, still fundamentally accountable to the regime only. 
In the manufacturing sector, the institutionalisation of neoliberalism saw an 
increased influence of businessmen in policy-making, either through direct 
participation in politics or through informal pressures, hence with a retreat of the 
state leading to predatory practices on the part of the private sector component of 
the ruling bloc. In finance, neoliberalisation led to a decreased importance of the 
state in terms of bank ownership, with its main functions being exercised by 
technocrats with sound neoliberal credentials. In this sector, relations within the 
ruling bloc were rearranged through the persistence of informal practices allowing 
large business groups to increase their power economically and eventually also to 
become more relevant in political terms. Interestingly, the business groups that 
emerged as winners of the neoliberal turn were, with minor exceptions, the same 
that benefitted from Sadat’s infitah in the 1970s. 
 
4.3. Social structures, rulers and regime change: comparing theories 
In Section 2.2 we have seen how changes in the economic sphere are considered to 
affect the prospect for political change from three different perspectives. This 
section assesses the value of the accounts provided by modernisation theory and by 
approaches focusing on rent-seeking elites in accounting for the ways political 
agency reacted to changes in the economic structure. The main argument in this 
respect is that whilst modernisation theory assumes too direct a link between a 
change in the capital accumulation regime and a change in the political regime, 
accounts focusing on elite behaviour – by looking exclusively at powerful actors – 
miss actions and reactions of social groups not belonging to such elite, and more 
generally ignore wider shifts in the overall class structure. I then show the added 
value of a Gramscian approach based on articulation. More specifically, I argue that 
neoliberal reforms produced a shift in class relations that acted as a determination in 
the first instance on the feasible political strategies. The relative autonomy of the 
political could still be seen in the articulation of neoliberalism with a reconfiguration 
of power relations within the ruling bloc aimed at preserving authoritarian rule. 
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4.3.1. The case of modernisation theory: middle class or capitalist oligarchy? 
In every causal relation linking two structures – in this case the economic and the 
political regime – there must be some form of agency allowing a given cause to 
produce a specified effect.130 In the case of modernisation theory, economic reforms 
characterised by liberalisations and privatisations are supposed to lead to the 
emergence of a strong and autonomous middle class which, in the very light of its 
strength and autonomy, has an interest in pushing towards the opening of the 
political regime too. Thus, there is a clear causal chain going from economic opening 
to the growth of the middle class to this pushing for and eventually forcing also a 
political opening. 
Modernisation theory is certainly correct in arguing that changes in the 
economic structure do have an impact on the political sphere, and compel political 
actors to do something about those modifications. It is also correct to maintain that 
social groups empowered by reforms will start to talk louder and demand more 
from an autocratic regime. In the Egyptian case, this emerges clearly from the 
increased power of landlords with respect to agricultural policies, entrepreneurs 
with respect to industrial policies, and bankers and traders with respect to financial 
sector reform. Being the main beneficiaries of reforms, they muster an amount of 
resources that often translates in greater organisational power – either 
institutionally or informally – putting them in a position to influence political 
decisions. This is all the more clear when they become part of those very institutions 
taking decisions, either as MPs or as ministers. 
However, modernisation theory is much less convincing when it provides the 
social profile of those expected to be the beneficiaries of liberalising and privatising 
reforms in authoritarian regimes. In other words, whereas there is a link between 
change in the accumulation regime and change in the social structure, 
modernisation theory gets the direction of this link wrong. The evidence provided 
in Sections 3.3 and 4.2 shows very clearly that neoliberal reforms in Egypt did not 
change the stratification of the social structure ‘from an elongated pyramid, with a 
large lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class’, as Lipset 
suggested (1959: 83). Rather, the opposite appears to be the case, with the 
establishment of a neoliberal regime of capital accumulation leading to the 
                                                 
130 Or at least: this should happen in social science if one is to avoid falling into the trap of 
structural determinism. 
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emergence of a capitalist oligarchy and the weakening of that middle class at the 
core of the explanation provided by modernisation theory. 
The rise of the capitalist oligarchy becomes glaring as soon as one thinks that 
the main business groups dominating the banking sector were usually the same 
with a prominent position in the capital market, and more often than not had a base 
in the productive economy through the ownership of privatised firms (Ahmed Ezz 
in steel), licenses granted by the government during the liberalisation of certain 
sectors (Sawiris in mobile telephony), strategies exploiting the withdrawal of the 
public sector from some areas (Mansour and Meghraby in agriculture), or simply 
investments in sectors where short-term speculation was more profitable (again 
Mansour and Meghraby but also Bahgat and Kamel in construction and tourism). 
The rise of this extremely thin stratum, quantified by Mitchell in about two dozen 
business groups (2002: 282), was guaranteed exactly by the fact that they had strong 
interests across the board, and the combination of wealth and connections allowed 
them to get first in every single reformed sector. The cases of Mansour and 
Meghraby and of Rashid discussed earlier are illustrative in this respect. 
This misjudgement of the direction of social change, and thus of the 
consequences of neoliberalism, pushes modernisation theory to overestimate the 
prospects of regime change stemming from a change in the economic regime. In 
other words, if their prediction of a strengthening of the middle class simply did not 
take place once reforms were implemented, then the further link leading from the 
middle class to an opening of the political regime cannot even be examined. More 
worryingly, modernisation theory is not of much help in explaining how 
modifications within the ruling bloc may take place without threatening the nature 
of the political regime as such. In this respect, the Egyptian case shows that 
economic reforms characterised by liberalisation and privatisation might well be 
related to intra-elite adjustments without any opening of the political regime. And 
this is something that modernisation theory is unable to account for. 
 
4.3.2. The case of predatory elites: all in the hands of the rulers 
Authors focusing on the rent-seeking behaviour of elites tend to be rather 
dismissive of the potential for political regime change deriving from economic 
reforms, however wide-ranging these may be. Rather, their argument suggests that 
new economic policies do not have a systemic impact on the political regime, but at 
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best force well-positioned actors to adapt their behaviour in such a way that they 
can maintain and whenever possible consolidate their privileged position within the 
reformed system. 
The significant room for manoeuvre enjoyed by political agents in adapting to 
structural pressures and to a good extent in shaping final outcomes is certainly what 
these approaches are best able to account for. In particular, their insistence on the 
relevance of positional rent is validated by the unfolding of the reform process in 
Egypt. In particular, a great wealth of evidence seems to support the assertion that a 
privileged position at the outset of the reform process will most likely translate into 
belonging to the list of beneficiaries. The correlation between being a member of the 
infitah bourgeoisie in 1990 and entering into the business oligarchy characterising 
the Egyptian political economy in 2010 appears quite neat. Also those that did not 
belong to ‘Sadat’s bourgeoisie’ and yet made it into the ruling bloc over the past two 
decades did so by forging alliances with members of the regime. The rise of Rashid 
Mohammed Rashid and Ahmed Ezz and their friendship with Gamal Mubarak are 
arguably the best case in point. In Egypt, politics is a key factor in determining what 
is the effect of economic reforms on your position in the social structure, and 
accounts based on rent-seeking elites are able to account for this aspect remarkably 
well. 
Yet, accounts focusing on the rent-seeking behaviour characterising elites, and 
even more so elites in authoritarian regimes, do suffer from at least two 
shortcomings. On the one hand, it appears that the concept of rent applies across the 
board over the entire ruling bloc. In some cases, it is the entire category of rulers to 
be considered as predatory (Levi 1988). Following from this, it becomes difficult to 
understand how relations within the ruling bloc have evolved over the reform 
period. More specifically, these approaches are somewhat indeterminate when it 
comes to evaluating which groups are most empowered and which are most 
weakened by reforms. In the Egyptian case, these approaches tend to overestimate 
the role of intra-elite alliances between potential winners and losers acting as a sort 
of veto that either stifles or derails the reform impetus (Kienle 2001 and 2003; 
Wurzel 2009). Yet, here we have seen how in fact reforms produced intra-elite 
adjustments more than alliances. These adjustments, albeit not univocal, point 
towards a strengthening of the component related to private capital vis-à-vis the 
army and the overall public sector. 
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On the other hand, the exclusive focus on well-placed actors leads to a 
dismissive conclusion along the lines of ‘nothing really changed’ that is profoundly 
misleading. It is misleading because focusing on one set of actors only – elites – 
obliterates how reforms affected actors who are not taken into account. Thus, the 
weakening of lower social groups, such as the peasantry and the working class, and 
those involved in the ever-larger informal economy, together with its potential 
repercussions on the stability of the political regime, is usually neglected, as is the 
increasing distance between the 5 per cent of the population holding more than 40 
per cent of the country’s wealth (Osman 2010: 115) and the increasingly pauperised 
majority of the Egyptian population. The substantial immobility suggested by elite-
centred approaches also ignores wider shifts in the class structure that are suggested 
by modernisation theory, and that are indeed real in the Egyptian case. This is 
where the approach developed in this study becomes most helpful. 
 
4.3.3. The Gramscian case: structural change meets political logic 
Focusing on the repercussions of the shift towards a neoliberal accumulation regime 
on the social structure, and more specifically on social relations defined in terms of 
class, allows to understand much of what has happened in Egypt over the past two 
decades. Reference to the impact on social classes allows us to single out the groups 
benefiting more from the reform process. In particular, we can see how neoliberal 
policies have empowered private owners of capital in its various forms and 
weakened classes relying exclusively on positional rent, such as the army and the 
wider bureaucracy, and lower classes selling their labour power, in the form of 
industrial workers, peasants and informal labourers. Within the capitalist class, 
what we see is not a clear-cut affirmation of financial capital, as has happened in 
other cases of neoliberalised economies,131 but rather an ever-greater integration 
between the traditional forms of capital: commercial, industrial and banking. 
These changes in the class structure suggest that there might be a relation 
between change in the economic regime and change in the political regime, but that 
this relation is not a univocal one. This contrasts both with what we have seen in 
modernisation theory, where a positive correlation between opening of the 
                                                 
131 The volume edited by Epstein on Financialization and the World Economy (2005) analyses 
the rise of financial capital brought about by neoliberal reforms in countries as diverse as the 
US, Mexico, Turkey and South Korea. 
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economic and of the political regime is posited, and in rent-based approaches, 
which argue against the existence of any such link. The Gramscian account 
developed here, on the other hand, suggests that a new accumulation regime brings 
with itself a constellation of conflicting pressures, some pushing towards change in 
the political regime and others allowing its reorganisation without any change in its 
authoritarian nature. To be more precise, the shift towards neoliberalism produced 
both changes within the regime and changes between the regime and the wider 
society. Yet, these changes point in very different directions. 
With respect to the changing conditions within the regime, the empirical 
section showed how the local capitalist class was empowered vis-à-vis purely rent-
based components of the ruling bloc.132 What is most interesting though is that 
despite becoming more powerful, the Egyptian bourgeoisie did not become 
substantially more independent from the regime. This is witnessed by the way in 
which access to newly liberalised and privatised markets was granted to capital 
owners. In particular, we have seen how prior position in the political economy and 
crony relations with the regime constituted two fundamental conditions to benefit 
from the shift towards a neoliberal accumulation regime. 
The lack of autonomy of the Egyptian capitalist class can also be measured 
referring to a set of parameters proposed by Luciani for evaluating the 
independence of the national bourgeoisie from its – usually authoritarian – regime 
in the Middle East (2007: 287-8, ft. 9). Luciani suggests that five indicators should be 
taken into consideration: accumulated wealth, access to global finance and know-
how, competitiveness and profitability of enterprises, independence from 
government protection,133 and sales to market as opposed to sales to government. 
The Egyptian capitalist class scores extremely high on the first indicator and very 
high on the second. On the third indicator, whilst large enterprises were certainly 
profitable, it is hard to maintain that this was due to their competitiveness, 
particularly considering the conditions of quasi-monopoly in which they often 
operated. With respect to independence of the local bourgeoisie from government, 
this was far from being achieved, and it is more evident with respect to the 
                                                 
132 As mentioned in the introduction, we should not discount what Hanaa Kheir-el-Din 
defines as ‘military production for civilian purposes’ (Interview with Hanaa Kheir-el-Din, 4 
May 2010, Cairo). 
133 Luciani mentions government subsidies, but considering the forms in which government 
appears to be able to support and/or control the local capitalist class, I consider the broader 
concept of protection to be more appropriate than an exclusive focus on subsidies. 
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importance of political power to accumulate wealth than to the decreasing role of 
the state as a prominent buyer of goods and services from the private sector. 
If these were the conditions of the Egyptian capitalist elite, its most rational 
choice might actually be to improve its relative position within the existing regime, 
particularly if one takes into consideration the elephant in the room of the parallel 
military economy. After all, political opening might mean that groups currently 
excluded from the ruling bloc would get a voice in the decision-making process, 
with the risk of endangering the privileged position of the entrepreneurial elite 
within the reformed political economy. Thus, it would seem that in the Egyptian 
case intra-elite relations were not conducive to meaningful political change. 
The advantage of taking a Marxist stance is that changes in the social structure 
are taken in their totality, thus forcing the researcher to look at how changes in the 
accumulation regime affect also the social classes excluded from the ruling bloc. 
Enough evidence has hopefully been provided with respect to increasing inequality 
but also more generally for escalating repression in agriculture and protests in 
industry, both important indicators of the increasing exclusion of lower classes. 
More interestingly, also social groups between the elites and the poor, what 
Leonard Binder referred to as the ‘second stratum’ (1978), appear on the whole to 
have been weakened by neoliberal reforms. Public sector employees, constituting 
the majority of the Egyptian middle class, were squeezed significantly, with their 
real wages substantially deteriorating vis-à-vis those of private sector employees 
(Said 2002 and 2009).134 On the other hand, it appears that at least in relative terms 
private sector employees and cadres benefited from reforms, and this in and of itself 
should make them supportive of the regime and its policies. Lastly, although there 
is a lack of data in this respect, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that self-
employed professionals were somehow able to hold their ground in the past two 
decades, leaving them with enough resources, often earned outside of the regime 
circuit and its cronies, to be mobilised in the political sphere. 
In sum, though not affecting all social groups in the same way, economic 
reforms squeezed the Egyptian middle class as a whole, weakening its larger 
                                                 
134 The worsening of the condition of public sector employees can easily be backed with 
reference to anecdotal evidence: take a cab in Cairo at night, have a chat with the driver, and 
you will soon discover that during daytime he works as a school teacher or as a land registry 
officer. More generally, moonlighting and work in the informal economy are becoming ever 
more common strategies to cope with financial strains (El-Mahdi 2002; Moktar and Wahba 
2002). 
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segment (public sector employees), slightly improving the position of employees in 
large private sector companies, and leaving substantially unaltered the position of 
self-employed professionals. If we add to this the worsening conditions of the 
peasantry and the working class, one might start to wonder whether the threats for 
regime survival might originate not within the ruling bloc but outside of it. And not 
from improved conditions, but rather from desperation. 
 
4.4. Articulation I: the emergence of neoliberal authoritarianism 
The mechanisms characterising the interaction between the economic and the 
political allow us to see the first form of determination in the first instance, on the 
part of the economic, and the following relative autonomy of the political. More 
specifically, we have seen how an exercise of political agency – i.e. the decision to 
undertake far-reaching economic reforms along a neoliberal path – produced 
structural change in terms of a shift towards a new accumulation regime and 
modifications in the class structure. Structural change means that the boundaries 
within which political action takes place are redefined substantially, forcing agency 
to adapt to these changed conditions. This is what I refer to as determination in the 
first instance by the economic structure. Within these newly defined boundaries, 
characterised by a substantially weakened role of the state in production and 
management, the relative autonomy of the political manifests itself in the measure 
in which actors well placed in the political sphere attempt to retain control over the 
changing economic structure by adapting old mechanisms and developing new 
ones. More specifically, the relative autonomy of the political emerged with 
reference to agriculture in the privatisation of what once were state functions, but 
which are now exercised by groups or families still under the control of the regime. 
In industry, the relative autonomy of the political was clear in the capture of 
institutional structures on the part of the emerging capitalist elite, ever more 
powerful within the ruling bloc, in order to direct the impact of structural change 
both in terms of wealth and power accumulation. In finance, it manifested itself in 
the decision to put technocrats in charge while attempting to preserve practices 
allowing the regime to keep under check the rising business elite. 
This is exactly how articulation works. After all, articulatory practices often 
aim at relating seemingly contradictory features. This is even more true in pre-
capitalist and newly capitalist societies, where the political often enjoys a higher 
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degree of autonomy from the class structure, leaving room for the survival of old 
practices within a new accumulation regime. As Ayubi put it, ‘[i]t is a distinct 
advantage of the articulation method that it would enable us to conceive of a 
situation where the “technical” arrangements most typical of a particular mode of 
production may be articulated with the cultural (and the political) aspects more 
typical of another mode (and therefore possibly of another “age”)’ (1995: 29). This 
also applies within capitalism, and thus with the shift from a regime of capital 
accumulation to another. And this is what we saw in the Egyptian case: a move 
from an étatist towards a neoliberal accumulation regime, producing substantial 
modifications in the relations between class forces, but still being articulated by 
political agents with pre-existing practices, and in this way being somehow 
transformed. 
This process of hybridisation of neoliberalism is not to be necessarily seen as a 
distortion of its original intentions. Indeed, the Egyptian case displays most of the 
typical symptoms of neoliberalised economies. Among these, the most relevant are 
the rise in inequality, the increasing polarisation of the social structure with the 
emergence of a ‘super-rich’ class and the weakening of middle and lower classes, 
and the rise of financial capital that rather than becoming dominant works as the 
cement linking together all the different forms of capital. These typical effects of 
neoliberalism were articulated with the peculiar characteristics of the Egyptian 
political economy, from its dependent position in the global economy to the 
sustained dominance of domestic over foreign capital to the persistence of practices 
of patronage and corruption, with the result of the emergence of a hybrid form of 
neoliberalism. 
As mentioned above, within this larger picture intra-elite adjustments are best 
seen as agential strategies in order to adapt to changes brought about by the 
neoliberal turn. Yet, whereas the rearrangement of power relations within the ruling 
bloc under an informal pact guaranteed by president Mubarak himself might be 
able to defuse tensions within the ruling bloc, it did little to tackle the other set of 
pressures produced by neoliberalism, between the regime and society at large. And 
we have also suggested that these unintended – or certainly underestimated – 
consequences of structural change might be eroding the basis of authoritarian rule. 
Here is where hegemony comes to the fore. To be successful, hegemony has by 
definition to be encompassing, including social groups beyond the ruling bloc. In 
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other words, it is the task of the latter to develop a ‘conception of the world’ of 
which most groups feel part of, regardless of their position in society. This also 
means that a promise and to a degree a delivery of improvements to the living 
conditions of all classes must take place, particularly in a state whose legitimacy is 
not based on elections, but rather on economic performance and on the distribution 
of its benefits to most strata in society. As we said in Chapter 1, hegemony is also 
and first of all an agential phenomenon linked to social relations of production. 
Thus, if the latter change, and change in such a comprehensive way as it happened 
with the neoliberal turn in Egypt, then the hegemonic project too would need to 
take into consideration these changes in their totality to preserve the stability of the 
political order. On the contrary, the Egyptian regime appeared concerned 
exclusively with intra-regime fixes.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
In analysing the impact of economic reforms on the political system, we have seen 
how things first started in agriculture, with state withdrawal and liberalisation of 
prices and inputs. It then followed in industry, again with liberalisation of trade and 
prices and then privatisation. At the end of the first phase of the reform process 
(1991-98), the period of stasis was also the phase in which businessmen, under the 
leadership of Gamal Mubarak, quintessential link between old regime and ‘new’ 
business, became significantly more powerful in the political arena, first joining the 
NDP, then becoming MPs, and finally working as cabinet ministers. This change in 
the political arena was fundamental in allowing the financial sector reform 
programme to get under way and thus neoliberalise the banking and capital market 
sectors. 
In attempting to understand what has been the impact of these economic 
changes on the political regime, we have firstly looked in the direction of 
mainstream approaches. Modernisation theory is valuable in the measure in which 
it maintains that changes in the economic structure will lead to social changes as 
well. However, it gets the direction of those changes wrong, and thus its prediction 
that changes in the economic regime will lead to change in the political regime does 
not hold. Certainly not in the Egyptian case. Approaches based on rent-seeking 
elites are correct in saying that well-positioned actors will do everything in their 
power to keep their privileged position in the reformed system. However, elites are 
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not the only actors that matter, even though in authoritarian regimes it might seem 
so. Thus, their conclusion that no substantial political change will follow from 
economic change does not hold either. 
The Gramscian approach developed here is valuable in that it is both holistic 
and nuanced. Holistic in that it forces us to look at the impact of neoliberalism on 
society as a whole, thus also focusing on lower classes. Nuanced because it prevents 
from reaching a definite conclusion, and rather points towards the presence of 
conflicting pressures, some working towards regime stabilisation under new 
conditions and some undermining it. These were the conditions of neoliberal 
authoritarianism in Egypt in 2010. Intra-regime adjustments made it possible to 
keep the regime stable on the inside, but devastating inequality and 
impoverishment seemed to suggest that regime stability might be threatened from 




HISTORY OF A PASSIVE REVOLUTION: 




In Chapter 3 we discussed three of the features characterising the Egyptian political 
economy in 1990. Two of them are particularly relevant with respect to the position 
and relation of Egypt with the global political economy. The first one is the 
persistence of a dependent economic structure. The second is the relatively minor 
role played by foreign private capital in comparison with other countries usually 
considered as dependent. The attempt to spatially locate the sources of the 
structural change produced by neoliberal reforms must start from these two 
elements, and from two implications deriving from them. 
The first one is mostly theoretical, and it refers to how patterns of uneven and 
combined development characterising the unfolding and evolution of capitalist 
relations of production on a worldwide scale interact with the dependent structure 
of the Egyptian economy. In this respect, it is safe to say that the increasing 
integration of the Egyptian into the global political economy will produce a 
qualitative change in the relation between the two scales. On the one hand, we 
could see Egypt taking advantage of the opportunities created by the ‘whip of 
external necessity’ and the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’, as Trotsky called 
them, in order to leapfrog outside of its position of dependence, skipping 
developmental stages and eventually outstripping early developers. This has 
already happened in history, for example with the United States and Germany 
overtaking Britain, and something similar seems to be happening currently with 
respect to China. On the other hand, increased integration might lead to a 
debasement of the Egyptian economy, with the interaction between international 
and national scale giving way to a strengthening of dependency under new 
conditions. These new conditions would be the result of the articulation of previous 
economic, political and ideological features typical of étatism with the neoliberal 
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ones prevalent on the international scale. It is important not to confuse this second 
alternative with the ‘development of underdevelopment’ thesis. Focusing 
exclusively on trade, the latter predicts that gradually worsening terms of trade will 
produce a deepening of dependency under the same basic conditions. U&CD, on 
the other hand, allows us to add financial flows – assistance, lending and 
investment – to commercial ones, showing how the interaction of these variables 
leads to a reproduction of dependency under conditions which are qualitatively 
different. In other words, if one accepts U&CD as the fundamental mechanism 
driving inter-societal relations under capitalism, ever greater integration will always 
produce a qualitative change in the workings of any given political economy. 
The second implication is of methodological relevance and orients the 
empirical focus of this chapter. The limited amount of private capital flows into the 
Egyptian economy suggests that the first steps towards neoliberalisation must come 
from somewhere else, and more specifically from institutional dynamics. This is also 
consistent with the fact that in order to change an étatist accumulation regime, you 
need to deal with the actors in a dominant position within the existing system, and 
thus with the state, its institutions and the ruling bloc controlling them. This is the 
main reason why this chapter mostly focuses on the interaction between the 
Egyptian government and those institutions most representative of the imperatives 
developing on the international scale, ranging from international organisations such 
as the IMF and the World Bank to particularly influential donors such as the US and 
the EU. After all, the role of IFIs in promoting neoliberalism across borders is 
supported by an established literature, including mainstream, constructivist and 
critical IPE scholars.135 In addition, in the specific Egyptian case the magnitude of 
the fiscal crisis of the late 1980s and the prospects of debt relief attached to 
successful reforms made the Egyptian government particularly sensitive to 
pressures from the Bretton Woods twins, and thus render even more appropriate 
the focus on institutional dynamics adopted here. 
With these two considerations in mind, the chapter proceeds as follows. The 
first section focuses on the interaction between national and international 
                                                 
135 In the mainstream IPE literature, an excellent example is The Globalizers by Ngaire Woods 
(2006). Among the constructivists, a very persuasive case with respect to the IMF is made in 
Chwieroth (2010). In critical IPE, the literature on IFIs-promotion of neoliberalism is nearly 
limitless. For a clear and succinct introduction from a broadly Gramscian perspective, see 
Peet (2003). 
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institutions in the three sectors under consideration, and suggests that interscalar 
relations have evolved over time, with the national scale gradually becoming more 
important as a nodal scale, and thus acquiring a greater degree of autonomy from 
the imperatives promoted by IFIs and the main donors. The following section 
interprets this core empirical finding in the light of the main existing approaches, 
based respectively on the transnational state thesis and on the more sceptical 
accounts expressed in some area studies, before addressing the same findings from 
the perspective of the Gramscian approach developed here. Lastly, the final section 
links back empirical findings to wider theoretical debates on the relation between 
globalising capital and national state, suggesting that what Egypt has experienced 
over the past two decades is best understood as a form of passive revolution. 
 
5.2. Scales, institutions and economic change: empirical study 
In the three sectors under consideration the international agents and their roles in 
the reform process vary greatly. A division of labour between IMF and World Bank 
has always been in place, with the former being in charge of evaluating the 
evolution of macroeconomic indicators and exchange rates and the latter monitoring 
structural adjustment (Weiss and Wurzel 1998: 25). However, particularly during 
the stabilisation phase, encroachments on the part of the IMF within areas formally 
under the supervision of the World Bank, such as privatisation and liberalisation, 
were far from unusual. Thus, whereas the IMF had a central role in the sectors 
particularly affected by privatisation, i.e.: manufacturing and to a lesser extent 
finance, and with respect to exchange rate management, it only has marginal 
relevance with respect to agriculture, where the World Bank was central in 
promoting a specific reform path rather than another. Two donors are taken into 
consideration in one of the sectors or sub-sectors under consideration: USAID 
because of its relevance in agriculture, and the EU for its crucial role in banking 
sector regulation. 
This section discusses relations between international institutions and the 
Egyptian government during the reform process. In particular, changes are 
evaluated with reference to two dimensions. On the one hand, it ascertains the level 
of cooperation between external and domestic institutions. When were reforms 
undertaken following a cooperative pattern? When were they imposed through 
coercion? In which cases did a confrontational approach prevent reforms from being 
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implemented altogether? On the other hand, it is equally important to evaluate who 
were the leaders and who the followers in the various phases of the reform process. 
By referring to these two dimensions, this section discusses the role of the 
international scale in pushing neoliberal solutions on the Egyptian government 
during the first phase of reforms, while at the same time highlighting the role of 
agency on the national scale during the second wave of reforms between 2004 and 
2008. 
 
5.2.1. Agriculture: from ‘one-size-fits-all’ to the Egyptian way to neoliberalism 
Other than being a forerunner, as discussed in Chapter 3, the agricultural sector was 
also an anomaly in the Egyptian reform process. Contrary to the other two sectors 
under consideration, reforms in agriculture were relatively untroubled, with 
relations between IFIs, donors and government mostly following a cooperative 
pattern. This continuity on one of the two dimensions under consideration makes 
the identification of shifts in the relations between national and international 
institutions harder to detect, as coercion – arguably the most visible indicator – was 
not a significant feature of agricultural reforms. Despite this, it is still possible to see 
how leadership in the reform process was exerted by the World Bank and USAID 
during a first phase (1986-1995), passing the during a second phase (from 1995 on) 
in the hands of the Egyptian government, following a new social and economic 
crisis caused by those very reforms implemented in the previous decade. 
Though characterised by the central role of Yusuf Wali,136 the first phase of 
structural reforms in agriculture was clearly led by the World Bank and USAID. In 
particular, these two institutions proved decisive in three different ways, 
encompassing both material and ideational forms of influence. Firstly, the World 
Bank and USAID provided the framing for the agricultural crisis, and thus a clear 
characterisation of the problems affecting the sector. More specifically, the whole 
crisis was explained referring constantly to the state-market dichotomy, with state 
intervention in the sector considered responsible for distorting prices, stifling 
innovation and ultimately thwarting efficiency. On the first aspect, the Bank’s 
Agricultural Strategy for the 1990s was very eloquent, praising the government’s 
                                                 
136 Wali was both minister of agriculture and deputy prime minister between 1986 and 2004, 
thus being effectively one of the most powerful policy-makers in the whole Egyptian scene 
after the president himself. 
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decision ‘to fully liberalise the agricultural sector, and to remove all controls and 
Government interference in commodity pricing within the next two to three years’ 
(1993: 14). Similar remarks are found on the following page, with respect to the 
removal of subsidies on fertilisers and pesticides and concomitant state divestiture. 
The lack of technological innovation as well is attributed to the state, this time in the 
form of ‘responsibilities dispersed among many institutions, and not effectively 
coordinated, leading to duplication of efforts’ and to ‘the absence of a widely 
accessible data base’ (Ibid: 15). From these two aspects it is not too difficult to 
extend charges to the state to wider issues of economic efficiency. As USAID put it: 
‘Public enterprises are generally inefficient, are usually subsidised by the Treasury 
and, therefore, unfairly compete with private investors. Public institutions are 
characterised by redundant employment, poor management practices, and absence 
of appropriate employee incentives. Public investment lacks suitable economic 
criteria. Food subsidies distort consumer decisions and contribute to false price 
signals to producers’ (USAID 1992: 7). 
Secondly, the World Bank and USAID suggested a set of solutions derived 
from this framing of the crisis. If you characterise problems in the sector around the 
state-market dichotomy, with the former being invariably the problem and the 
second the solution, then the rationale for reforms becomes straightforward: weaken 
the state and empower the market. Privatisation was meant to achieve the first 
objective,137 liberalisation towards export-oriented agriculture the second. In the 
words of a long-serving USAID official, public sector withdrawal from input 
provision would make sure that the state only thinks of ‘providing the legal and 
regulatory framework necessary for the private sector and to the support for market 
driven trade and investment’ (Lewis 2009: 167). The function of wide-ranging 
liberalisation was once again best exemplified by USAID (1992: 15): 
 
Freeing prices will encourage farmers, buyers and processors of agricultural 
commodities to invest in productivity enhancing capital and technological 
improvements, and over time should shift the sector towards the production of 
commodities for which Egypt has a comparative advantage. Increases in income 
                                                 
137 It is important to remind here that land reforms under Nasser did not dismantle private 
ownership of land, but only limited the maximum extension of individual landholdings. 
Thus, when we talk of privatisation in agriculture we are referring to the state withdrawing 
not from direct production, where its role was already limited, but rather from the provision 
of inputs. 
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in the agricultural sector will provide a significant and broad-based contribution 
to the enhancement of Egypt’s long-term prosperity. 
 
There is no need to discuss at length here how deeply problematic both the framing 
and the policy guidelines proposed were.138 
Lastly, the World Bank and USAID provided the bulk of the financial 
resources needed to carry out reforms, with the former resorting to loans and the 
latter to assistance loans. Structural adjustment funds by the World Bank have been 
disbursed in the amount of $300 million between 1991 and 1994, with the entry 
regarding rural policies and institutions amounting to 16 per cent of the total.139 On 
the other hand, USAID financed two specific agricultural projects: the Agricultural 
Production and Credit Project running from 1986 to 1995 with assistance amounting 
to $309 million, and the Agricultural Policy Reform Programme covering the 
following decade and amounting to $245 million (Abt Associates 2002: 1). It is not 
surprising that, in times of serious economic distress, the sheer amount of resources 
at stake and the additional promise of debt forgiveness in case of successful 
reforms, proved enough to entice the government to adopt far-reaching measures.  
This first phase of the reform process ended with a crisis provoked by 
liberalisation in the provision of fertilisers, which highlighted some of the 
weaknesses of the model proposed by World Bank and USAID. Until the mid-1980s, 
both inputs and fertilisers were provided at a subsidised price by PBDAC. In a way 
the reader should by now be familiar with, the dismantlement of public sector 
monopoly led to the emergence of an oligopoly controlled by three companies, with 
a fourfold increase in local price between 1994 and 1996 coupled with the incentive 
                                                 
138 Two main arguments have been advanced in this respect. Firstly, that the state-market 
dichotomy forgets that the state is only one of the factors affecting the constitution of 
markets and the form that they take, and in the case of Egyptian agriculture is not even the 
most important one (Saunders and Mehanna 1986). Secondly, that the IFIs approach tends to 
conceal that the market itself is an institution, and that market relations are power relations, 
with the deriving asymmetries. For example, relations in the marketplace are certainly 
shaped by availability of information, but this in Egyptian agriculture is far from the 
perfection assumed in neoclassical models. It is not a case that the marketisation of 
agriculture did not lead to the disappearance of rent, but rather to its re-organisation. As 
noticed by other scholars with reference to Sub-Saharan Africa, ‘[r]eplacing exploitative 
forms of state regulation by a regime of non-regulation allows the state bourgeoisie to legally 
“privatise” its interests without transforming its essentially parasitic form of economic 
operation’ (Gibbon et al. 1993: 147). 
139 The repayment of the overall loan was subject to a five-year grace period after which a 
variable interest rate would be applied, set at 7.73 per cent at the signing of the agreement 
(Weiss and Wurzel 1998: 47-48). 
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for producers to export rather than sell at home because of a sizeable price 
differential.140 Following from this, acute supply difficulties in 1994 and 1995 forced 
the Principal Bank to restart public sector provision of fertilisers. 
This crisis was a significant turning point in the balance of power between the 
Egyptian government and both the World Bank and USAID with respect to 
agriculture. Without putting into question the cooperative relations of the previous 
decade, the government was allowed to pursue its own brand of reforms, with 
external agencies lowering their profile and working more as technical advisors in 
support of the government. The reaction of international institutions to this new 
state of affairs was telling. Whereas in the 1990s the liberalisation of input provision 
was suggested as one of the most urgent measures to be taken to reform agriculture, 
the World Bank’s view on this issue in 2001 had changed substantially: 
liberalisation in this subsector was turned into a long-term objective, but in the 
short-term the co-existence of public provision with private oligopolists was 
accepted (World Bank 2001: 16). More interestingly, the Egyptian government did 
not mention this issue neither in the fifth nor in the sixth five-year plan (Ministry of 
Planning 2002: 98-101; 2007: 93-100), leading to a gradual watering down of the 
hypothesis that fertiliser provision move entirely in the hands of the private sector 
as originally advocated by international agencies. And whereas the letter of what is 
written in the government’s development plans should not be taken at face value, 
this should be an additional reason for paying lip service to the requests of World 
Bank and USAID rather than dropping the issue altogether. 
This trend can also be illustrated with reference to the hard-line taken by the 
government in the full implementation of Law 96 of 1992. More than most other 
reforms carried out in the sector, Law 96 of 1992 was a genuinely Egyptian law, 
with external agencies suggesting a reform of land tenure, but playing a very minor 
role in the drafting and discussion of the law itself (Hinnebusch 1993: 21-2). Yet, the 
new tenure law was still moulded on neoliberal principles, and one of them in 
particular: the commodification of all factors of production (Harvey 2005: 160-1), 
and in this specific case of land and labour, and the state-sanctioned redistribution 
of assets in favour of the ruling classes. At the end of the transitional period, while 
entirely aware of the social and political costs of the full implementation of the law, 
                                                 
140 As reported by Bush (1999: 68-9), export price of fertiliser was of LE800 per tonne 
compared with local price of LE450. 
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the government did not show much hesitation in allowing land takeover and the 
dispossession of tenants. Not much enthusiasm was shown on the part of 
international institutions in this respect, but no opposition either.141 The fact that the 
government proved willing to fully implement the tenure law and that international 
organisations gave them the chance to do so is indicative of a more proactive role 
for national institutions in driving agricultural reforms.  
These two cases are telling of the evolution of agricultural reforms, and more 
specifically of the lopsided character of domesticated neoliberalism. More 
specifically, both the unevenness of liberalisation and the implementation of the 
new tenure law show a tendency on the part of the government to privilege the 
aspects of dispossession and exchange over the alleged objectives of state 
withdrawal and competition. The management of the crisis in fertiliser provision 
similarly suggests that whenever the state is needed for the market not to break 
down (as what was experienced was a clear case of market failure), it is allowed to 
step in even though this means constraining competition. In other words, capital 
accumulation seems to be the main priority for both national and international 
stakeholders: trade liberalisation and land dispossession are more functional to this 
task than the liberalisation of input provision, which can be sacrificed if social 
stability is perceived to be at stake.  
 
5.2.2. Industry: privatisation as a taboo, privatisation as a must-do 
The unfolding of reforms in the manufacturing sector is best understood if the two 
decades under consideration are split into three phases. The first one goes from 1991 
to 1998 and encompasses macroeconomic stabilisation and the first wave of 
privatisations. The second phase covers the following five years (1999-2004) and 
represents a moment of stasis with respect to the reform process, but also one of 
great importance particularly because of the power struggle taking place on the 
national scale. The third period spans the remaining part of the second decade, from 
the moment when the Nazif cabinet took office in 2004 to 2010. While reforms 
regarding liberalisation of trade and prices are also considered, most of the attention 
here is focused on what Waterbury called ‘the heart of the matter’ (1992): public 
                                                 
141 Interview with Tarek Moursi, professor of economics at the Cairo University and expert 
in agricultural economics and quantitative analysis at the Information and Decision Support 
Center (IDSC), the government’s think tank, Cairo, 29 April 2010. 
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sector reform, and more specifically privatisation. This is because privatisation was 
the most contentious point in negotiations in 1991 when Egypt sought help from 
IFIs, and the changing position of the government on this issue might tell us 
something valuable also about transformations in interscalar relations. 
The first phase of the reform process saw IFIs leading the way with respect to 
the reforms to be implemented, with the Egyptian government being mostly 
reactive, either following the advice of IMF and World Bank or ignoring it. The 
perception of uncertainty and vulnerability that the fiscal crisis of the 1980s had 
produced in key Egyptian policy-makers inevitably increased the bargaining power 
of IFIs and international donors, particularly with respect to the conditions under 
which Egypt would be granted much needed hard currency and debt forgiveness. 
The steadiness and consistency with which trade liberalisation measures were 
implemented between 1991 and 1998 is a remarkable example of how the Egyptian 
government complied with some of the demands coming from international 
institutions (see Table 5.1). These reforms took in a first phase the form of a drastic 
reduction of items covered by import and export bans (1991-92), followed by a 
gradual reduction of the tariff range effected between 1993 and 1998 (see Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 – Trade liberalisation measures (1991-98) 
1991    - Production coverage of import bans reduced from 35.6 to 33.3 per 
cent of tradable goods output 
- Number of products subject to export bans reduced from 20 to 4. 
- Number of products under quantitative annual export quota 
reduced from 17 to 4. 
- Production coverage of import bans reduced from 37.2 to 22.7 per 
cent. 
 
1992    - Number of preferential tariff rates cut from 60 to 30. 
- 4 more items reduced from export bans list. 
- 32 preferences removed from tariff preference, with 29 remaining. 
 
1993    - Tariff range reduced from 5-100 to 5-80 per cent. 
 
1995    - Tariff range reduced to 5-70 per cent. 
 
1996    - Tariff range reduced to 5-55 per cent. 
 
1997    - Tariff range reduced to 5-50 per cent. 
 
1998    - Tariff range reduced to 5-40 per cent. 
 Source: Abdel-Khalek 2001: 55-6. 
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When it came to the divestiture of state-owned assets, the position of the Egyptian 
government vis-à-vis the demands of IFIs changed over time from non-cooperative 
to merely compliant to enthusiastically committed. Already Law 203 of 1991, setting 
the guidelines for the restructuring and privatisation of SOEs, encountered great 
resistance in the People’s Assembly, even though this was not enough to prevent its 
approval (Khattab 1999: 7-8). However, during the first years of stabilisation not 
much happened on the privatisation front, with the IMF repeatedly raising its 
concerns (EIU 1992; IMF 1993a). Government’s inactivity also pushed the World 
Bank to extend its 1992/1993 Privatisation Programme until June 1994 to allow the 
government to achieve at least the minimum targets (Momani 2005: 48). The only 
significant step forward was the setting of parameters for privatisation, under the 
threat of the World Bank to withdraw the second tranche of structural adjustment 
loans (EIU 1993). Yet, these were only steps in the planning of privatisation rather 
than in its implementation, and despite the promises included in the 1993 Letter of 
Intent presented while applying for an Extended Fund Facility, ‘the IMF were 
particularly disappointed with delays in the privatisation of state assets. Egypt was 
supposed to have sold 22 state-owned companies by the end of 1993, but had only 
sold three and wanted to reinterpret the term privatisation to include employee 
buyouts and partial sales’ (Momani 2005: 55). And indeed privatisation, rent 
decontrol, liberalisation of insurance laws and currency devaluation were the 
measures not implemented by the government which led the IMF not to release the 
final tranche of the 1993 Extended Fund Facility (Ibid: 63). 
At the end of structural adjustment things changed rather dramatically, with 
the Minister of Planning Atef Ebeid pledging the privatisation of 100 companies that 
were supposed to bring $2.9 billion into the state coffer by the end of 1996. The IMF 
staff was truly impressed that the list of companies to be privatised was even more 
comprehensive than its own demands, signalling a real commitment towards public 
sector reform (Butter 1996: 3). In the five months before the conclusion of the 1996 
Stand-by Arrangement, the government sold more SOEs through flotation than it 
had done in the previous three years (Wright 1996). 
In 1998, the impetus for reforms quickly faded away, with Egyptian economic 
policies effectively held hostage of a power struggle within the ruling party. The 
first wave of privatisations had exacerbated the differences between two NDP 
factions, neither of which was particularly happy with the reform process. On the 
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one hand, the étatist wing saw public sector reform as a substantial erosion of state 
power, to control the main levers of the economy to the advantage either of the 
infitah bourgeoisie or in some cases of foreign companies. On the other hand, the 
reformist wing was equally worried but for the opposite reason: there was still too 
much interference of the state in the economy, and despite complying with the IFIs’ 
requirements the government still had a dirigiste attitude. In the 2002 party 
conference these two opposite visions on the economic path to be followed squared 
off (Collombier 2006: 7). The appointment of Mahmoud Mohieldin as co-chairman 
of the Economic Committee of the party meant that the argument of the reformist 
wing could not be ignored any longer, and indeed marked the beginning of a 
change of the guard, which led in 2004 to the resignation of the cabinet headed by 
Atef Ebeid. 
Despite the standstill in terms of actual reforms, this period is particularly 
important as it is here that one can see a modification of power relations between 
international and national institutions, with political agency at the national scale 
becoming a key factor in the reform process since the entry into office of the Nazif 
cabinet. Endogenous agency is for example visible in the launch of the National 
Supplier Development Programme (NSDP) by the industry minister in October 2005 
(EIU 2005c: 30). The programme aimed at modernising Egyptian industry by 
providing funding and technical assistance to SMEs supplying large companies in 
all sectors.142 
This change of the tide is better witnessed by what happened with respect to 
the management and privatisation of state-owned assets. Under the direction of 
Mahmoud Mohieldin, the Asset Management Programme (AMP) repeatedly 
received the praise of the World Bank, as witnessed by the yearly Doing Business 
Report (see Section 3.3.2 on this). According to Mohieldin himself, the reform agenda 
of the Nazif government ‘was ahead of what was expected by the IMF and the 
World Bank’, and the success of the Egyptian government in getting the support of 
IFIs was in his opinion related to the fact that ‘when you have your own agenda, 
                                                 
142 The government contacted large companies (thirty-seven contacted before the launch of 
the programme, about one hundred during the unfolding of the process), which would then 
extend the project to their smaller suppliers. It is not difficult to see how this might serve 
more the purpose of strengthening the alliance between regime and largest companies rather 
than actually improving the efficiency of small and medium suppliers. 
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you can always get people behind you’.143 Again, the degree of autonomous 
national agency is visible already in September 2004 when Mohieldin said that ‘the 
“strategic” designation previously applied to certain industrial sectors – such as 
pharmaceuticals, flour milling and tobacco – would no longer apply’ (EIU 2004: 23). 
By mid-2005, significant state-owned shares in companies such as Eastern Tobacco, 
monopolist in the sector, and Sidi Krir Petrochemicals were divested through the 
stock exchange, whereas the Egyptian Fertilisers Company (46 per cent controlled 
by the state) was sold to a local consortium for almost LE2 billion (EIU 2005b: 26-7). 
Only the impact of the worldwide recession put a halt to the privatisation 
programme. 
Thus, compared to agriculture, reforms in the manufacturing sector show a 
remarkable degree of variation on both the dimensions considered. On the one 
hand, whereas trade liberalisation measures were undertaken without much 
controversy, public sector reform and privatisation encountered the resistance and 
non-cooperation of the Egyptian government until 1996, before a phase of 
enthusiastic compliance followed by stasis and then again by cooperation from 2004 
on. On the other hand, the first wave of economic reforms was characterised by a 
strong leadership on the part of international organisations, whereas the second part 
saw an endogenous project emerging from within the ruling party and getting the 
IFI’s support. 
 
5.2.3. Finance: the politics of policy turnarounds 
Financial sector reforms are better analysed when split into three different phases, 
largely overlapping with those identified in industry, with the only substantial 
difference being that here the second wave of reforms, spurred by Egyptian forces, 
starts one year earlier (in 2003), with new Central Banking Law and the 
appointment of Farouk El-Okdah as CBE governor. Whereas the range of policies 
entailed by financial sector reforms is indeed impressive, and some attention is 
devoted to general developments, the focus here is on two specific aspects: 
exchange rate management, fundamental for the smooth operation of monetary 
relations; and ownership structure of the banking sector, usually considered a key 
variable with respect to credit creation and allocation (La Porta et al. 2002). 
                                                 
143 Interview with Mahmoud Mohieldin, then minister of investment, Cairo, 10 July 2010. 
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In the first phase, some reforms were adopted even before the signing of 
ERSAP. Starting in January 1991, the Egyptian government gave in to increasing 
pressures from IFIs and international donors with respect to opening up the 
financial sector, with the approval of a range of measures ranging from the 
introduction of a treasury bill system to the liberalisation of interest rates, from the 
removal of credit ceilings to the substantial lowering of reserve requirements for 
banks (Ikram 2006: 182-3).  
With respect to our two main areas of concern, however, the government did 
not prove particularly receptive to the demands coming from IMF and World Bank. 
Devaluation of the pound was at the top of the IMF wishlist, as export-led growth 
had to be based on a more competitive exchange rate. However, the government 
considered a measure of that kind to be unsustainable for three reasons. Firstly, it 
would have increased substantially the import bill, and particularly the wheat one, 
fundamental for feeding lower-class Egyptians and keep them away from the 
streets. Secondly, devaluation would have reduced the incentives for Egyptian 
workers abroad to send their remittances.144 Lastly, a lower value of the pound 
would have pushed Egyptians to look for a safe haven in the US dollar, thus further 
exacerbating the dollarisation of the economy. Thus, in this phase the only success 
of ERSAP was the unification of the exchange rate at the level of the most devalued 
rate. The deadlock on the issue of devaluation proved so tough to break that by 1995 
the IMF dropped the call for devaluing the pound (EIU 1996: 18). 
International organisations were even less successful in convincing the 
government to privatise public sector banks. In January 1993, under the threat of the 
World Bank withdrawing the second tranche of its loan, the government committed 
to estimate the value of several joint venture banks, with the prospect of divesting 
state-owned shares (IMF 1993a). In September of the same year, when the three-year 
Extended Fund Facility was approved, the IMF included among its conditions the 
privatisation of joint-venture banks and one public bank (IMF 1993b: 313). Under 
the pressure of debt cancellation to be decided in mid-July 1994, the government 
partially complied with these demands, selling its shares in eleven joint-venture 
banks, but without touching the ‘big four’ public banks (Momani 2005: 55). The 
                                                 
144 In this respect, Mubarak and the minister in closer contact with the IMF used repeatedly 
the argument that remittances constituted a greater source of foreign exchange earnings than 
exports (EIU 1994). 
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privatisation of a public sector bank was also a condition of the 1996 Stand-by 
Arrangement, but the government did not comply with it. 
 The phase of political struggle within the NDP, and more broadly within the 
regime, had a twin relevance for the financial sector. On the one hand, the financial 
sector policies of the Ebeid cabinet were at the very heart of the critique developed 
by Mahmoud Mohieldin, firstly as researcher at ECES and then as co-chairman of 
the NDP Economic Committee (Mohieldin and Nasr 2003a and 2003b; FEMISE 2004: 
43-83). On the other hand, the ‘reformist’ wing within the NDP had developed over 
time strong ties, both personal and financial, with the most globalised fractions of 
capital (Roll 2010). This obviously meant that international actors, be they IFIs, 
international donors or transnational firms, had considerable stakes in the power 
struggle taking place on the national scale. 
Whereas not much happened on the front of privatisations, it was exactly in 
this phase that the exchange rate system was turned upside down. Formal relations 
between the IMF and Egypt ended in 1998 with the conclusion of the 1996 Stand-By 
Arrangement. Yet, from 2000 on the government proceeded with the liberalisation 
of exchange rates, firstly abandoning the fixed exchange rate towards a managed-
peg and then announcing the flotation of the pound in January 2003 (EIU 2003: 18-
21). The combination of these two measures, and of the several devaluations in 
between, amounted to a depreciation of the pound against the US dollar of about 40 
per cent between January 2000 and June 2003 (OANDA 2011). These measures also 
led to a very uncharacteristic statement of support on the part of the IMF (2003). 
The new Central Banking Law and the aggressive programme of divestiture of 
state-owned shares in joint-venture banks signal a sea change also with respect to 
state ownership of the banking sector. By December 2005, twelve out of seventeen 
joint-venture banks were fully privatised, 80 per cent of Bank of Alexandria was 
sold to a foreign investor, and Bank Misr and Banque du Caire were merged 
(Mohieldin and Nasr 2007: 719). The privatisation of the resulting Banque Misr was 
postponed indefinitely due to adverse market conditions in the wake of the 2007-08 
financial crisis. Despite this protracted break, further extended by the popular 
protests leading to the fall of Mubarak in early 2011, the change in the approach 
with respect to the overall financial sector is still apparent. 
The most important aspect of this phase is arguably the change in the position 
of international organisations. With the exception of the yearly Article IV 
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consultations, the IMF had disappeared from the Egyptian scene, with the World 
Bank and to a lesser extent the EU being the most relevant international institutions 
in the financial sector. Contrary to what happened in the 1990s, both these 
institutions had a much lower profile: they became supporters rather than leaders in 
the reform process. This was exemplified by the strong emphasis on policy 
ownership by the World Bank documents supporting the issuing of three successive 
Financial Sector Development Policy Loans totalling $1.5 billion between 2006 and 
2010 (World Bank 2006, 2008a and 2010b). 
With respect to financial sector reforms, an implicit division of labour was 
established, with the World Bank focusing on the macro-aspects of reforms, such as 
the consolidation of the banking sector, the divestiture of state-owned shares in 
joint-venture banks and the privatisation of state-owned banks, and the EU ‘doing 
what it does best’: creating institutional and regulatory capacities.145 More 
specifically, this meant supporting the CBE towards being in a position of 
implementing Basel II regulation by 2011. In this direction, the EU financed two 
projects, carried out by the European Central Bank, and within it by the central 
banks of seven EU member states.146 The first project, running from 2006 to 2008, 
focused almost exclusively on capacity-building missions. The second project (2009-
11) supported the CBE in developing the appropriate tools, and particularly an 
effective regulatory framework, to ensure the compliance of the Egyptian banking 
sector with Basel II regulations (ECB 2008). Thus, the EU was mostly active in terms 
of technical assistance and support, but the goals for the Egyptian banking sector – 
i.e.: Basel II compliance – were set by the CBE jointly with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Investment. 
Overall, it appears that relations between international and national 
institutions on financial sector reforms changed significantly between 1991 and 
2010, with different tempos depending on the issue at hand but with two 
underlying tendencies. On the one hand, a marked improvement can be noticed in 
the quality of relations between international organisations and donors and their 
Egyptian counterparts. Even on the two most sensitive issues of exchange rate 
management and state ownership in the banking sector, a phase of confrontation 
                                                 
145 Interview with Sahar Nasr, senior financial economist for the World Bank in the Middle 
East and North Africa, Cairo, 20 June 2010. 
146 Namely: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Romania. 
Interview with Hervé Leclerc, ECB Resident Programme Coordinator, Cairo, 23 June 2010. 
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and reluctance to cooperate was replaced firstly by compliance and then, always 
after fierce political battles on the national scale, by unfettered enthusiasm. On the 
other hand, as reforms unfolded, the role of the actors involved changed 
dramatically, with international institutions changing their position from leaders 
and devisers of reforms to supporters of an economic project arising from within 
Egypt. Conversely, national actors, and particularly the Ministry of Investment and 
the CBE, gained a substantial degree of autonomy, becoming themselves leaders of 
the second wave of reforms in the country. 
 
5.3. Global capital, national state and class structure: comparing theories 
In order to show the state-driven character of neoliberalisation in Egypt, the 
previous section focused on institutional relations. On each of the two dimensions 
discussed, a broad shift took place in the period considered. Firstly, with respect to 
the type of relations, institutions at the national and at the international scale 
gradually smoothed their divergences out, with an increase in the quality of their 
relations, away from confrontational stances and towards a more cooperative 
approach. Secondly, with respect to the leadership in the reform process, a shift was 
identified from international institutions to national ones, with the latter gaining 
more autonomy particularly during the Nazif government. 
In the awareness of the limitations of this approach, but at the same time in the 
hope of still being accurate enough, institutional relations are taken in this section as 
a reliable proxy for relations between different spatial scales. Referring to the three 
approaches discussed in Section 2.3, the aim here it to assess their validity in the 
light of the empirical material presented in the previous section. In particular, the 
added value of the approach developed in this work is identified in the ability to 
account both for the early relevance of ‘the international’ in altering the conditions 
for successful capital accumulation on the national scale and for the increasing 
importance of political agency in defining the details of Egyptian reforms on the 
national scale, considered as nodal and thus as the scale where the peculiarities of 
the Egyptian way to neoliberalism are effectively designed. 
 
5.3.1. The transnational state case: state as transmission belt of global capital? 
This first hypothesis is discussed here referring to the three related forms in which it 
has been developed in critical IPE. Firstly, accounts inspired by Cox and thus 
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discussing the power of US hegemony in diffusing neoliberal policies in the rest of 
the world. Secondly, the agency-focused account provided by the Amsterdam 
School, referring to the emergence of a transnational capitalist class increasingly 
integrated beyond the national scale. Lastly, the thesis of the ‘transnational state’ 
proper and of the emergence of global capitalism developed by William Robinson 
(2004: 85-144). Whereas these approaches may differ with respect to which actors 
engendered neoliberal globalisation and which ones benefit the most from it, they 
all share the point that this process has substantially weakened the power of states 
to resist the imperatives of global capital accumulation. Indeed, Robinson compares 
explicitly the state to a filtering device at best (2004: 109), and to a transmission belt 
of the transnational elite project at worst (2003: 62). 
Their interpretation of what happened in Egypt would go along these lines. 
The rise of the transnational capitalist class led to the diffusion of neoliberal policies 
across the globe since the 1980s. Some areas, and the Middle East most notably, 
were more resilient to these pressures, but eventually the imperatives of global 
capital accumulation pushed them to adapt, and to give in to the transnational 
project of transforming national economies in order to serve the interests of the most 
transnationalised factions of capital, and most eminently financial. The stops-and-
goes on the part of the Egyptian government are to be seen as attempts at resisting 
pressures that eventually won out, transforming Egypt into one of the outposts of 
neoliberalism in the Middle East. This substantially weakened the economic power 
of the state in favour of local and transnational capitalists. 
The greatest merit of this approach is the ability to point out how the 
international widely conceived altered the conditions of workability for the existing 
regime of capital accumulation in Egypt during the late 1980s. It is undoubted that 
the spread of a different set of policies on the global stage, including most notably 
the liberalisation of capital movements and the withdrawal of the state from the 
economy, had a significant role in worsening the fiscal crisis of the state. In the 
specific Egyptian case, the pressures deriving from these trends were further 
strengthened by its peripheral position in the global political economy. These 
approaches are thus particularly well-suited to explain how the combination of 
uncertainty and vulnerability perceived by Egyptian policy-makers during the early 
1990s had a key role in pushing them to embrace the recipes provided by IMF, 
World Bank and major donors. 
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The transnational state thesis appears validated by the specific reform agenda 
promoted by IFIs and USAID in the wake of the 1987-88 fiscal crisis. In particular, 
the emphasis put on movements towards a floating exchange rate, the liberalisation 
of capital movements and more generally investment-friendly policies are signals of 
the ever-greater clout of financial capital on the global scale, and thus also within 
international organisations (Duménil and Lévy 2004). The claims of the 
transnational state thesis appear to hold also with respect to the end results, as the 
expected and predicted rise in FDI did take place, even though it did so in a 
sustained way only between the past decade (see Figure 5.1), with Mohieldin as 
‘minister of foreign direct investment’, as an official at the EU delegation put it.147  
 






















 Sources: World Bank (2010a) 
 
Whereas the influence of ‘the international’, both in its structural features and its 
agential forms, is well captured by this approach, the transnational state thesis 
struggles when dealing with the other side of the equation. Considering the state as 
a transmission belt is somewhat ungenerous and certainly misleading in the 
Egyptian case. Rather, the empirical section suggests that the state has been a 
                                                 
147 Interview with Felipe de la Mota, official of the EU delegation in Egypt, Cairo, 21 June 
2010. 
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fundamental force in the domestication of neoliberalism, to the point of making the 
neoliberal project an endogenous and genuinely Egyptian one. 
The internalisation of neoliberalism on the national scale on the part of a 
relevant part of the ruling bloc had two main consequences. On the one hand, over 
time the leadership in the design of the reform process shifted over time away from 
the transnational capitalist class and its agents towards a project driven by the most 
outward-oriented faction of Egyptian capital. This is visible in the evidence 
discussed in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 regarding the increasing relevance of large 
entrepreneurs at the core of Egyptian economic policy-making. More specifically, 
the previous section has indicated in which circumstances leadership in the reform 
process moved towards the national scale. In agriculture, this happened when the 
state stepped back in the provision of fertilisers in the 1990s, being able to get the 
issue off the agenda until the Nazif government decided to divest state-owned 
shares in some of these companies. In manufacture, the tide changed with the 
aggressive programme of liberalisation launched by Mohieldin with the support of 
Rashid. In finance, the crucial moment was the unexpected decision to move 
towards a floating exchange rate regime.  
On the other hand, the domestication of neoliberalism also means that the 
reform process, once internalised at the national scale, is subject to significant 
variations to adapt to the social fabric into which it is applied. In the Egyptian case, 
it would probably be more correct to say that the project was adapted to the needs 
and interests of the ruling bloc, and of a particular section of it. These changes were 
visible first of all in the cases of resistance to neoliberal pressures, particularly 
during the first phases of the reform process. The stubbornness of the Egyptian 
government with respect to what were considered key priorities by the Bretton 
Woods twins such as exchange rate flexibility and privatisation of SOEs, and 
particularly banks, is a case in point. Similarly, the role of the national scale can be 
seen in those cases of partial or selective implementation of controversial reforms. 
The fact that these happened because of considerations related to political stability 
does not hamper the fact that this was possible because of the opposition of key 
decision-makers on the national scale. Thus, it would appear that also in this respect 
the definition of the state as a transmission belt is somewhat inadequate. 
In sum, the transnational state thesis gets most of the big picture right. 
Changes on the global scale are indeed fundamental in pushing the Egyptian 
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government to pursue another strategy of capital accumulation. After all, it was the 
starting point of the empirical part of this study to show that the Egyptian economy 
was subject to a process of neoliberalisation over the past two decades. Yet, these 
approaches pay insufficient attention to the resilience of institutions on the national 
scale, with some episodes of successful resistance and partial implementation 
running counter the expectations of neo-Gramscian scholars. At the same time, the 
dominance of the international is questioned also by the very dynamics of the 
second wave of reforms, with the economic troika taking the lead and international 
institutions effectively playing second fiddle to an Egyptian reform project. This 
was characterised by a lower pace than the one originally advocated by IFIs, and 
sometimes also by a different sequencing of specific reforms.148 With respect to its 
content, domesticated neoliberalism in Egypt appeared less interested in 
competition than IFIs would have hoped, and also showed that the regime, and 
within it the rising capitalist elite, is still holding the keys to the economic system, 
either through direct state intervention or more often through the deployment of 
new informal mechanisms of control and exploitation. 
 
5.3.2. The area studies case: global capital fooled? 
While being the main aspect that the transnational state thesis is unable to explain, 
the domestication of neoliberalism is in fact the main focus of the second set of 
approaches, which discuss how in the Middle East key policy-makers on the 
national scale are able to adapt, defuse and sometimes subvert international 
pressures and bend them towards the pursuit of national goals. Extrapolating from 
the main approaches coming from this tradition, what was experienced by Egypt in 
the past two decades would be interpreted in the following way. During the last 
1980s, the fiscal position of the Egyptian state was so dire that help from 
international institutions was no longer avoidable and could only come with strings 
attached. The two pressing concerns of obtaining debt forgiveness and cash in the 
form of loans pushed the Egyptian government to accept some of the conditions set 
by IMF and World Bank. However, controversial measures were either opposed, 
diluted or their implementation postponed indefinitely. Thus, economic reforms 
were carried out only according to what was considered as acceptable and 
sustainable by the ruling bloc. According to this hypothesis, prominent actors on the 
                                                 
148 The management of the exchange rate is probably the best case in this respect. 
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national scale, which in the Egyptian case correspond to the various components of 
the ruling bloc (military, bureaucracy, infitah bourgeoisie), were able to take control 
of the reform process, subjecting international pressures to their project of reforming 
the Egyptian political economy in the direction of the stabilisation of authoritarian 
rule. 
An account of this sort is particularly well-suited to show the divergences 
between the demands of international institutions and donors and what was 
actually implemented by the Egyptian government, particularly during the first 
phase of the reform process. The devaluation of the pound demanded by the IMF 
and repeatedly delayed by the government is a good case in point. On this occasion, 
the decision to ignore this demand and rather focus on the more manageable and 
less threatening target of unifying the exchange rate were dictated by concerns with 
the reactions of lower social classes and Egyptians abroad. Delays in privatisation, 
on the other hand, were more directly related to concerns about the balance of 
power within the regime, with the attempt on the part of the public sector, in both 
its military and bureaucratic components, to derail the privatisation process in order 
to keep the status quo firstly within the ruling bloc and then more broadly within 
Egyptian society. Also the change of course on both aspects of devaluation and 
privatisation can be explained by referring to the changed balance of forces within 
the regime, with the following shift in interests that made these measures not 
threatening anymore for the ruling bloc, and indeed allowing the more outward-
oriented component to push towards a new wave of reforms, with IFIs guadually 
becoming less important. 
Domestication also means the de-radicalisation of the potentially disruptive 
impact of pressures encroaching on the national scale. Most area studies account 
convincingly also for this aspect, showing how some pressures for reform from IFIs 
were effectively adapted, if not subverted, in two ways. On the one hand, as 
demonstrated by the example above on privatisations, the objective was avoiding 
that reforms would endanger regime survival, thus making sure that the measures 
would benefit those already part of the wider ruling bloc. On the other hand, 
domestication might also take another route, with the insertion of genuinely 
Egyptian elements substantially different from the initial proposals and demands of 
IFIs. We have seen this for example in agriculture in the form of renewed state 
intervention with respect to fertiliser provisions. In the manufacturing sector a 
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similar process can be detected in the launch of the NSDP programme discussed 
above and in 2008 in the proposal by Mohieldin, turned into law in June 2010, to 
substitute privatisation with public-private partnerships (PPPs) as the privileged 
form of state-asset management.149 Thus, it would appear that despite strong 
pressures, the national scale and within it the most powerful actors were able to 
keep the overall reform process under check. 
Keeping the reform process under check is very different from preventing 
reforms from happening altogether, and here lies the first significant deficiency of 
this approach. Accounts focusing on the national scale and its ability to manoeuvre 
international actors pay insufficient attention to changed conditions on the global 
scale. In other words, it is undeniable that a domestication of neoliberal policies took 
place, but this does not mean that the policies adopted were not neoliberal anymore. 
After all, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the conditions for capital accumulation, and 
the regime regulating them, changed substantially in the past two decades. The 
direction of their change is indicative of the power of the international scale in 
limiting the range of available choices for the Egyptian regime. This is a 
fundamental aspect to which most area specialists tend to pay insufficient attention.  
Following from this, it is also difficult to explain which factors are leading to 
the shift in power relations between the entrepreneurial and the public sector 
components within the ruling bloc, if not in terms of unintended consequences of 
reforms that were originally adopted to please the IMF and the World Bank. But 
both the increased political activism of businessmen, and their positioning behind 
the rising star of the ruling party, suggest that there was something more than 
unintended consequences, and that the relations of this business class with foreign 
companies might also have played a significant role in their political rise, thus 
marking once more the relevance of changed international conditions in setting the 
conditions for action also on the national scale. At the same time, and rather 
ironically, while explaining the power shift within the ruling bloc in terms of 
unintended consequences, this approach is largely unable to grasp the unintended 
consequences that such power shift produced on regime stability. Thus, the risks 
involved in the empowerment of the emerging capitalist elite for the stability of the 
                                                 
149 An even more controversial proposal by Mohieldin, involving the free distribution of 
amalgamated shares of SOEs to the population (named: ‘popular equities’), was watered 
down by the government itself (EIU 2008: 12-3). 
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implicit pact between public sector and infitah bourgeoisie are somewhat neglected 
by this approach. 
Summing up, accounts based on the specific circumstances characterising the 
Middle Eastern political and economic systems are particularly convincing in 
accounting for the ways in which the national scale is capable of bending 
international forces towards the pursuit of national goals, be they regime stability or 
economic growth. This is an aspect somewhat overlooked by the transnational state 
thesis discussed earlier, and thus provides a welcome improvement. However, by 
focusing so closely on the national or at best regional dimension, most area studies 
tend to lose sight of the underlying transformations experienced by the Egyptian 
political economy in terms of ownership shift away from the state towards the 
private sector and of unprecedented growth of the banking sector, and more 
generally of a shift towards a different regime of capital accumulation, which 
despite certainly having significant national peculiarities still remained neoliberal in 
its substance. 
 
5.3.3. The Gramscian case: international constraints meet national agency 
The approach developed in this work is able to grasp the ‘big picture’ in a similar 
way to the transnational state thesis does, and at the same time it takes into account 
also the details at the heart of area accounts of the political economy of reforms in 
Egypt. It also points towards the main mechanism driving the modification in 
interscalar relations, away from the domination of international institutions towards 
a specifically Egyptian reform path. In a nutshell, this approaches argues that shifts 
in relations of class forces produced by the move towards a neoliberal regime of 
capital accumulation opened up the space for a political battle between the two 
main components of the ruling bloc, with the end result of eventually further 
empowering the private capital oligarchy also vis-à-vis international institutions and 
donors. 
Since the 1980s, and ever more so since the signing of ERSAP, the international 
scale dictated the parameters within which capital accumulation in Egypt could take 
place. Even though the empirical section above mostly focused on the international 
in the form of specific agents, it ought to be reminded that there were also structural 
elements at play, such as the ever greater integration of markets particularly in the 
developed core and the increased role of finance in the overall economy, which had 
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made ‘developmentalist’ economic policies much more difficult to sustain (Kim 
1999). Thus, in this phase the dominating influence of the international was visible 
in the first place in the increasing malfunctioning of the étatist regime of capital 
accumulation had become dysfunctional, and then in the pressures leading national 
policy-makers to adopt policies inspired by the Washington Consensus. 
During this period, the most important actors on the national scale could at 
best resist specific measures whose impact might have been detrimental to regime 
stability. For example, resistance to privatisation until the mid-1990s was eminently 
based on considerations of intra-regime stability, and specifically on the fear that the 
state might on the one hand lose power by forsaking direct economic production, 
and on the other hand it might jeopardise the intra-regime balance between the 
dominating public sector and the dependent infitah bourgeoisie. The other main 
example of resistance discussed, with respect to the devaluation of the pound, was 
on the other hand related to the potential impact on Egyptian society at large, in 
terms of more expensive bread, less remittances and increased dollarisation of the 
economy, which could have also constituted a threat to regime stability. 
Despite the relevance of these disagreements on which the government had 
the upper hand, during this phase we saw an incipient shift not only in the regime 
of capital accumulation, but also in the wider class structure. This took the form of a 
substantial empowerment of private-sector capital owners, and more specifically of 
the heirs of infitah bourgeoisie, which led in turns to an ever greater integration of 
commercial, industrial and financial capital. Conversely, these years produced a 
relative weakening of other social groups both within the ruling bloc and outside of 
it. On the one hand, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises after 1995 
diminished the clout of the public sector on economic production, and more 
generally on job provision and thus on the ability to create effective patron-client 
relations. On the other hand, various forms of dispossession in the countryside and 
in industrial plants also worsened the position of working class and peasantry. 
Winners and losers of reforms in the ruling bloc were effectively the two NDP 
factions fighting for supremacy within the regime. The composition of the two 
factions, while often discussed in generational terms (Collombier 2006: 8-10), could 
alternatively be traced in class terms. On the one hand, in the ‘reformist’ camp 
around Gamal Mubarak we see the presence of large entrepreneurs, from the 
already mentioned Ahmed Ezz and Rashid Mohammed Rashid to the Bahgat Group 
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(EIU 2005a: 22). On the other hand, the old guard (al-haras al-qadim) was entirely 
composed by long-serving politicians and bureaucrats, such as Kamal al-Shazly and 
Safwat al-Sherif, supported by the highest echelons of the army, and particularly the 
minister of defence Hussein Tantawi. It is thus not surprising that the former group 
advocated further retrenchment of the state and more aggressive moves towards 
liberalisation both in trade and finance, whereas the latter supported a roll-back of 
reforms towards a stronger presence of the public sector in the economy. 
While influenced by the demands and preferences of major actors on the 
international scale, the political battle at the heart of the regime did not have a 
predetermined outcome. The reforms pushed by IFIs, USAID and other donors 
certainly strengthened the position of the ‘reformist’ wing. In this respect, the first 
phase of reforms emancipated what had been the ‘junior partners’ of the public 
sector from their inferiority, putting them in a position to compete for leadership in 
government and by extension in the regime.  
This very battle suggests that the national scale certainly has a role that goes 
beyond that of a transmission belt. While the rise of the ‘reformist’ component was 
at least partly dependent on the international, its triumph produced the further 
empowerment of the national scale. More specifically, the economic and political 
rise of the financial fraction of capital, albeit not as clear-cut as in most OECD 
economies, led to a relative alignment of the Egyptian class structure to the 
prevailing one on the international scale. The most significant elements of this 
alignment were the weakened position of industrial workers, peasants and workers 
in the informal economy, as much as in the relative decline experienced by the 
public sector, particularly in its bureaucratic component. The spectacular rise of a 
small minority of private capital owners is also in line with what happened in the 
rest of neoliberalised economies. This alignment is however bound to remain 
relative, in that there is always a discrepancy in outcomes when the same policies 
are applied in different places and at different times. In the Egyptian case, the most 
significant peculiarity was the fusion of the various forms of capital into the hands 
of very few entrepreneurs, significantly different from the disproportionate 
empowerment of the financial fraction of capital seen elsewhere. 
Following from this relative alignment, the broad framework informing the 
policies of international institutions and donors could now be pursued from within 
the country. This shift in the balance of class forces on the national scale is also 
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linked to the two forms of domestication of neoliberalism discussed above. On the 
one hand, the outward-oriented component within the regime developed its own 
project of neoliberal reform, which leads the IMF, the World Bank and the EU to 
take on a lower profile. On the other hand, ‘reformers’ were able to pursue the final 
goal of ‘a free market economy’ by mixing up the implementation of recipes 
suggested in the previous decade with more heterodox policies, such as continuing 
state intervention in agriculture, the launch of state-funded industrial 
modernisation and the move towards PPPs with respect to the management of state 
assets. 
In the attempt to keep together the constraints set up by the international with 
the room for choice left for agency on the national scale, while at the same time 
preserving its sensitivity to shifts in class relations, the articulation approach 
developed in this thesis accounts both for changes in the ‘big picture’ and for the 
relative autonomy of local action. The diffusion of neoliberalism on the global scale 
worsened the fiscal crisis of the state in Egypt. This pushed the regime towards 
following a path that would not only alter the regime of capital accumulation in a 
neoliberal direction, but would also shift the balance of class forces within Egypt. 
Financial capital took centre-stage, becoming the cement linking together also the 
various form of capital, now increasingly in the hands of a small number of 
entrepreneurs very close to the regime. This shift provided the conditions for a 
second wave of reforms, this time driven by this very component of the ruling bloc, 
being able to follow the guidelines provided by IFIs during the 1990s while at the 
same time ‘Egyptianising’ neoliberalism in significant respects. 
 
5.4. Articulation II: U&CD, spatial scales and passive revolution 
The evolving relation between national and international scale constitutes the 
second instance of the relation between structure and superstructure on which 
hegemony is constituted, reproduced and transformed. Also in this case there is a 
determination in the first instance, on the part of the international, constraining the 
perimeter for potential courses of actions on the national scale. At the same time, the 
national scale has its own relative autonomy, evident in a weaker sense in the 
possibility of pursuing a specific course among those provided, and in stronger 
sense in the ability to reshape some of the initial constraints set up by the 
international. 
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As originally discussed by Trotsky and now revived by Rosenberg, the spread 
of capitalism on the global scale across highly uneven societies does not lead to an 
overall equalisation of profit rates, but rather to the combination within the newly 
affected societies of new elements inherent to capitalist development with elements 
typical of the pre-existing socio-economic formation. This combination further 
exacerbates rather than ameliorates the unevenness of development, and even more 
so in peripheral countries. In the case of Egypt, for example, ‘whip of external 
necessity’ and forms of ideological and material influence are fundamental in 
accounting for the shift from an étatist towards a neoliberal accumulation regime. At 
the same time, as we have seen, geopolitical and geoeconomic pressures combined 
to alter the class structure on the national scale, and this in and of itself prevents a 
copycat approach, transposing the accumulation regime prevalent on the 
international scale into Egypt. Following from this, also the impact on the social 
structure could only take the form of a partial, relative, alignment with prevailing 
social structures on the international scale. 
What is relatively undisputed is that under conditions of neoliberal 
globalisation the room to manoeuvre on the national scale narrows down 
significantly. This reduction is different from the cancellation of the autonomy of the 
national scale. Despite the urgency of the ‘whip of external necessity’, there is never 
a predetermined course of action with respect to how a lower spatial scale – the 
national in our case – will react to the pressures of the international. In the Egyptian 
case, this autonomy manifested itself in two main forms. In a weaker sense, it 
affected the ‘when’ of policy change. For example, with respect to timing and 
sequencing, the delays and selective implementations on exchange rate devaluation 
and privatisation of state-owned banks impacted significantly on the development 
of the Egyptian financial sector, by both allowing the ruling bloc to prepare for the 
change to come and on a more systemic level further reproducing unevenness in 
time. The autonomy of the national scale was also exerted in a stronger sense, as 
visible in the strategies employed by the government to cope with external 
pressures, ranging from dilution in time to the insertion in the reform programme of 
elements apparently in contradiction with the neoliberal template. 
In the Egyptian case, actions on the part of the regime fall squarely within the 
category of passive revolution as reinvented by Gramsci, and recently revived in 
critical IPE (Morton 2007a). Within an already existing political framework 
 185 
revolving around the territorial state, the imperative of capital accumulation on a 
global scale cannot circumvent the mediation of pre-existing political structures. 
When the development of the very social structure is heavily influenced by the 
presence of an overpowering public sector, as in Egypt, it is not surprising that the 
state itself becomes a key agent of socio-economic change. As no other social class 
was on its own in a position to drive the process of restructuring of social relations 
of production along neoliberal lines, this socio-economic change was effected mostly 
through state instruments. As Mandel famously put it, in these circumstances the 
state acts as ‘the midwife of modern capitalism’ (1975: 54). Within this state-
dominated framework on the national scale, the diffusion of material – i.e.: capital, 
goods and services – and ideational – i.e.: policies and ideologies – trends is thus 
necessarily fragmented, with the differential insertion of different societies within 
the global circuit of capital accumulation happening through gradual adaptation 
mostly implemented at the state level, even though a distinctive class dimension is 
retained. At the same time, the advancement of this process of economic 
restructuring is accompanied with the restoration of asymmetrical relations between 
different social classes in the political sphere, and thus with the reconfiguration of 
political relations under redefined yet undeniably authoritarian conditions. 
Neoliberalisation of the Egyptian economy taking place via passive revolution 
also has significant implications for the way we think of hegemony. In Chapter 1 I 
have suggested that hegemony in the Gramscian sense necessarily arises out of 
state-civil society relations. Considering the lack of a supranational state and at best 
the embryonic state of global civil society, hegemony is thus best conceived as 
originating on the national scale. In Chapter 2, I discussed how passive revolution is 
always linked to the crisis of an accumulation strategy on the national scale, 
requiring an adaptation to a new accumulation regime prevalent on the 
international scale. The failure of an accumulation strategy usually means that the 
existing hegemonic project on the national scale has become ineffective. Indeed, it 
proves the failure of hegemony on the national scale, as the ruling bloc abdicates to 
the attempt of achieving ‘integral hegemony’ in its relations with the ruled, and 






Through the interaction between international and national institutions, this chapter 
has identified three main trends characterising relations between international and 
national scale in the unfolding of reforms in Egypt. In the first place, these relations 
grew increasingly more cooperative over time, after a first period where resistance 
and repeated delays were the favoured strategy of the government, particularly 
with respect to what were considered more sensitive issues, such as exchange rate 
devaluation and privatisations. The second trend sees the national scale becoming 
gradually more important over time, so much so that the reforms implemented 
since 2003 were remarkably free of international pressures, and rather originated on 
the national scale, and more specifically within the component of the ruling bloc 
most closely tied to financial capital. Lastly, the interaction of the two trends above 
produced a differentiation of the form of neoliberalism as developed in Egypt 
compared to the template promoted by IFIs and international donors during the 
1990s. More specifically, neoliberalism in Egypt privileges the dimension of 
dispossession over that of competition and efficiency, even though this meant 
resorting to heterodox policies in sectors as different as fertiliser provision, 
industrial modernisation and management of state assets. 
Existing accounts of these developments tend either to privilege the 
imperatives of global capital accumulation or to grant a disproportionate power to 
the national scale in reshaping to its own advantage pressures originating from the 
international. In the former case, this leads to a flattening of the political space, with 
states simply internalising and reproducing on the national scale the material and 
ideational trends typical of neoliberal globalisation. In the latter case, it is the ability 
of the international to fundamentally alter the conditions for socio-economic 
sustainability to be seriously underestimated. 
It is my contention here that a Gramscian approach sensitive to evolutions in 
class relations is able to account both for the determination in the first instance on 
the part of the international and for the relative autonomy of the national scale. The 
affirmation of neoliberal globalisation with its material and ideational trends 
redefines the boundaries within which purposeful political action on the national 
scale can take place. However, the latter still enjoys relative autonomy both in terms 
of choosing a course of action rather than another among those available, and to 
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some extent in reshaping the boundaries set up by the international structure, 
leading to various forms of domestication of neoliberalism. 
According to this account, interscalar articulation of external pressures takes 
the form of passive revolution of capital effected by state means. More specifically, 
the socio-economic crisis of the 1980s was used by the infitah bourgeoisie within the 
ruling bloc to reshape the accumulation regime in a neoliberal direction, producing 
on the one hand their empowerment vis-à-vis the military and bureaucratic 
component of the ruling bloc and on the other hand the further weakening of those 
social groups already excluded from the ruling bloc. In sum, the neoliberal 
economic revolution could take hold, albeit with distinctly Egyptian features, while 










The third main area of contribution of a Gramscian approach to understanding the 
political economy of reforms in developing countries refers to the conceptualisation 
of the interaction between material forces and ideas, and the way they relate to class 
relations. The focus on shifts in class relations is nuanced by a third form of 
articulation, which sees ideas as relatively autonomous from material factors. In this 
way, it is possible to develop an account able to eschew both instrumentalist 
explanations that see ideas as merely functional to a specific economic and political 
project and ideational accounts suggesting that ideas are the main driving force of a 
given reform project, with no relation to their social substratum and to the ways this 
feeds back on ideas themselves. 
The evaluation of this argument with reference to the Egyptian case is 
complicated by two peculiarities whose implications point in very different 
directions with respect to the articulation of material and ideational factors. On the 
one hand, as rightly suggested by Babb (2001: 16-21), within an increasingly 
integrated global economy based on freedom of movement for capital and goods, 
developing countries are caught in a dilemma by which the more they open up their 
markets, the more they become resource-dependent. In turn, the growing 
importance of foreign capital also increases the sensitivity of national policy-makers 
to the demands of foreign companies and governments. As a consequence, resource 
dependence often translates into knowledge dependence, with policy-makers and 
academics being pushed to follow the wisdom of the day in the more powerful 
countries. 
On the other hand, Egypt came from a history of strong rhetoric against the 
United States and the West under Nasser. Under Sadat, the étatist framework for 
economic policy was not altered significantly by infitah. The sedimentation of these 
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ideational aspects could not be wiped off overnight. As we have seen in Chapter 2, 
the transformation of ‘common sense’ as intended by Gramsci is always a 
molecular, and thus gradual, process. This argument would seem to suggest a form 
of path-dependence with respect to the economic policy paradigm, which – while 
not necessarily opposed to the correlation between resource and knowledge 
dependence – certainly acts as a countervailing force in the Egyptian case. 
This chapter aims to weigh the relative importance of these two trends. In 
doing so, it proceeds as follows. The first section abandons the threefold structure 
employed in the previous two empirical chapters to focus firstly on the emergence 
of think tanks in Egypt as organic intellectuals clarifying and organising the key 
ideas at the heart of the reform project, and then discusses whether and when a 
paradigm change took place with respect to economic policy in agriculture, industry 
and particularly finance. The second section compares the findings emerging from 
the empirical section firstly with materialist and ideational approaches extrapolated 
from the critical IPE literature, before suggesting that a Gramscian approach 
sensitive to changes in class relations highlights in a clearer way the interaction 
between material and ideational factors in the Egyptian reform process. Lastly, the 
third section discusses the third form of articulation, interpreted as a determination 
on the first instance on the part of materiality that leaves ideas and ideologies 
substantial relative autonomy.  
 
6.2. Instrumentality, organic intellectuals and ideology: empirical study 
Because of the holistic character of policy paradigms, which by their very nature 
tend to encompass the whole policy field to which they refer, the sectoral focus of 
the two previous empirical chapters will simply not do here. Instead, this section 
discusses the timing and forms in which two typically neoliberal norms on 
economic policy – namely: private sector inherently more efficient than public 
sector, and capital account liberalisation as desirable – have been internalised in the 
circles involved in Egyptian economic policy-making. If these two norms have 
become ‘taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole’ (Hall 1993: 279), 
what we may see emerging in economic policy-making might amount to a new 
ideology, superseding the previous étatist paradigm while at the same time 
absorbing some of its elements. 
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This focus on the forms of policy change is complemented, and indeed 
anticipated by, the study of organic intellectuals, that is: those agents undertaking 
‘[t]he task of clarification and organisation, through which ideas become a material 
force’ (Bruff 2009: 49). In the Egyptian case, two economic think tanks – the 
Economic Research Forum (ERF) and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies 
(ECES) – are taken as the most important organic intellectuals in the past two 
decades, with the aim of instilling a ‘reformist’ view within the national debates on 
economic policy, which – despite infitah – by the end of the 1980s still revolved 
around the idea of the state as the central actor in the economy.  
Thus, the first part of this section discusses how and when these two think 
tanks were established, their relations with the business community, the NDP and 
the regime, and the content of their knowledge production, mostly in the form of 
working papers. The second part then focuses on the two key norms of 
neoliberalism mentioned above and attempts to establish whether their 
internalisation led to a change in the policy paradigm and eventually in the 
‘common sense’ with respect to how the Egyptian economy should be run. 
 
6.2.1. Organic intellectuals: manufacturing consent for neoliberalism? 
As seen in the previous chapter, the participation of Egyptian actors to the design of 
policies during the first years of structural adjustment was rather limited. Instead, 
the pattern resembled more a situation where the government would either accept, 
delay or reject to implement measures whose content was decided elsewhere. 
Beyond the individual inclinations of some members of the executive, this limited 
participation suggests that in this first phase it was merely the need to comply to 
drive Egyptian economic policies. With respect to the wider public sphere, in fact, 
free market ideas did not have much currency. Rather, the main public intellectuals 
tended to combine views largely derived from economic nationalism,150 either in the 
ISI form pursued by Nasser or in the export-oriented form driving the Asian 
tigers.151 In this respect, the economic policy debate in Egypt was not significantly 
                                                 
150 As I mentioned in Chapter 3, economic nationalism had an established tradition in Egypt 
well before the coup (EzzelArab 2002). 
151 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, founder of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies and one 
of the most prominent Egyptian intellectuals, and Gouda Abdel-Khalek, economist at Cairo 
University, leaned closer to the first position; Galal Amin, professor of economics at the 
American University in Cairo (AUC) and the most brilliant populariser with respect to 
economic issues in the country, was arguably the strongest advocate of the Asian model. 
 191 
different from what could be seen in other developing countries with an étatist 
tradition, such as Mexico, before the rise of the ‘money doctors’ (Babb 2005). 
The two most important economic think tanks – ERF and ECES – were created 
respectively in the early 1990s. The former was from its very inception a region-
wide research centre, covering the whole Arab world, Iran and Turkey. Most of its 
donors were, and still are, foreign foundations and institutions, including the Ford 
Foundation, which contributed $1 million to the endowment fund, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the EU-funded 
FEMISE (Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques), and the Arab 
Fund for Economics and Social Development.152 Broader geographical focus and 
international sponsorship were key in removing ERF from the local economic policy 
debate, thus reducing the influence of the various components of the regime. This 
also had two further consequences. Firstly, most of the academic production was 
not immediately policy-relevant, from the working paper series to the recently 
launched semestral publication, Middle East Development Journal. Secondly, the 
heavy reliance on external funds translated into a tendency to employ economic and 
especially developmental models prevalent on the international scale, thus relying 
heavily on the principles of the Washington and post-Washington Consensus. The 
analysis of the theoretical foundations of the ERF working papers series in Figure 
6.1 shows the ever increasing relevance of neoclassical economics, in its combination 
of neoclassical theoretical models and econometric models trying to design the 
correct ‘experimental’ apparatus to correlate theoretical principles with empirical 
data (Maki 2011: 1-5). 
The establishment of ECES has a very different story. It was set up in 1992 
exactly with the aim of being policy-relevant by the various components of the 
Egyptian business community, including several prominent members of the infitah 
bourgeoisie.153 It is thus not a surprise that ECES became in the late 1990s and early 
                                                                                                                                          
Interviews with Gouda Abdel-Khalek, professor of economics at Cairo University, Cairo, 27 
March 2010, , and Galal Amin, professor of economics at the American University in Cairo, 
Cairo, 29 March 2010. 
152 For a list of the main ERF sponsors today, see: 
http://www.erf.org.eg/cms.php?id=about_erf_partners_donors.  
153 All the main sectors of the economy were represented in the ECES board, from food 
processing (Rashid Mohammed Rashid and Shafiq Boghdady) to textiles (Mohammed 
Khamis and Galal Zorba), from electronics (Ahmed Bahgat) to the car industry and steel 
production (Mohammed Mansour and Ahmed Ezz), from banks (Adel El Labban for the 
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2000s the centre where the policy platform of the ‘reformist’ wing of the ruling bloc 
was elaborated, under the theoretical leadership of Mahmoud Mohieldin, then 
senior economist at ECES and advisor of Boutros Ghali at the Ministry of Economy, 
and the political leadership of Gamal Mubarak, himself a member of the board.154 
By 2004, Mahmoud Mohieldin and Rashid Mohammed Rashid were both ministers, 
Gamal Mubarak was head of the NDP Policies Secretariat and Ahmed Ezz of the 
Budgetary and Monetary Commission of the party. Thus, looking at ECES means 
analysing the heart of the main organisation of the NDP faction that emerged 
victorious from the political struggle in the party. Figure 6.1, shows that the ECES 
working papers series also relies heavily on neoclassical and new classical 
assumptions. 
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Thus, what can be seen in the work of the two think tanks is a division of labour 
within the same economic outlook. On the one hand, ERF mostly focused on the 
                                                                                                                                          
Commercial International Bank) to local representative of consultancy giants such as 
Mackenzie and KPMG. 
154 Frederik Richter epitomised the role of ECES in the clearest possible way, saying that its 
main task was ‘to formalise the NDP’s economic policies and to feed private sector 
promotion with macro-economic expertise based on an IMF and World Bank oriented 
thinking’ (2006). 
155 ECES working papers published before 1996 and ERF working papers published before 
1999 and between 2005 and 2006 cannot be accessed from their websites. 
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theoretical aspects, and this allowed for the inclusion of perspectives differing from 
the mainstream, particularly with respect to policies against poverty and 
unemployment.156 On the other hand, ECES had the more practical task of 
translating into policies the general principles guiding government’s action, and – 
once policies were adopted – to evaluate their impact. These evaluations can be – 
and usually are – critical with respect to the effectiveness of the measures 
implemented, but very rarely go as far as contesting the fundamental guidelines 
inspiring those policies.157 
The theoretical and more policy-oriented work by ERF and ECES was 
complemented on a more accessible level by Business Monthly, the magazine 
published by the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (AmCham). With its 
‘fact-filled’ articles about the benefits brought about by reforms in terms of 
investment opportunities for the business community at large, this magazine was 
extremely successful in popularising the emerging ideology and in creating an 
‘esprit de corps’ within the Egyptian business community that historically had been 
divided across sectoral and generational lines.158 Indeed, anecdotal experience from 
my fieldwork in Cairo suggests that it is very rare to find an English-speaking 
Egyptian businessman without a copy of Business Monthly in his office.159 
At the same time, this emerging economic wisdom found its way within the 
ruling party. The Eight General Congress of 2002 was the tipping point in this 
respect, not only because Mohieldin and Gamal Mubarak become respectively co-
chairman of the Economic Committee and head of the Policies Secretariat, but most 
importantly because a different political discourse emerged, characterised as ‘new 
thinking’ (fikr al-jadid) centred around ideas such as ‘active centrism’ and ‘market 
reforms’ (Aidi 2009: 168). This constituted the discursive basis and the policy 
platform for the unification of at least two generations of self-styled ‘reformists’.160 
                                                 
156 The works edited of Ragui Assaad on the evolution of the Egyptian labour market are 
probably the best examples of this pluralism (2002 and 2009). 
157 Interview with Galal Amin. 
158 Interviews with Ahmed Kamaly, director of the Egyptian National Contact Point with the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Cairo, 19 April 2010, 
and Mohammed Gamal Moharam, president of AmCham, Cairo, 29 April 2010. 
159 I am using the masculine purposefully here, as with very few exceptions – none of which 
I had the chance to meet during my stay in Cairo – the Egyptian business class is composed 
of men. 
160 The two groups were respectively labelled by Abdel Moneim Said, head columnist of Al 
Ahram Weekly, as ‘the liberals with the past’, including people entering their fifties and led by 
Youssef Boutros Ghali, and ‘the new new guard’, led by Gamal Mubarak and including all 
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To sum up, in the early 1990s the ideational drive towards reforms arrived 
mostly from the outside, and from international organisations particularly, with the 
government mostly reacting to such pressures, either fine-tuning policies, 
implementing them selectively or rejecting them altogether. In the same years, the 
establishment of two major think tanks finally provided local sounding boards for 
ideas that until then had not gained much currency in Egypt. In the following 
decade, neoclassical approaches came to dominate the discipline of economics. This 
inevitably restricted the boundaries within which academic debates about economic 
policy took place, leading to the emergence of a neoliberal common sense within the 
Egyptian economics profession.161 One should not forget that the move from policy 
paradigm to common sense and ideology means bringing back to centre-stage the 
central issue of cui bono, thus asking which social groups benefit the most from the 
emergence of this new ‘conception of the world’, at least as far as economic activity 
is concerned. If these think tanks were successful as organic intellectuals of the 
rising capitalist oligarchy one would expect to see this common sense in the 
profession has also translated into policy change. The task of the next subsection is 
to understand if this was the case. 
 
6.2.2. Paradigm change: instrumentality, belief and cognitive biases 
This subsection focuses especially on the internalisation of two quintessentially 
neoliberal norms on the part of Egyptian economic policy-makers. The first norm 
regards the consideration of the private sector as inherently superior to the public 
sector in terms of welfare maximisation. This consideration stems from the 
neoclassical argument which sees market mechanisms as the key to the achievement 
of optimal outcomes. The second norm is the preference for capital account 
liberalisation, which must be analysed as a normative construction, as ‘it is difficult 
to make a case for capital account liberalisation on a purely evidentiary basis’ 
(Chwieroth 2010: 12). As this second norm applies exclusively to the financial sector, 
the reader will excuse me if the discussion here is somewhat skewed towards this 
sector. After all, financialisation was one of the four processes characterising the 
                                                                                                                                          
the emerging business tycoons as well as Mohieldin and Moneim Said himself as chief 
ideologues (quoted in Collombier 2006: 9, ft. 20). 
161 Whilst there is not a one-to-one correspondence between neoclassical economics and 
neoliberal policies, the assumptions of the former significantly foreclose economic policy 
options, and thus constitute an important precondition for the promotion of neoliberal 
policies. 
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definition of neoliberalisation borrowed from Harvey (2005: 159-65). The 
internalisation of these norms is one of the two aspects of the neoliberal common 
sense at work, the other being the analysis of policy change in the three sectors 
under consideration. In this respect, the focus is on the pieces of legislation with the 
strongest impact on the structure of each sector: Law 96 of 1992 for agriculture, Law 
203 of 1991 for industry and Law 88 of 2003 for finance. 
 
Agriculture. The analysis of Law 96 of 1992 does not help much in understanding 
how the normative preference for the private sector came about. After all, despite 
giving significantly more power to cooperatives, Nasser’s land reform never put 
into question the principle of private ownership of land. Yet, the tenure reform 
witnessed a fundamental shift in productive relations in the countryside which truly 
amounts to a paradigm change (ARE 1992). Law 96 of 1992 aimed at dismantling 
social relations as they had developed in the countryside since the 1952 coup, 
amounting to what some authors called a ‘counter-revolution’ (Bush 2002). By 
effectively giving land back to landlords, the reform redesigned the boundaries 
within which agricultural policies would be defined, excluding a priori alternative 
measures to tackle the issue. As Mitchell put it, ‘[t]he redistribution of agricultural 
land offered a workable and proven means of creating sustainable rural livelihoods. 
[…] But in official studies of the obstacles to Egypt’s further economic development, 
the question of additional land reform was simply never raised’ (2002: 221). 
Despite not directly touching upon the private/public divide, Law 96 of 1992 
provided the setting for the introduction of market relations in the Egyptian 
countryside. Attached to this came the inherent bias in favour of the private sector, 
visible for example in the wide-ranging reforms of input provision, which required 
a withdrawal of public sector provision at controlled prices towards both credit and 
material inputs such as crops and fertilisers being provided by private actors at 
market prices (Bush 1999: 68). This move was inspired by the crowding out thesis, 
by which excessive state intervention was preventing private actors to enter these 
markets. Such an argument was in turn grounded on the belief that the public sector 
cannot act efficiently in this context, thus making its withdrawal necessary. Other 
than being theoretically questionable, this argument was also proved empirically 
incorrect by subsequent developments. The downsizing of PBDAC led to 
substantial credit shortage, whereas private providers of fertiliser created a cartel 
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which brought the prices of their products well above what was sustainable for the 
average Egyptian farmer (Ibid: 68-9). Rather importantly, the reintroduction of state 
provision came back not as a restoration of the previous system, but rather had to be 
qualified in the light of the new paradigm. This happened in two ways. Firstly, the 
return of public suppliers alongside private ones was announced as a temporary 
measure (MEED 1997), thus in fact accepting that this was an unusual state of 
affairs, with further moves towards private provision to come along the way. 
Secondly, the main motivation for this intervention was admittedly extra-economic, 
having to do with increasing social unrest in the countryside and thus with the risk 
of wider political instability. In other words, the dispensation from market 
mechanisms was justified on emergency grounds. 
 
Industry. Moving on to manufacturing, Law 203 of 1991 is arguably the clearest case 
of paradigm shift, and one that has at its very core the relation between public and 
private sector (ARE 1991). Since the 1952 coup, industrial policy had always tried to 
balance developmental and equity concerns, and strong state presence was 
considered essential for this aim. By setting conditions for the privatisation of more 
than three-hundred SOEs, the new law effectively constituted a policy turnaround, 
to the point of being challenged – unsuccessfully – before the Supreme 
Constitutional Court for going against the Constitution, which in Art. 59 mandates 
that ‘safeguarding, consolidating and preserving the socialist gains shall be a 
national duty’ (Hill 2003: 89). 
Spanning both agriculture and industry, another norm not exclusive to 
neoliberalism yet integral to it is trade liberalisation. By the beginning of the 2000s, 
the norm of trade liberalisation had penetrated into the writings of respected 
Egyptian economists in a rather uncritical form. In a 2003 ECES working paper, 
Amal Refaat discussed the reduction of tariff barriers to industrial goods in the 
1994-2002 period without ever questioning the hidden assumption that trade 
liberalisation had been inherently good for the Egyptian economy (2003). Thanks to 
WTO membership, free trade had become the inescapable endpoint with respect to 
commercial relations, and all other measures would have to stem from this 
assumption, effectively reproducing the primacy of exchange over production 
discussed by Abdel-Khalek (2001: 42). Such a primacy was also reproduced in the 
political language, with the ministries of industry and trade being merged into the 
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Ministry of Trade (i.e.: exchange) and Industry (i.e.: production). In the words of 
Galal Amin, this renaming of this ministry was the clearest statement of the policy 
mission inspiring the work of Rashid.162 
Another interesting discursive aspect of paradigm shift was the sidelining of 
the argument that state interventionism might indeed support industrial and 
eventually economic development, strongly supported by the East Asian case. In the 
local policy debate the tension within an economic strategy focused on export-
orientation and at the same time advocating a retreat of the state from industrial 
policy started to be debated particularly among scholars (Amin 2000; Abdel-Khalek 
2001). In 2005, an ECES paper put to rest this argument by suggesting that, albeit 
extremely successful in itself, the East Asian model could not be reproduced 
elsewhere, and even less in the Middle East, because of its cultural specificity, and 
because it increased corruption and produced disincentives to the acquisition of 
skills in the financial sector, and neither of these features was deemed sustainable in 
a world where capital mobility had become the starting assumption (Noland and 
Pack 2005). Intererstingly, the last section of this paper, titled ‘Are there positive 
lessons from the East Asian experience?’, collapsed its policy recommendation into 
a sort of ‘Washington Consensus +’, where ERSAP suggestions were enriched with 
bland considerations on the importance of institutional quality and human 
capital.163 
 
Finance. In the banking sector the inherent preference for private over public sector 
actors, while accepted as an economic argument, encountered fierce resistance 
during most of the 1990s. The most glaring signal in this respect is that Law 203 of 
1991 did not include public sector banks among the companies that had to be 
restructured and eventually privatised. Under strong IMF pressures, the four public 
sectors banks were requested to reduce their shares in joint-venture banks to less 
than 51 per cent in 1994, and then to less than 20 per cent in 1996. Whereas they 
complied entirely with the first demand, the second was almost entirely disregarded 
(Mohieldin and Nasr 2003a: 15-6). 
                                                 
162 Interview with Galal Amin. 
163 More specifically, for Noland and Pack the lessons to be drawn by Middle Eastern 
countries from the East Asian miracle are: the importance of macroeconomic stability, low 
inflation and competitive exchange rates (all aspects of the Washington Consensus), high 
rates of accumulation of both human and fiscal capital, education, microeconomic and 
institutional quality (2005: 18-22). 
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Yet, the argument of state intervention, and even more ownership, in the 
financial sector had become one of the beacons of the ‘reformist’ wing within the 
NDP. Whereas it is difficult to ascertain whether their rise was related to the power 
of their economic ideas or vice versa, there are little doubts about a strong 
correlation between the two. The first page of an ERF working paper by Mohieldin 
and Nasr is arguably the strongest statement of the negative impact of state 
intervention in the banking sector ever seen in the Egyptian political scene. It is 
worth quoting directly from the text to give a sense of its flavour (Ibid: 1): 
 
[P]ublic ownership of banks tends to be associated with financial repression, 
poorly developed banking system, higher interest rate spreads, slower financial 
development, and lower economic growth. Moreover, empirical evidence shows 
that public banks seemed to generate enormous losses that impose a huge 
burden on the economies. Such problems that are inherent in banking system 
dominated by public ownership have led many countries to considering 
privatising their public banks. Experience has also shown that public banks can 
contribute to banking crises by permitting political objectives to distort market 
operations. […] Public banks are more likely to allocate capital to low 
productivity investments. Moreover, public banks tend to have a lower 
incentive to identify problem loans, and to minimise costs. 
 
With such strong opinions on the matter, it should not surprise that with Mohieldin 
as minister of investment and Nasr as supervisor for the World Bank of the financial 
sector reform programme,164 the government managed to divest virtually all the 
public sector shares in joint-venture banks and to privatise the smallest of the four 
public sector banks. 
The bias in favour of capital account liberalisation did not find the same 
resistance, and over the two decades of reforms it penetrated into the Egyptian 
economic think tanks, and then in the relevant ministries and regulatory authorities. 
Pockets of resistance in the research community and in the policy-making world 
were gradually marginalised and excluded from the debate on the direction that the 
                                                 
164 Sahar Nasr was also a NDP member, and has also been part of the economic policy 
committee while Mohieldin co-chaired it. She received a PhD in economics from Cairo 
University, with a thesis on banking sector reform under the supervision of Hanaa Kheir-el-
Din, ECES’s former direction, and Mahmoud Mohieldin, his counterpart in the negotiations 
for financial sector reforms loans (Interview with Sahar Nasr, senior financial economist for 
the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank, Cairo, 20 June 2010). 
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Egyptian financial sector should have taken. A study of the working papers 
published by ERF and ECES between 1994 and 2010 demonstrates this inbuilt bias 
in favour of capital freedom (see Table 6.1). Sixty-three out of seventy-two finance-
related papers, or 87.5 per cent, take for granted, either implicitly or explicitly, the 
assumption that free capital mobility is desirable. Eight of the nine ‘dissident’ 
papers were written either before 1997 (three of them) or in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis (five). Thus, it would seem that in the period between 1997 
and 2008 the Egyptian research community took for granted the desirability of 
capital freedom. 
 
Table 6.1 – Capital mobility and think tank production165 
Year 
ERF ECES Total 
For Against For Against For Against 
1994 2 0 X X 2 0 
1995 1 1 X X 1 1 
1996 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1997 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1998 0 0 4 0 4 0 
1999 1 0 1 0 2 0 
2000 5 0 1 0 6 0 
2001 3 0 4 0 7 0 
2002 3 0 0 0 3 0 
2003 4 0 2 0 6 0 
2004 6 0 0 0 6 0 
2005 X X 2 0 2 0 
2006 X X 0 1 0 1 
2007 2 0 2 0 4 0 
2008 9 2 1 1 10 3 
2009 3 1 1 0 4 1 
2010 3 1 1 0 4 1 
Total 44 6 19 3 63 9 
 
With respect to policy change being characterised as paradigmatic, the best case in 
point is arguably the new central banking law approved in 2003, which entirely 
transformed the goals of the CBE. Law 120 of 1975 regulated the CBE’s role rather 
vaguely by giving it ‘the powers for the management of its affairs and for the 
regulation of monetary, credit and banking policy and the supervision of its 
implementation’ (ARE 1975: Art. 7), then listing the instruments the CBE was 
                                                 
165 All the working papers published by the two think tanks dealing with all aspects of 
finance, from monetary policy to banking regulation to Islamic banking, were analysed 
individually in order to discover how they related to the norm of capital account 
liberalisation. 
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endowed with, but without making any mention of the goals to be pursued. In 
practical terms, monetary policy was effectively at the mercy of the borrowing 
needs of the government. This was altered by Law 88 of 2003, with the CBE finally 
being given a clear goal: price stability.166 This followed an increasingly popular 
trend in the developed world, moving away central banking from Keynesian 
consideration of a trade-off between unemployment levels and inflation as 
exemplified in the Phillips curve, and towards a monetarist approach based on the 
idea that in the long-run market actors adapt their expectations to a higher level of 
inflation, thus leading to cases of both high inflation and high unemployment 
(Campbell 2001: 168-70). 
The EU-supported move towards Basel II implementation is another 
significant case of how the norm of capital freedom has become the hidden 
assumption also with respect to the regulation of the banking sector.167 The Basel II 
framework was designed to cope with regulatory problems in the banking sector of 
developed countries. Griffith Jones identifies five major areas on which the Basel II 
agreement either neglected to take into account the needs of developing countries or 
risked to create further problems in their banking systems (2007: 2-3): neglect of key 
sources of banking vulnerabilities in developing countries, such as currency 
mismatches; overall reduction of credit levels; reinforcement of pro-cyclicality of 
banking lending, with following increase in volatility; disincentives to lend to SMEs; 
competitive advantage for more internationalised banks, which in the case of 
developing countries usually means foreign banks.  
Table 6.2 shows the results of a survey conducted on the members of the Basel 
II task force at CBE on the potential criticalities of the Basel II framework for 
developing countries. Three out of five aspects were considered of little or no 
relevance by the vast majority of CBE officials surveyed, and only the first and the 
last one were considered by the majority as respectively very important and 
                                                 
166 Art. 5 states: ‘The Central Bank shall work on realising price stability and banking system 
soundness, within the context of the general economic policy of the State’ (ARE 2003). 
167 To make it brief: in order to ensure the soundness of the banking system, the Basel 
agreements put capital adequacy standards on the shoulders of banks, through a complex 
system that weighs the risk of different types of capital held by banks. This approach starts 
from the very assumption that capital flows are not regulated, and that once such flows are 
free, it is up to the banks and their regulators to ensure that capital flows do not endanger 
the stability of the banking system. 
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important.168 The last question of the survey attempted to grasp the awareness of 
CBE’s officials of the inbuilt bias in favour of capital account openness 
characterising the Basel II agreement. On this point, only three out of fourteen 
surveyed task force members thought that capital account openness could entail 
significant risks for the Egyptian financial sector.  
 
Table 6.2 – CBE’s task force perceptions on Basel II risks for developing countries 
Issues 
Relevance CBE 
official Not at all Marginal Relative Significant Top 
FX exposure of banks 0 0 3 6 5 Relative 
Reduction of credit levels 1 8 4 1 0 Marginal 
Increased volatility 4 6 2 1 1 Marginal 
Difficult lending to SMEs 3 8 1 2 0 Relative 
Advantage for foreign 
banks 
0 0 4 5 5 Not at all 
Capital account openness 3 5 3 3 0 Marginal 
 
Looking both at overall policy change and the penetration of two specifically 
neoliberal norms, one could see the increasing influence of neoliberalism on the 
Egyptian economic reform process. In agriculture this influence mostly took two 
forms. On the one hand, the shift in property relations, while not being directly 
related to a neoliberal norm, still relied implicitly on the idea that the guarantees 
hitherto provided to small tenants by the state ought to be removed to allow market 
mechanisms to work adequately. This imposition of market relations was 
complemented, on the other hand, by the normative preference for the private 
sector, visible in the attempts to end public sector provision of inputs, and then in 
the need to find extra-economic justifications for the restart of public provision of 
fertilisers and crops. In manufacturing, while enshrined already in Law 203 of 1991, 
the preference for the private sector encountered substantial resistance also within 
the ruling bloc, and this dissent was put to rest only during the second decade of 
                                                 
168 Understandably, the foreign exchange exposure of domestic banks hit a raw nerve, as the 
black currency exchange market, which created so many troubles to the official economy, 
disappeared only during the last decade. As for the relevance of the competitive advantage 
that Basel II might give to foreign banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) permanent 
representative in Cairo maintained that this is probably due to some leftovers of statist 
banking that still do have a weight within CBE. Interview with Hervé Leclerc, ECB 
permanent representative in Cairo, 23 June 2010, Cairo. 
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reforms, as the ‘reformist’ wing became predominant in the political arena. With 
respect to finance, the norm of capital freedom was complied with in terms of 
policies in the very early stages of reforms and the analysis of working papers 
shows how by the end of the 1990s was largely taken for granted by the Egyptian 
research community. On the contrary, the privatisation of public sector banks was 
opposed for the most of the 1990s, and only in the following decade, and 
particularly after 2003, it became a linchpin of Egyptian economic policies. 
If this is the pattern of internalisation of neoliberal norms, how is one to relate 
it with material pressures and constraints? In the case of both agriculture and 
manufacturing one could see how in the first phase neoliberal policies were largely 
imposed from the outside, with material needs on the other hand being the main 
concern of Egyptian policy-makers. These material needs could be internal, as for 
example in the form of compensation for the landed elite dispossessed by Nasser, or 
external, for instance regarding compliance with IFIs conditions in order to achieve 
debt cancellation from Paris Club countries. Yet, in both cases, the imposition of 
neoliberal ideas ended up producing policy models that became more relevant over 
time. Material factors and ideas interacted in a significantly different way within 
finance with respect to capital freedom and bank privatisation. In the former, 
resource dependence, in the form of needing foreign capital, translated into 
accepting prevailing knowledge in capital-rich countries. In the latter, the 1990s 
were characterised by strong resistance largely on material grounds (i.e.: fear to lose 
control over the historically vital banking sector), but the tide changed in the 
following decade, and this despite the fact that material conditions did not seem to 
lead in this direction. Thus, in this case more than others ideational change still begs 
for an explanation. 
 
6.3. Power, ideas and class relations: comparing theories 
In the light of what has been discussed in the previous section, it is now time to 
evaluate the value of existing approaches to explaining the interaction of material 
and ideational factors in critical IPE. A first set of approaches, ranging from the 
Amsterdam School to Robinson and his modified version of world system theory, 
can account convincingly for material constraints and pressures, both national and 
international, and for the way they drive government choices, but tend to 
underestimate the role of ideas beyond the function of legitimising specific material 
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interests and objectives. A second strand in the literature, largely referable to 
constructivist and Coxian approaches, is extremely successful in tracking how 
embracing some ideas, however imposed in a first phase, ends up reshaping 
cognitive boundaries and thus the perception of interests, but also of what are the 
problems and what their potential solutions. Yet, they are much less successful in 
accounting for why certain ideas and not others become prevalent. By contrast, it is 
argued that a Gramscian approach based on articulation can keep in both material 
influences and the relative autonomy of ideas particularly in the second phase of the 
reform process. 
 
6.3.1. The materialist case: the functionality of ideas 
The first set of accounts includes those focusing on the role of the transnational 
capitalist elite as well as core-periphery relations with respect to critical IPE.169 
According to these accounts, the modifications experienced by the Egyptian political 
economy over the past two decades are better understood in relation to a changing 
constellation of material constraints and pressures, both on the international and the 
national scale. It is these constraints and pressures that have pushed Egypt on its 
specific reform path rather than the neoliberal ideas associated with these material 
trends. Whereas the latter are not necessarily seen in strictly instrumental terms, 
they still tend to be considered as functional to the pursuit of a specific project 
originating from material conditions and driven by material goals, be they the ever-
greater integration of Egypt into the capitalist world economy made possible by 
neoliberal globalisation or more simply regime survival under changed class 
relations inside and outside Egypt. 
First of all, it might be helpful to differentiate material factors into constraints 
and pressures. On the one hand, material constraints refer to existing conditions 
which are perceived as structural, and thus unchangeable in the short term, by 
agents on the national scale. In the Egyptian case, the very existence and spread of 
neoliberal globalisation, with its corollary of increased exchange of goods and 
movement of capitals, can be considered as an existing material constraint. On the 
other hand, though often deriving from such constraints, material pressures are 
                                                 
169 Also area studies starting from an assumption of instrumental rationality, such as Kienle 
(2001) and Schlumberger (2004), belong to this category. However, as this study aims to 
contribute primarily to critical IPE, I decided to focus on those approaches only. 
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analytically different as they do not simply prevent some courses of actions, but 
rather push agents on the national scale towards a specific direction among those 
allowed by existing material constraints. The clearest example of this is probably the 
conditionality attached to IMF and World Bank loans, and their direct relation with 
debt rescheduling and forgiveness. 
Materialist accounts are extremely well-suited to identify the existence of these 
constraints and pressures, and to show how they are able to limit political action on 
the national scale. For example, with respect to the financial sector, the insistence on 
the combination of unsustainable debt levels, the need for cash and thus the need 
for foreign capital are crucial to understand capital account liberalisation, and more 
generally a wide range of financial sector policies adopted by developing countries 
in the past two decades. At the same time, these accounts are also successful in 
pointing out how changing class relations produce changes on the ideational level. 
For those focusing on the transnational capitalist class, the focus is on the material 
implications of promoting a form of globalisation driven by neoliberal norms when 
the main beneficiary of such ideas is the financial fraction of capital (Robinson 2004: 
51-2). This is something that can easily be seen in the Egyptian case with respect to 
the promotion of capital account liberalisation, and to the development of what 
Galal Amin calls ‘FDI fetish’.170 In the case of core-periphery approaches, the 
emphasis is instead on the national class structure, and thus on the tendency on the 
part of the different components of the ruling bloc to support reforms that are seen 
as serving their interests. This would for example explain the relative ease with 
which the shift in class relations in the countryside was effected, as it pleased both 
the rentier and the infitah components of the ruling bloc. At the same time, it also 
suggests that rifts between these two components might be the reason behind the 
difficult road encountered by the other main neoliberal norm, as the privatisation of 
SOEs which would have clearly favoured the private business component at the 
expense of the public sector component. In fact, the full implementation of this norm 
took place only when the business-oriented group was able to take control of the 
NDP first and then to become extremely influential also within the government. 
On the other hand, these accounts tend to give ideas a backseat role, 
considering them as little more than mediated expressions of class relations. By 
doing this, they are unable to adequately address two important aspects that have 
                                                 
170 Interview with Galal Amin. 
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emerged from the analysis of the empirical material. Firstly, materialist approaches 
do not account convincingly for those cases in which specific ideas outlive the 
material conditions originally producing them, for instance with the disappearance 
of the material pressures promoting them, and despite that material constraints 
would allow for alternative policy paths. In the Egyptian case, this happened for 
example with the relaunch of privatisations in the 2000s. The most common 
objection to this critique is that these neoliberal ideas are subscribed to because they 
are expected to yield material benefits to specific components of the ruling bloc. Yet, 
this argument is dependent on the acceptance of the neoliberal paradigm, as it is 
underpinned by the belief that neoliberal policies are the ones most likely to best 
serve the interests of the rising capitalist oligarchy. In other words, materialist 
approaches underestimate the link between adopting, however instrumentally, a 
specific set of ideas, and the possibility that these ideas will shape perceptions, thus 
influencing interest formation, but also the identification of problems, of potential 
solutions and of expected outcomes of a given process.171 
Secondly, materialist perspectives tend to neglect how the emergence of 
neoliberalism as an ideology played a vital role in making the political battle 
between the infitah bourgeoisie and the public sector an asymmetrical one. The rise 
of neoclassical economists as the best qualified group to provide advice on how the 
economy should be run dramatically redefined the boundaries within which 
economic policy could be conducted (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2000). This 
modification effectively turned the table against the public sector. If the name of the 
game had become market relations with a preference for private actors as self-
interested rational welfare maximisers, then the options available to the army and 
the bureaucracy were limited. They could have accepted the emerging order and 
thus their gradual marginalisation within the ruling bloc; or they could have 
decided to play by the new rules, but with the disadvantage of representing the 
public sector within a changing economic system favouring by definition private 
actors; or lastly they could have taken their chances by pushing towards a rupture 
that would restore their prominent position within the ruling bloc. As we will see in 
the conclusion, the latter option is one of the possible interpretations of how the 
army reacted to the popular protest against Mubarak in January 2011. 
                                                 
171 As Manea (2010: 9) put it, ‘the “instrumental” use of social relations by social actors 




6.3.2. The ideational case: ideas all the way down 
A second set of approaches, ranging from neo-Gramscian studies to more 
mainstream constructivist IPE, would maintain that the modifications experienced 
by the Egyptian political economy are mostly related to a change in ideational 
trends, firstly on the international scale, with the emergence of neoliberal 
hegemony, and then also on the national scale. By the end of the 1980s, the 
prolonged fiscal crisis had produced perceptions of uncertainty and vulnerability, 
putting into question the existing wisdom about the positive role of the state in 
stirring economic development. The economic ideology which had gained 
hegemonic status on the international scale, based exactly on a critique of state 
intervention in the economy, provided a set of solutions at least worth 
experimenting. Whereas in the first phase the adoption of neoliberal ideas might 
have been instrumental, over time these began to influence the way in which 
relevant actors – in the academic, business and policymaking community – 
perceived economic processes. With neoclassical economics becoming the basis of 
the ever more prestigious economic profession, neoliberalism acquired hegemonic 
status also on the national scale, carrying a force of its own which was not reducible 
to material factors, but rather was able to redefine them through cognitive shortcuts 
and biases guiding policies and thus impacting on materiality. 
Ideational approaches are able to highlight at least two aspects that largely go 
unnoticed for materialist accounts. Firstly, they provide a convincing explanation of 
how ideas shape perceptions of what is deemed possible by relevant actors in 
economic policymaking. This was most visible in the already discussed cognitive 
biases characterising policy-making in agriculture. In spite of the fact that several 
experts had suggested that in developing countries land redistribution might have 
been beneficial for agricultural development, the acceptance of the state-market 
dichotomy implied that forms of direct state intervention, such as a law 
redistributing land, would have meant an interference in the market mechanisms 
believed to produce welfare maximisation. Thus, the acceptance of the inner 
primacy of market dynamics prevented the consideration of alternative options. 
Something similar also happened in finance with respect to financialisation in 
general and more specifically the acceptance of Basel II regulations in the banking 
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system. As seen in the survey on the CBE’s task force on Basel II, taking capital 
account liberalisation as desirable and then moving towards a regulatory system of 
the banking sector based on this very assumption prevented from appreciating the 
risks implicit in the policies implemented. In this case, instead of preventing the 
identification of policy alternatives, cognitive biases led to an underestimation of the 
potential side effects related to the adoption of specific policies in a context different 
from the one in which they were elaborated. 
Secondly, accounts focusing on the autonomous role of ideas are successful in 
suggesting why in some cases policies inspired by neoliberalism persisted 
irrespective of material constraints and pressures. Privatisations, both in the 
manufacturing and banking sector, are the best case in point here. Whereas in the 
first phase of reforms divestitures of SOEs had proceeded at a snail’s pace,172 it is 
when material pressures weakened, both internationally from the IMF and the 
World Bank and nationally with respect to sustainable debt levels, that the 
government embraced wholeheartedly the privatisation plan. In this respect, the 
objection that the material constraint of neoliberal globalisation was still there is a 
relatively weak one, as it is exactly during the 2000s that countries which had 
recently defaulted such as Argentina or which had experienced severe currency 
crises such as Brazil started to grow at sustained rates following admittedly 
heterodox policies, mixing up the lessons from the East Asian crisis with their 
national peculiarities. Thus, in these cases, the weakening of the grip of material 
conditions would have allowed for different policies, and it was mostly belief in the 
tenets of neoclassical economics, and in policies stemming thereof, which drove 
Egyptian policy-makers. 
Whereas ideas-focused approaches highlight the weaknesses of materialist 
analyses, they fail in providing an adequate account in at least two crucial respects. 
In the first place, tying the adoption of neoliberal ideas solely to perceptions of 
uncertainty and vulnerability is not enough. On this point, Coxian accounts go 
further than mainstream constructivists, by pointing to the relevance of class 
relations underpinning neoliberalism. They would for example suggest that 
neoliberalism on the international scale has been successful because it is framed in 
such a way as to favour the most mobile form of capital (financial) over the other 
forms in the circuit of capital accumulation (industrial and commercial). However, 
                                                 
172 Roughly until 1996 in industry and until 2004 in the banking sector. 
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with their focus on the emergence of hegemony in the core and then its propagation 
into the periphery, Coxian accounts would fail to account adequately for the 
mobilisation of class fractions in Egypt, with the uncertainty and vulnerability 
correctly highlighted by ideational approaches providing an opportunity for the 
framing of a specific project aiming at empowering private capital owners. In other 
words, the fundamental of question of ‘cui bono’ (Strange 1988), which should 
characterise political economy, is either neglected altogether, as in mainstream 
constructivist IPE, or answered only partially, with reference to the emerging 
nébuleuse on the global scale (Cox 1992: 27). 
The second main problem of ideational approaches is the following: if one 
accepts that compliance with neoliberal ideas in Egypt was instrumental during the 
first phase of reforms, as it appears from the empirical material, where is it that we 
place the tipping point where ideas became a force of their own and a driver of 
economic change? In other words, when one accepts that ideas arise from material 
conditions, and then suggests that ideas do take a life of their own and become an 
autonomous form of causation, it is important to understand what allows such ideas 
to detach themselves from materiality. Referring to the power of ideas only might 
not be enough, particularly in the light of the political battle at the heart of the NDP, 
which suggests that until that moment alternative options might have been 
considered, and only the defeat of the étatist wing allowed for the triumph of 
neoliberal ideas in the Egyptian declination. On this issue, it might be worth paying 
more attention to transformations in class relations, and how this might feed back 
on the role of ideas, as the Gramscian approach based on articulation. 
 
6.3.3. The Gramscian case: materiality meets ideas 
Understanding why and how neoliberalism, and not something else, kicked off 
requires a careful appreciation of material conditions, and especially of class 
relations both on the national and international scale. On the latter, the return of 
global capital since the late 1960s had significantly empowered the financial fraction 
of capital, leading it to become a vocal supporter of worldwide liberalisation of 
capital flows (Helleiner 1994; Robinson 2004). On the national scale, the fiscal crisis 
of the late 1980s led to both unsustainable debt levels and most importantly cash 
shortage for the regime, with the ruling bloc feeling threatened for the first time 
since the 1977 bread riots. While on the one hand the crisis led to accepting 
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conditions imposed by IFIs to relieve the pressure, on the other hand the crisis 
deepened the rift within the ruling bloc on what were clearly class, more than 
generational, grounds. The intersection of these elements led to a first phase of 
reforms mostly based on compliance with, rather than outright acceptance of, 
neoliberal recipes. A notable exception in this respect is the case of agriculture, 
where the new paradigm was successful from the outset. This might be related to 
the fact that there was no serious clash between the various components of the 
ruling bloc on where agricultural policies should go, as landed elites got to benefit 
from the new tenure law, and infitah bourgeoisie and former military officers could 
benefit becoming input suppliers with the withdrawal of state provision. 
Whereas existing accounts tend to identify the exogenous shock of the East 
Asian crisis as the main reason for the slowdown in reforms from the mid-1990s, a 
Gramscian approach also points in the direction of political agency, and more 
specifically of the split of the ruling bloc into the two components that had 
respectively gained and lost from the first wave of reforms. In the eyes of the infitah 
bourgeoisie, the economic rewards derived from liberalisations and privatisations 
had made the ideas underpinning reforms ever more appealing. At the same time, 
following the example of most other neoliberalised economies, it made them 
appreciate the advantages of depoliticising economic policymaking and portray it as 
a technical field where the wisest strategy was to trust the advice of economic 
experts. The establishment of ERF and ECES in the mid-1990s fits into this logic. 
The success in this endeavour to depoliticise economic policy-making 
constitutes the first form of autonomous causation on the part of ideas which fed 
back on material forces. More specifically, accepting economic policy as an 
eminently technical field regulated by market dynamics led to the establishment of 
an uneven playing field, where entrepreneurs are structurally better positioned than 
the other ruling bloc components. If neoliberalism becomes the new common sense 
for the rising capitalist elite, every challenge to its precepts must find a form of 
justification, whereas everything that happens according to its dynamics is 
naturalised and seen as a movement towards the end state of a free-market 
economy in the hands of private sector actors. Such an argument did play a 
significant role in the struggle for political power within the NDP, as it put the 
public sector component in a position where actions to defend its own interests had 
to be justified, whereas the interests of the infitah bourgeoisie, already rising 
 210 
capitalist oligarchy, had become coincident with what was portrayed as the general 
public interest. 
Thus, a shift in class relations on the national scale empowered firstly 
economically and then politically a specific component, leading to the relative 
alignment with prevailing social relations on the international scale discussed in 
Chapter 5 and to the power reconfiguration on the national scale discussed in 
Chapter 4. During this process, ideas played a fundamental, and already relatively 
autonomous, role in allowing for the most outward-oriented component within the 
ruling bloc to gain political prominence.  
With the political shift brought about by the appointment of the Nazif cabinet, 
ideas had a second form of autonomous impact. Neoliberal principles became the 
guidelines by which economic policies were carried out. The benefits expected by 
the new capitalist elite were calculated through a cognitive framing deeply 
embedded in neoliberal norms and assumptions. As a consequence, neoliberalism 
had an autonomous influence on Egyptian economic policy-making by shaping the 
overall problematique, thus defining what was to be thought as an economic issue 
worth tackling, and then identifying potential solutions from within its own 
parameters and thus hiding alternative yet feasible reform paths. This falls squarely 
within the concept of policy paradigm, with the emergence of a new common sense 
among researchers and most of all among the capitalist oligarchy. Albeit it did not 
succeed in becoming hegemonic within wider society, neoliberalism was a powerful 
ideology driving the private sector component of the ruling bloc. 
 
6.4. Articulation III: money, ideology and hegemony as exchange 
Once more, the Gramscian approach developed here suggests to conceptualise the 
relation between material factors and ideas as a form of articulation. Following 
Stuart Hall, we could say that ‘[m]aterial conditions are the necessary but not 
sufficient condition of all historical practice’ (1996b: 147). Thus, material conditions 
are taken as determining in the first instance what could happen in the realm of 
ideas. This form of determination is combined with the relative autonomy enjoyed 
by ideational factors, both in terms of outliving the material conditions producing 
them and in terms of ability to feed back on material conditions themselves, and by 
this influencing their evolution. As in previous forms of articulation, the extent of 
the relative autonomy is defined by shifts in class relations. However, the main 
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difference in this case is that this shift is measured with respect to both the 
reconfiguration of power taking place on the national scale and the relative 
alignment with prevailing class relations on the international scale. But let me 
explain better. 
First of all, also determination in the first instance on the part of material 
conditions takes place both on the international and national scale. With respect to 
the former, the constraints and opportunities to deal with are the ones imposed by 
globalisation, and by the specific neoliberal form that it took under the dominance 
of finance capital. These conditions undoubtedly set the Braudelian ‘limits of the 
possible’, for example preventing any solution to the 1980s fiscal crisis outside of the 
parameters of capitalist development, and at the same time pushing in the direction 
of more integration with the global political economy. On the national scale, the 
limits of the possible were set by social relations prior to the shift in the 
accumulation regime. As already discussed, the ruling bloc rested on an alliance 
between various forms – and degrees – of rentierism, from landlords to various 
sections of the public sector to the dependent bourgeoisie created by infitah. The 
main element holding together these components was arguably the public control 
over the economy, which incidentally also gave the public sector a prominent 
position vis-à-vis the other components of the ruling bloc. Again, this situation 
constituted an objective limit to the ideational underpinnings of potential 
developments that could take place in Egypt. Indeed, one could argue that the 
common ground for the success of neoliberalism as an economic ideology can be 
found right at the intersection of the interests of private capitalists in Egypt and 
those of the neoliberal project on the international scale. 
Within these boundaries, the relative autonomy of ideas has manifested itself 
in two different yet complementary ways. In a conscious form, the affirmation of 
neoclassical models and of neoliberal policies led to a redefinition of the disciplinary 
boundaries with respect to what is considered to be economics, what are its 
problems, the solutions offered and the expected payoff. Thus, the first form of 
feedback on material conditions is visible in the fact that the solutions offered are 
actual policies that once implemented have a concrete impact on material factors. 
These material effects, and the prediction of the expected payoff, might suggest that 
the adoption of neoliberal ideas might be driven by instrumental considerations. 
Whereas this is not to be excluded in principle, and indeed is also quite likely, we 
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should also pay attention to the performative power of academic disciplines, and 
particularly of economics. Ideas that were originally implemented out of 
instrumental considerations can become a causative factor on their own, in this case 
in the direction of reinforcing the material changes wished for by their supporters. 
In this form ideas become an autonomous policy driver, identifying some problems 
and neglecting some others, privileging some solutions and overlooking 
alternatives, and by doing this eventually reshaping those very material conditions 
from which they arose, thus effectively outliving them. This is one of the strongest 
effects of ideologies, intended in their strongest sense as a system of justification and 
mystification of existing social relations. 
The relative autonomy of ideas can also be seen in a series of unintended – or 
at least seriously underestimated – consequences on material conditions. Two of 
them deserve mention here. On the one hand, within the ruling bloc, the material 
impact of the application of neoliberal ideas was a substantial deepening of the 
division between private capital owners and the public sector component, with the 
deriving upset of the delicate balance between the different components within the 
regime. On the other hand, with respect to social relations at large, neoliberalism 
produced a phenomenal concentration of power in the hands of what I have termed 
capitalist oligarchy, with the impoverishment of both the middle class and the 
poorer strata of society, to be identified in the working class, the peasantry and the 
increasing number of urban dwellers relying on the informal labour market. 
What does this tell us about hegemony conceived following Sassoon (2000: 6) 
as a combination of material and ideational exchanges? The attempt to import a 
hegemonic project originally developed in the core economies has had devastating 
consequences on the Egyptian social structure. The precarious balance between the 
various components of the regime was shattered, leading to predatory practices on 
the part of ‘reformist’, i.e. private capitalist, wing, which displayed a ‘winner-takes-
all’ attitude both economically, occupying all the privatised sectors and effectively 
exercising what previously were state functions in the economy, and also politically, 
becoming the most powerful component in the Nazif cabinet. At the same time, 
even the dimension of exchange, populist or otherwise, with respect to the wider 
Egyptian society largely disappeared. The end result was ideological dominance 
that failed to be backed by any material dimension of exchange, thus being once 




This chapter has discussed the power of economic ideas in bringing about the 
emergence of a new policy paradigm, and effectively of a new economic ideology, 
in Egypt. This has been done by referring to the crucial role played by the two main 
economic think tanks, conceived here as organic intellectuals, in changing the tide 
with respect to the reception of neoclassical models and neoliberal policies in the 
economic policymaking community. The emergence of neoliberalism as a new 
policy paradigm, and eventually as a new form of economic common sense, has 
been discussed with respect to the internalisation of two fundamental norms 
characterising neoliberalism. On the one hand, the preference for the private over 
the public sector on grounds of economic efficiency. On the other hand, the 
preference for capital account liberalisation over capital controls. The performative 
power of embracing neoclassical economics and neoliberal policies has been 
highlighted with respect to the cognitive biases produced by the acceptation of the 
two norms above and to the feedback on material conditions produced by the 
implementation of policies inspired by neoliberal ideas. At the same time, I have 
also tried to follow the power-politics dimension implicit in this battle, with specific 
reference to the political struggles within the ruling NDP. 
On the one hand, materialist accounts tend to interpret this relevance of ideas 
in terms of their functionality to a class-based project largely defined in materialist 
terms. Whereas this is certainly a dimension worth considering, and witnessed 
empirically by the actual economic and political rise of the oligarchy of private 
capitalists supporting neoliberal ideas, these accounts tend somehow to neglect the 
performative power of economics, and the ability of neoliberal ideas to reshape 
material conditions themselves, both in intended and unintended ways. On the 
other hand, ideational accounts suggest correctly the persistence of policies inspired 
by neoliberal ideas, and thus the persistence of neoliberalism as a policy paradigm, 
in the face of changed in the material conditions that originally produced them. 
However, these accounts are limited by their inability to answer convincingly the 
question of who benefits from the dominance of these ideas, with constructivists 
somewhat neglecting the social forces supporting and opposing such ideas, thus 
falling back on an eminently consensual and persuasive path to the affirmation of 
neoliberalism, and authors inspired by Cox answering the question almost 
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exclusively in terms of the hegemonic interests of financial capital on the 
international scale. 
Through the method of articulation, the Gramscian approach developed here 
is able to keep together these two parts of the picture, framing them together in 
terms of a determination in the first instance on the part of material factors that 
constrains but does not prevent the relative autonomy of ideas, which eventually 
feeds back on material conditions themselves. At the same time, ideational factors 
do not lose their social grounding, as the degree of their relative autonomy is related 
to shifts in the social structure, thus with ideas becoming relatively more 
autonomous when the reconfiguration of political power follows the shifts in class 
relations, and when the latter lead to a relative alignment with respect to prevailing 
class relations on the international scale. 
When we link this relation between material and ideational factors to the 
definition of hegemony, on this dimension we see the affirmation of an ideology 
that had a divisive effect both within the ruling bloc and in the wider social fabric. 
At the same time, the political power gained by neoliberal ideas and by their 
supporters did not translate into any substantial material benefits for the rest of the 
population. Thus, if hegemony is conceived in terms of a material and ideational 
exchange, it appears that neoliberalism in Egypt fell far short of being hegemonic. 
Indeed, this appears the main finding of these three empirical chapters. A politico-
economic system that appeared remarkably stable, having restored the path to 
economic growth and enjoying relatively untroubled times in political terms, was in 
fact experiencing on all the three dimensions studied a dramatic erosion of the 




ARTICULATING HEGEMONIES?  
GRAMSCI, NEOLIBERALISM IN CRISIS AND TAHRIR SQUARE 
 
 
Neoliberal authoritarianism as passive revolution: key findings 
Four main findings have emerged from adopting the articulation approach in the 
study of the political economy of reforms in Egypt in the past two decades. Firstly, 
the Egyptian economy changed significantly in a neoliberal direction. The fiscal 
crisis of the late 1980s provided a must-take opportunity for IFIs to push the set of 
reforms that since the beginning of the decade had increasingly been adopted in 
several developing countries, with the aim of transforming them into liberalised 
export-oriented economies. Despite considerable disagreements, both 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment measures were effectively 
carried out in Egypt, initiating a shift in the accumulation regime from the étatist one 
that had dominated since Nasser to a neoliberal regime. Relying on the definition of 
neoliberalisation provided by Harvey, we have seen that what happened in Egypt 
amounts to such a process. In particular, the late 1980s crisis was managed and 
manipulated by the state in order to open up the economic system, through a 
combination of liberalisations and privatisations that provided the conditions for 
the rise of a capitalist oligarchy. At the same time, slow but steady reforms in the tax 
code, together with a much greater reliance on the financial sector, produced a 
redistribution in favour of large capital owners leading to a further increase in 
inequality. Whereas these trends were partially obscured by the persistence of 
previous patterns, particularly with reference to the continued dominance of 
informal networks over formal networks, it is difficult to maintain that the 
penetration of neoliberalism in the Egyptian economy was not a game-changing 
event. 
Secondly, the Gramscian approach based on articulation suggests that the 
form of neoliberalism emerging in Egypt is considerably different from the versions 
seen in most other countries. The main common threads with neoliberalism as we 
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came to know it in Western Europe and Latin America are to be found in an 
economy that is now mostly owned by private actors, in economic policies shaped 
by neoclassical economic theory, in the significant rise of the financial sector as a key 
engine of economic growth, and in the increased concentration of wealth and power 
in the hands of a small minority. Yet, the Egyptian way to neoliberalism is 
characterised by peculiarities deriving from the articulation between a shifting 
accumulation regime and the existing political regime, and the relations of forces 
embedded therein. In particular, it was discussed how on the institutional level one 
can see the increased relevance of privatisations and liberalisations, but also the 
political rise of the capitalist oligarchy and of select technocrats unified by a 
neoliberal outlook. Informal mechanisms, on the other hand, show the capturing of 
most privatised companies and liberalised markets by infitah business 
conglomerates as well as the construction of business alliances to raise informal 
barriers to entry in the most profitable sectors. The articulation of these factors 
amounted to a hybridisation of neoliberalism, which was combined with practices 
typical of the previous corporatist arrangement. At the same time, this articulation 
produced a reorganisation of authoritarian rule, with a redistribution of power 
within the ruling bloc that sanctioned the political rise of the new capitalist 
oligarchy. The emerging politico-economic configuration is termed neoliberal 
authoritarianism, and is characterised by the fact that both constituents of the 
compound concept are themselves transformed by articulation. 
Thirdly, the spatial sources of neoliberalism evolved over time, with the 
articulation of international and national scale leading to a passive revolution with 
the aim of restructuring the accumulation regime while changing as little as possible 
in the political regime. In the early 1990s economic reforms informed by the 
Washington Consensus were mostly a project of international organisations pushed 
on the Egyptian government in the wake of a severe fiscal crisis. At the same time, 
already during the years of macroeconomic stabilisation, the ability of the regime 
with respect to delaying, diluting and in some cases resisting specific measures 
suggests that the national scale was never merely a ‘transmission belt’ as maintained 
by Cox and Robinson. Rather, as the most relevant actor on the nodal scale, the state 
articulated pressures towards economic reform in a neoliberal direction with its 
imperative of maintaining, and whenever possible strengthen, the stability of the 
political regime. As class relations began to shift in favour of private capital as a 
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consequence of the first round of reforms, the national scale increasingly took 
control of the reform process, pursuing what had become its own task of pushing 
forward neoliberal transformations while preserving authoritarian rule under a 
changed balance of forces. Thus, the emergence of neoliberal authoritarianism was 
itself the result of the passive revolution carried out by the state. 
Lastly, if over time neoliberalism became more of an endogenous process, the 
study of the articulation of material and ideational factors suggests that economic 
ideas played a major role in this internalisation of neoliberalism. The study of the 
two main economic think-tanks in Egypt shows their role in the emergence in the 
capitalist elite of neoliberalism as a new economic common sense, taken for granted 
yet at the same time ridden with inconsistencies. This rise of neoliberalism as an 
ideology had far-reaching consequences on material conditions too. On the one 
hand, neoliberalism provided cognitive boundaries to understand what is to be 
considered as ‘economic’, relying on neoclassical economics to draw the line 
between ‘the economy’ and other social activities which economists, and economic 
policymakers, should not be concerned with. On the other hand, it also provided 
cognitive biases that identified and framed problems arising in the economic sphere 
and suggested policy solutions to them. This was seen for example with respect to 
the embedded, and often unreflexive, preference for private over public sector and 
for capital account liberalisation. The material consequences of these ideas became 
visible once policies following neoliberal principles are implemented. If neoliberal 
reforms were adopted mostly out of compliance during the first wave of reforms, 
over time belief came to play a more central role, and once again in concomitance 
with the rise of the capitalist oligarchy. Thus, over time neoliberalism developed as 
an ideology strongly influencing economic policymaking in Egypt. 
Linking these findings back to Mohieldin’s comment at the start of the thesis, 
it is possible to say that this time was different because neoliberalism had become a 
powerful force in the Egyptian political economy. Yet, the penetration of 
neoliberalism was mediated by articulation on different levels. This led to the 
emergence of a neoliberal authoritarian regime as a result of a passive revolution by 
which the imperatives of global capital accumulation were related to the objective of 
maintaining authoritarian rule. This time was different because the shift in class 
relations produced by these reforms was over time further reinforced by the rise of 
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neoliberalism as an economic ideology, and eventually produced a combination that 
would prove lethal for Mubarak’s regime. 
 
Back to Gramsci: outline of the articulation approach 
Whereas Cox’s interpretation of Gramsci aimed at establishing a critical theory of 
IR, the theoretical aim of this study was considerably less ambitious. More than 
developing an alternative theory, my intention was to explore how Gramsci can 
provide a sound starting point for establishing an alternative method for studying 
changes and continuities in the global political economy. Following Gramsci’s 
suggestion, rather than focusing on select concepts that might provide the 
grounding for a theory, I have looked for the leitmotiv of his thinking and tried to 
trace down its methodological basis. This quest has led to develop a Gramscian 
approach based on articulation that has been illustrated with reference to the 
Egyptian case. 
The leitmotiv of Gramsci’s thinking was identified in the ‘philosophy of praxis’, 
which in its very name contains a manifesto for the method of articulation, as it 
implies the coexistence and mutual constitution of theory and practice. At the same 
time, when understood as historical dialectical materialism, it already provides a 
crucial guideline which allows to understand articulation as determination in the 
first instance and relative autonomy. In the notebooks, Gramsci recalls Marx’s 
preface to The Critique of Political Economy when arguing that ‘a society does not set 
itself tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions have not already been 
incubated’ (Gramsci 1971: 106, Q15II§17). Hence, while necessary for our 
understanding of society and for our ability to act purposefully within it, social 
theories must be based on existing material conditions. At the same time, in that it 
allows theories to feed back on material conditions and eventually influence their 
evolution, the philosophy of praxis already contains what is considered to be the 
main innovation brought by Gramsci to twentieth century Marxism: the 
transformation of the increasingly rigid and mechanic base-superstructure 
metaphor into a more flexible relation where superstructural developments produce 
transformations at the structural level. Thus, Gramsci conceives the relation 
between structure and superstructure as a never-ending interaction whose results 
are by definition provisional, in a dialectic where the structure sets the boundaries 
for action which to an extent are constantly redrawn by actions themselves on the 
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level of superstructures. This is best embodied in the concept of ‘historical bloc’, 
with the former term referring to the contingent conditions underlying any given 
relation between structure and superstructure and the latter referring to the 
inescapable relation between the realm of production and the realm of state and 
civil society relations. 
This work maintains that a disaggregation of the different instances of the 
structure-superstructure relation is most helpful when adopting the articulation 
approach to study the global political economy. Such choice dispels even more 
forcefully the risks of economic determinism. This is done by showing how the 
globalising tendencies of capital accumulation are fragmented, refracted and also 
subverted on three different dimensions, entailing the interaction of respectively: 
the economic and the political, the international and the national, the material and 
the ideational. In this respect, the main contribution of the articulation approach 
developed here to critical IPE lies in the chance of retaining the structural grounding 
by acknowledging the shaping power held by social relations of production, while 
at the same time suggesting in which forms their mediation on the realm of the 
superstructures leads to a fragmentation and transformation of the logic of capital 
accumulation. In other words, the articulation approach allows to bring respectively 
the political, the national, the ideational back in – to use a fashionable expression – 
eschewing economistic, globalist and vulgar materialist tendencies. 
The potential of this approach has been illustrated with reference to the 
Egyptian case, with an eye to how transformations on these three dimensions have 
influenced the constitution, reproduction and trasformation of hegemony, 
undoubtedly the Gramscian concept most used in IR and IPE. Because of limitations 
regarding the research tools available and because of the historically prominent 
position of the state in economy and society in the Middle East, this research has 
mostly focused on the state, considered both as a relatively autonomous actor and 
as an arena within which other social groups struggle for relevance. However, the 
focus on the state in the specific Egyptian case need not imply the impossibility of 
extending the articulation approach to the study of other instances of the political, 
the national and the ideational. 
To put it in the simplest possible way, the adoption of neoliberal reforms, 
while itself realised by political actors, national and international, on the basis of the 
acceptance of or compliance with some economic ideas, acts as a determination in 
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the first instance on the part of the economic, the international, the material. Yet, the 
other three poles in these interactive relations – the political, the national, the 
ideational – become significantly more relevant as the class struggle on the national 
scale evolves in favour of the social group initially empowered by reforms. Let me 
discuss this statement further with reference to what happens on each of the three 
forms of articulation. 
 
Economic-political. Whereas transformations in the economic structure determine in 
the first instance the boundaries within which political forces can act, it is the latter, 
with their struggle to achieve their aims, to define the final outcome of the reform 
process. As mentioned in the introduction and hopefully substantiated in Chapter 4, 
this weaker meaning of relative autonomy is complemented by a stronger one. More 
specifically, the very actions of political forces do feed back on the economic 
structure, eventually reshaping – either narrowing down or widening – the 
possibilities for future action. 
The thesis has focused on two political factors which have a particular bearing 
in the Egyptian case but also retain wider applicability. Firstly, I have focused on the 
form of political regime, and thus have highlighted that knowing if reforms are made 
in an authoritarian or a democratic regime makes a difference. Certainly because of 
the tendency to focus on the North Atlantic, this is an aspect somewhat overlooked 
by most neo-Gramscian approaches. Yet, the type of political regime does matter 
when it comes to the form taken by the accumulation regime. Because of the lack of 
meaningful political participation, authoritarian regimes need a working regime of 
capital accumulation even more than democracies do, or they must be committed to 
systematically resort to coercion, in a pattern that is however very unlikely to be 
sustainable in the long run. In this respect, the bigger autonomy that an 
authoritarian regime usually enjoys with respect to its society is counterbalanced by 
the imperative of economic growth in order to gain legitimacy. 
Secondly, I have also focused on changes within the political regime, and thus on 
those adjustments that might appear as minor, but that in the Egyptian case turned 
out to be of great relevance. In this respect, we have seen the empowerment of the 
capitalist oligarchy acting as a form of determination in the first instance. The shift 
towards an accumulation regime more attuned to the interests of this section of the 
ruling bloc also had repercussions on relations in the political regime. Rather than 
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interpreting it as the necessary consequence of structural modifications, thus falling 
back into economic determinism, I have tried to emphasise the contingent nature of 
the political struggle, which saw the capitalist oligarchy organising itself 
economically, politically and ideationally. Despite structural shifts were already 
pointing in this direction, it was political struggle that led to the final outcome of 
neoliberal authoritarianism. This relative autonomy of the political manifested itself 
in the forms of hybridisation by which the new accumulation regime was itself 
transformed by articulation with old practices. In the Egyptian case, the main reason 
for this is arguably that the infitah bourgeoisie turned into capitalist oligarchy was 
not an autonomous and independent class, but was rather one engineered by the 
state. Following from this, the capitalist elite had an interest in preserving all the 
privileges enjoyed under the previous regime and articulate them with the benefits 
deriving from the new. Hence, whereas the outcome was contingent on the political 
struggle here and now, it was still related to social relations of production in that the 
form and extent of relative autonomy were determined in the first instance by pre-
existing class relations and the transformations they experienced. 
 
International-national. This study has discussed at length how the affirmation of 
neoliberalism on the international scale is to be considered a shaping event that 
limits the field of action for the ruling bloc on the national scale. More specifically, 
the ever-greater integration of the global economy on neoliberal terms altered the 
conditions for successful capital accumulation on the national scale, pushing the 
Egyptian government to pursue the strategy of passive revolution discussed in 
Chapter 5. In this respect, passive revolution can be seen as a form of adaptation to 
the pressures of the international. 
At the same time, passive revolution is also the agential process by which 
relative autonomy is exerted, providing the conditions for the domestication of 
neoliberalism, that is: for its adaptation to the social, economic and political 
conditions of the spatial scale where it is to be implemented. This study has focused 
on two forms of domestication. The first is a weaker form, and consists in the 
national scale becoming gradually more important as a nodal scale as 
neoliberalisation unfolds. In the first phase, the leaders of the reform process were 
clearly international organisations and donors. As the faction of the ruling bloc that 
benefited most from reforms began to internalise neoliberal norms and practices, the 
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path towards neoliberalisation became eminently driven by Egyptian social forces, 
and particularly by the most outward-oriented fraction of national capital, 
increasingly represented in parliament and government particularly after 2004. 
The second form of domestication, and thus of relative autonomy, is a stronger 
one, and manifests itself in the form of variations to the original project of 
neoliberalisation promoted by IFIs and donors. This study has focused more 
specifically on two mechanisms by which such variations were produced. On the 
one hand, particularly in the first phase, we have seen several instances of key 
actors on the national scale resisting measures whose implementation was 
perceived as potentially detrimental to regime stability and to the prominent 
position of the ruling bloc. In some cases this took the form of delays in the 
implementation of measures such as the floating of the Egyptian pound or the 
privatisation of state-owned banks. In other cases, some measures were dropped 
altogether, for example with respect to enhancing competition in agriculture and 
manufacturing. In this way, relative autonomy as domestication became the strategy 
by which the national scale influenced the timing, sequencing and in some cases 
also the content of reforms. This was particularly evident for example in the 
privileging of trade liberalisation over internal market liberalisation, as much as in 
the firmness showed when implementing various forms of dispossession which was 
not replicated in the pursuit of unfettered state withdrawal from the economy. In 
this respect, domestication served as a form of deradicalisation of the potentially 
disruptive impact of neoliberal reforms on regime stability. 
On the other hand, particularly once the leadership in the reform process 
shifted in the hands of the national scale, and of the cabinet in the particular, 
reforms began to include genuinely Egyptian elements that made them better suited 
to the local conditions and less threatening to the ruling bloc. We have seen two 
instances of this ‘Egyptianisation’ of neoliberalism in the discussion and eventually 
adoption of a private-public partnership law and in the launch of a state-led 
programme of industrialisation. These innovations were justified with reference to 
two arguments that had some success also with neoliberal hardliners in IFIs. On the 
one hand, as Mohieldin said during our interview, ‘Egypt is no country for shock 
therapy’. On the other hand, ‘economic reforms cannot be imposed following a one-
size-fits-all approach’. These two considerations gave the ‘reformist’ wing enough 
leverage for devising and pursuing the Egyptian way to neoliberalism. 
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As with the articulation of economic and political factors, pre-existing class 
relations, and the transformations they experienced with respect to spatial scale, 
determined in the first instance both the weaker and the stronger form of relative 
autonomy. For the former, the shift in leadership became possible in the light of the 
relative alignment that saw Egyptian private capital rising to prominence, albeit 
more as an alliance between its various components rather than as the dominance of 
financial capital seen elsewhere. With respect to the stronger form of relative 
autonomy, the resistance to new elements and the persistence of old ones was 
determined in the first instance by previous class relations, with the attempt on the 
part of the capitalist oligarchy to preserve its rent while at the same time 
consolidating its position through the domination of newly created markets. 
 
Material-ideational. Conceiving articulation as determination in the first instance and 
relative autonomy is of great help also in the third instance of the structure-
superstructure relation. In this case, the distinction between material and ideational 
factors allows to look at both international and national forms of the influence 
material conditions have on ideational developments. Thus, on the one hand one 
must note the constraints and pressures that neoliberal globalisation put on the 
political discourse. On the other hand, a delimitation of the boundaries for 
ideational developments was set also by pre-existing class relations and by the 
accumulation regime regulating them on the national scale. Indeed, this 
convergence between the neoliberal hegemonic project on the international scale 
and the interests of the main factions of the ruling bloc further limited the 
possibilities for effective discursive agency. Form and extent of relative autonomy 
were once again determined in the first instance by prior class relations and by the 
transformations these experienced. 
Yet, in Chapter 6 we have seen how ideas did gain a relatively autonomous 
role. Particularly, this study has focused on two closely related forms of conscious 
relative autonomy of ideas. The first form manifests itself in the ability of the 
neoliberal discourse in producing a depoliticisation of economic policymaking. With 
reference to policymaking in agriculture, manufacturing and especially finance, we 
have seen how by delegating to experts the choice of the economic model to follow, 
the room for political discussion effectively shrank, even though it did not 
disappear altogether. 
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The second form of relative autonomy relates to the adoption of neoclassical 
economics and neoliberal principles as guidelines for effective economic policy-
making. In the Egyptian case, this produced a reshaping of the boundaries for social 
action, by reframing what ‘the economy’ is, how it should be treated as an ‘object’ of 
study, and what are the desirable outcomes that economic policies should pursue. 
By looking at the function of clarification, organisation and diffusion of 
neoliberalism on the part of the two most prominent economic think tanks in Egypt, 
we have seen how the increasing dominance of neoclassical economics and 
neoliberal policies translated into reliance on cognitive biases reflecting the 
internalisation of normative choices. This was studied with specific reference to two 
distinctly neoliberal norms: the preference for private over public sector actors in 
the economy, and the preference for capital account liberalisation over capital 
controls. The affirmation of these two norms, albeit initially dictated by 
instrumental considerations, eventually reshaped the whole discourse about 
economic policy in such a way as to structurally empower the capitalist oligarchy, 
effectively leading to an identification of the interests of outward-oriented private 
capital with those of the Egyptian economy as a whole. 
At the same time, the relative autonomy of ideas in producing consequences 
on the material structure also had unintended effects. This could be considered in 
terms of lack of political articulation between the economic policy discourse being 
adopted and the material conditions characterising Egyptian society. The main 
unintended effect of the adoption of neoliberal ideas was the polarisation brought 
about both within the ruling bloc, between the private and public sector component, 
and in wider society, between the minority reaping the benefits of reforms, and the 
majority impoverished by successive waves of dispossession and by reforms more 
generally. Both these unintended consequences had a fundamental role in 
undermining the basis of support for Mubarak’s regime. 
 
In sum, whereas relatively coherent in its abstract-theoretical form, once translated 
in concrete-complex terms (Jessop 1982: 211-20; 2010: 187-8) – and thus once 
articulated with politics, territoriality and ideas – the logic of capital accumulation 
in the age of neoliberal globalisation becomes much more fragmented and varied 
than is often assumed in critical IPE. Indeed, the forms of hybridisation and 
domestication of neoliberalism could well be enriched by the study of other forms of 
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the political, the national and the ideational that were not treated in this work. For 
example, the informal one-party system dominated by the NDP prevented an 
appreciation of the role that political partisanship might have on the articulation of 
economic and political factors. Similarly, the focus on institutional relations in the 
study of interscalar articulation translated into a neglect of the role of non-
institutional channels, and particularly of private capital, in influencing the forms of 
domestication of neoliberalism on the national scale. Lastly, the impact of the 
structure could be further mediated by articulation among different discourses, 
which have been overlooked to focus exclusively on the economic policy discourse. 
In the Egyptian case, this might have meant analysing how neoliberalism interacted 
with the various Islamist discourses and to what effect. Yet, already in the form 
delineated here, the articulation approach provides the tools to develop a tentative 
account of the Egyptian revolution. 
 
Hegemony unravelling: a longer term perspective, 1952-2010 
What is the relevance of the findings brought to light by the articulation approach 
for the constitution of hegemony in Egypt? Before addressing this question, it is 
imperative to put into historical perspective the transformations Egypt experienced 
in the past two decades. Thus, a brief recollection of the constitution of hegemony 
under Nasser and Sadat is needed. Under Nasser, articulation between the 
economic and the political produced the emergence of a state capitalist 
accumulation regime, committed to both equality and growth, while at the same 
time saw the gradual elimination of most of the pre-existing elites and the 
consolidation of an authoritarian regime. Without allowing for meaningful political 
participation, regime legitimacy almost exclusively relied on economic performance 
and redistribution. With respect to interscalar articulation, Egypt was able to 
develop a positional rent by sitting on the fence in the confrontation between 
superpowers and taking the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. These were 
the times of Keynesianism as the dominant economic policy discourse, with strong 
capital controls containing the thrust of global capital accumulation, thus allowing 
for forms of articulation where the autonomy of the national scale was almost 
unconstrained. On the articulation of material and ideational factors, Nasser’s 
regime relied on the populist appeal of its welfare measures and on a strong 
tradition of economic nationalism, bolstered in the first decade by Pan-Arabist 
 226 
ambitions. All of this was underpinned by a ruling bloc including the ever-
expanding public sector, with the army taking a central position, and allegedly 
industrial workers and the peasants, away from the ‘half-per-cent society’ of 
colonial Egypt. Whereas there was certainly a strong rhetorical element in this 
inclusion of lower social classes, what matters most here is that it somehow worked. 
This suggests that Nasser was able to establish a distinctly Egyptian form of 
hegemony. It was certainly not an ‘integral’ hegemony, as this would not need to 
limit political participation in order to achieve its objectives. Yet, despite the 
extensive use of repression, particularly towards the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
regime was not predominantly based on coercion, as it was able to provide both 
material and symbolic benefits to most strata of society. For this reason I deem 
reasonable to speak of an hegemonic system being in place in Egypt between 1952 
and 1967. 
The Six-Day War brought this phase to an abrupt end, as witnessed by the 30 
March Programme in 1968, which constitutes a first relaxation of the state’s grip on 
the national economy (Bush 1999: 15). Under Sadat, despite the accumulation 
regime remained an étatist one, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is already possible to 
detect some transformations occurring in the articulation between the economic and 
the political. In particular, infitah started a process of economic and political 
liberalisation that, despite weakened on both dimensions, spurred social changes 
that would produce a first reorganisation of power within the ruling bloc and in 
society as a whole. The most relevant transformation was arguably the creation of 
the infitah bourgeoisie, which became a junior partner of the public sector in the 
ruling bloc. On the international-national dimension, the peace with Israel and the 
realignment in the Western camp were instrumental in bringing about a mass 
consumer society, but at the same time did not help in winning the support of the 
masses. On the other hand, the rise of neoliberalism on the international scale 
started to put the Egyptian regime of capital accumulation under severe pressure. 
Yet, the vital strategic importance of Egypt in the Middle East peace process was 
used to good effect to resist pressures towards more thoroughgoing economic 
reform. With respect to the articulation of material conditions and ideas, after the 
1979 elections the populist discourse inherited from Nasserism was replaced by 
political demobilisation, which opened the way to the resurgence of Islamist groups. 
In his first decade in power, Mubarak continued on this route. The economic 
 227 
liberalism underpinning infitah was largely neutralised by the dirigist preferences of 
the still dominant public sector. These transformations also had an impact on the 
constitution of hegemony, particularly as material benefits in the form of welfare 
programmes started to be withdrawn and were only partially replaced by increased 
mass consumption. Thus, hegemony started to decline, and was somehow 
‘fractured’, holding together the ruling bloc but starting to lose the grip on the rest 
of society. 
This broader historical perspective sheds a different light on the main findings 
of this work, suggesting that a gradual unravelling of hegemony on the national 
scale was already taking place, and that this trend was only accelerated by the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms. Transformations produced by articulation on 
each of the three dimensions appear to support this view. Firstly, the articulation of 
the economic and the political shows how neoliberal reforms, by promoting and 
reinforcing the rise of a capitalist oligarchy and conversely weakening both its 
partners within the ruling bloc and the rest of the population, produced a 
reorganisation of political power whose stability was more apparent than actual. If 
the success of a hegemonic project is dependent on its ability to relate to an existing 
or prospective accumulation strategy, and to the social relations underlying it, then 
the rising capitalist elite fell short of fostering this link, relying more on the 
predatory practices identified in Chapter 4 than on its potential leadership of a new 
hegemonic project. 
Secondly, on the spatial dimension, the affirmation of neoliberalism on the 
international scale spurred a state-led passive revolution on the national scale by 
which the accumulation regime was transformed in the direction suggested by 
globalising capital and its main international supporters. At the same time, this 
reliance on an accumulation strategy prevalent on the international scale was not 
articulated with a national hegemonic project. If in Chapter 1 we emphasised the 
importance of the social basis of hegemony on the national scale, then the rising 
capitalist oligarchy was unsuccessful on this level too, with the neoliberal project 
being carried out with the only aim of favouring the narrow interests of a social 
group rather than also in the attempt of stabilising political rule. 
Thirdly, with respect to the articulation of material and ideational factors, the 
rise of neoliberalism as an economic ideology has been discussed with reference to 
the academic, research and policy-making community. Yet, beyond these areas 
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increasingly influenced by the power of the capitalist elite, neoliberalism proved 
divisive both in the ruling bloc and in the wider society. In the former, this 
happened mostly because neoliberalism pitted the public and private sector 
components one against the other, thus creating a latent conflict that jeopardised the 
precarious balance ensuring regime stability. In the latter, the divisiveness of 
neoliberalism was rooted on its material consequences, bringing sizeable benefits to 
a small stratum and impoverishing the rest of the population. In this respect, the 
neoliberal turn hampered the effectiveness of hegemony-as-exchange discussed in 
Chapter 1. This was a further element suggesting how the sources of hegemony in 
Egypt, already weakened by infitah, had gradually been drained by neoliberal 
reforms. 
Transformations on the dimensions evaluated by this work suggest that 
national hegemony in Egypt experienced a substantial erosion since the 1980s, 
which accelerated dramatically since the adoption of stabilisation and adjustment 
measures. If under Nasser hegemony was not ‘integral’, it was considerably 
successful, especially after the Suez crisis. Infitah produced a fracturing of the 
system, still hegemonic in the face of the ruling bloc, but increasingly less so 
towards the rest of the population. It is only with neoliberal reforms, though, that 
hegemony on the national scale effectively fails, providing the conditions for the fall 
of Mubarak. 
 
Hegemony at home and abroad: the interscalar articulation of crises 
Focusing on the transformations of hegemony on the national scale, this work has 
neglected changes occurring on the international scale. In these concluding remarks 
some considerations on the crisis of neoliberal regimes of capital accumulation 
worldwide are due, particularly as they suggest two sets of considerations. On the 
one hand, discussing the interscalar articulation of hegemonies allows to appraise in 
which conditions the decision of relevant actors on the national scale to rely on an 
accumulation strategy prevalent on the international scale might work or not, and 
why. On the other hand, it complements the main argument of this thesis and 
moves towards developing an account of what happened last year in Egypt. More 
specifically, while the hybrid and ‘domesticated’ form of neoliberalism developed in 
Egypt provided the conditions for a hegemonic crisis on the national scale, the crisis 
of neoliberalism on the international scale produced a further exacerbation of 
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conditions within Egypt, effectively turning what was a latent hegemonic crisis into 
an actual one. 
In hard times such as the ones Egypt was facing in the late 1980s, the decision 
to rely more heavily on an accumulation regime prevalent on the international scale 
was arguably the most promising way to go. While defusing pressures coming from 
international actors, economic liberalisation could have brought benefits in terms of 
economic performance, and by this might have increased regime legitimacy on the 
national scale. The improvements displayed by Egypt with respect to its 
macroeconomic indicators during the two waves of neoliberal reforms seem to 
corroborate this argument. If one looks at the peak years of the two waves of 
reforms, respectively in 1997 and 2008, aggregate indicators paint a rather rosy 
picture: the economy was growing at a sustained rate (5.5 per cent in 1997, 7.2 in 
2008), budget deficit was under control (1.6 in 1997, 6.6 in 2008), large capital 
inflows seemed to provide the preconditions for successful long-term development. 
Thus, neoliberalism as a strategy of capital accumulation was working remarkably 
well for Egypt. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, together with sustained growth 
neoliberalism has also produced a shrinking of most sections of the middle class and 
an impoverishment of both working class and peasantry. Thus, the benefits of a 
regime that was successful in its main task – i.e.: sheer capital accumulation – were 
not felt by most of the Egyptian population. Here arguably lies the key problem of 
relying on the neoliberal accumulation regime prevalent on the international scale: 
to be successful and sustainable in the long run, it has to be weaved into the social 
fabric of the country adopting it. In this case, articulation is more a political strategy 
that the ruling class of a given country has to put into practice to allow the 
internalisation of a growth model also in its political and ideational components. 
Only in this way political rule on the national scale has the chance of becoming 
hegemonic, under the leadership of a specific class, or fraction thereof. 
When one relates the adoption of neoliberal policies to the unravelling of 
hegemony on the national scale discussed in the previous section, the failure of the 
Egyptian capitalist elite to fulfil its hegemonic potential becomes apparent. 
Liberalisations and privatisations inspired predatory behaviours on the part of the 
capitalist oligarchy both in the newly created marketplaces and in the political 
arena. It was apparent that the rising section of the ruling bloc was not planning, at 
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least in the short run, to give up part of its immediate interests in order to 
accommodate some of the material and symbolic demands of other social forces, 
stabilising the regime in the long run. In other words, the only social group with the 
potential of becoming hegemonic either had no interest in constructing a new 
hegemony on the national scale, or was planning to move in this direction in a 
second phase, when its prominent position would become unassailable. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the following financial turmoil meant 
that no long-run hopes and calculations would apply anymore. If on the national 
scale neoliberalism had eroded the basis of hegemony, the global crisis had put 
neoliberalism into question on the global scale. In the Egyptian case, this meant that 
the incipient hegemonic crisis was compounded by a worldwide crisis of the regime 
towards which capital accumulation in the country had been redirected over the 
previous two decades. Whereas the aggregate indicators reacted reasonably well, 
the delayed impact of global recession became increasingly unsustainable, 
particularly for the poorer strata.173 This was witnessed by the change in the social 
composition and in the demands of protests. The Kefaya movement emerged before 
the 2005 elections mostly around civil and political concerns. In contrast, after 2007 
Egypt saw increasing working class mobilisation particularly in the spinning and 
weaving mills in the Nile Delta, the fight for the creation of independent trade 
unions on the part of tax collectors and vocal protests in front of the People’s 
Assembly demanding an increase of minimum wages. Thus, the interaction of the 
global and national crises produced protests which were broader in their social 
composition, and at the same time advanced demands which had to do at least as 
much with socio-economic issues as with civil and political rights.  
Whereas positive economic performance had been able to hide the hegemonic 
crisis and keep it latent for some time, the crisis of the neoliberal model on the 
international scale, and the impossibility of being shielded from its impact, 
remobilised social strata that the regime had become used to consider as passive 
subjects. Horreya (freedom), dimuqratya (democracy) and the oft-forgotten ‘adala 
igtimaya (social justice) provided the platform for an embryonic alliance between 
what Harvey calls dispossessed and discontented (2010: 240-6). The former included 
                                                 
173 Both the moderately positive reaction of macroeconomic indicators and the delay with 
which the crisis hit Egypt are themselves signals of the still partial incorporation of Egypt 
into the global political economy, and thus suggest that neoliberalisation was still on-going 
and incomplete. 
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farmers thrown out of their land after the implementation of Law 96 of 1992, 
industrial workers dismissed after privatisation or still working but with lower real 
wages and crippled rights, informal labourers, and also increasingly 
‘proletarianised’ sections of public sector employees. On the other hand, the 
discontented included those self-employed professionals and relatively well-off 
private sector workers who were not among the losers of neoliberal reforms, but 
were increasingly dissatisfied with the political regime. To some degree, the 
discontented also included the army that increasingly perceived the rise of the 
capitalist oligarchy as a threat. These social transformations, together with some 
genuine underrating of the strength of the protests, and amateurish miscalculations 
on the part of the regime, provided the conditions for revolts to go as far as 
achieving Mubarak’s overthrow. 
When delving into the socio-economic causes of political events, the risk of 
essentialising economic factors is always behind the corner. This was far from being 
my intention here. Still, I am convinced that tracking down the interaction of 
national and international crises, economic and political factors, material and 
ideational elements, allows to put the Egyptian revolution into broader perspective, 
showing how long-term transformations, such as the gradual neoliberalisation of 
the economy and the following increase in inequality, interacted with more 
contingent changes often mentioned, ranging from the effect of global recession to 
the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ page on Facebook to the events of Sidi Bouzid. In much 
the same way the articulation of the latent hegemonic crisis on the national scale 
with the global economic crisis wiped off the table the few remnants of hegemony in 
Egypt, setting the conditions for the overcoming of the Mubarak regime. 
 
After Mubarak: from passive to active revolution, and back? 
To make a long story short, the fall of Mubarak could be interpreted as the 
unintended outcome of a passive revolution gone wrong. The attempt to stabilise 
political rule under changed conditions for capital accumulation failed because it 
was not successful in developing a base for the emergence of a new ruling bloc 
beyond the narrow ‘corporatist’ interests of the capitalist oligarchy, or in providing 
at least a modicum of benefits to subaltern classes. Tahrir Square became the symbol 
of the willingness on the part of a sizeable portion of the Egyptian population to 
take direct action, producing a shift from a passive to an active revolution, which 
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succeeded in overthrowing an autocrat who had been in power for nearly thirty 
years. 
Whereas the demise of Mubarak was hastily hailed as the fall of the main 
obstacle to democratisation, subsequent developments had a sobering effect on 
these optimistic expectations. The military junta that took power in the wake of 
Mubarak’s overthrow appears reluctant to transfer power to civilians, and in the last 
weeks of 2011 launched a full-scale intimidation campaign against NGOs 
investigating human rights abuses. At the same time, the provisional results of the 
ongoing parliamentary elections see the Freedom and Justice Party born from the 
Muslim Brotherhood ahead of the Salafis’ Al Nour as the two most voted parties. 
Finally, in the last couple of months, protests across the country, with Tahrir Square 
once more serving as the symbolic centre of gravity, started to gain new 
momentum, despite the increasingly repressive reaction of police and army forces. 
Within this extremely fluid configuration it would be unwise to predict in 
which direction things will evolve. On the one hand, the rollback towards an étatist 
regime once more dominated by the military cannot be ruled out, particularly in the 
wake of the global crisis of neoliberalism, which the Egyptian military never really 
liked anyway. On the other hand, there is a distinct possibility of matters 
developing in the direction of a ‘neoliberalism without neoliberals’, with the NDP 
businessmen jailed last spring merely serving as scapegoats, and providing the 
chance for a reorganisation and continuation of the passive revolution on the part of 
the other component of the ruling bloc. This second strategy would not necessarily 
be incompatible with some measure of political liberalisation, and possibly also with 
the transfer of power to civilians. 
Whatever the army’s strategy, two factors are bound to play a major role in 
future developments. Firstly, the latest wave of protests and demonstrations shows 
that the mobilisation of part of the middle and lower classes was not a temporary 
phenomenon, but rather one that can be sustained over time. Secondly, albeit 
currently put in the shadows by demands for the junta to step down, the demands 
for greater social justice have also become a durable feature in the Egyptian political 
landscape. Both these elements are likely to persist unless these demands, and the 
social groups expressing them, will be taken seriously by the next Egyptian regime. 
After all, as Fawaz Gerges put it, the exit of Mubarak ‘removes the barrier of fear in 
the region’ (2011). This is already a consolidated result of the Arab Spring, and one 
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